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ABSTRACT
Why do individuals take the extraordinary risk of traveling abroad to fight, and
potentially die, in another country’s conflict? This dissertation compares the motivations behind
the U.S. citizens who fought on behalf of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War
(1936 – 1939) and the Tunisian citizens who fought on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in the Syrian Civil War (2011 – present). The study relies on personal narratives of
individual foreign fighters collected through twelve weeks of archival research at the Tamiment
Library in New York City and the Ernest Hemingway Archives in Boston dedicated to U.S.
foreign fighters and fifteen weeks of field research in Tunisia conducting interviews and
examining interview and focus group data on Tunisian foreign fighters to understand the
competing motivations driving individual decisions to travel and fight for a foreign cause.
This dissertation’s findings suggest that a robust understanding of the foreign fighter
phenomenon must, by necessity, draw on multiple theories and scholarly literatures. Three
factors, social networks, collective identity, and sacred values, are significant across both cases,
suggesting that they are necessary factors driving the foreign fighter phenomenon. A fourth
factor, structural grievances, was significant in explaining the case of Tunisian foreign fighters to
ISIS but not U.S. foreign fighters to the International Brigades, suggesting that the finding is not
robust, but is nevertheless one that is ripe for future research. Personal grievances and economic
incentives were not significant factors in either case. These results potentially establish foreign

xii

fighting as an act that is distinct among different types of collective action, with implications for
both academics and policymakers.

xiii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In September 1937, Carl Orton, a 30-year-old bank teller born in St. Paul, Minnesota, left
behind his family and traveled to Spain to volunteer for the International Brigades fighting on
behalf of the Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936 – 1939). Orton would be reported
“missing in action” (MIA) on March 10, 1938 near Gandesa, Spain during the retreat of the XV
International Brigade after a failed offensive. Seventy-eight years later, in December 2015, a 27year-old bank teller from Alexandria, Virginia, named Mohamed Khweis, also left behind his
family, and traveled to Syria to fight for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Syrian
Civil War (2011 – present). He was captured by Kurdish forces in the town of Sinjar in
neighboring Iraq and turned over to U.S. authorities who extradited him to the U.S. to be
prosecuted by the Justice Department for giving aid to a terrorist organization. Both of these
seemingly ordinary bankers, despite hailing from different centuries (1930s and 2010s) and
taking part in civil wars in two different regions (Europe and the Middle East), made the
extraordinary decision to become “foreign fighters” in another country’s conflict. In so doing,
they also demonstrated the puzzle that is central to this dissertation: “Why do individuals take
the extraordinary risk of traveling abroad to fight, and potentially die, in another country’s
conflict?

1
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This dissertation explores the foreign fighter phenomenon in comparative perspective. It
does so by relying on the personal narratives (i.e., personal experiences as told in the first
person) of the foreign fighters themselves from two different mobilization contexts: the
U.S.citizens who fought for the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War and the Tunisian
citizens who fought for ISIS in the Syrian Civil War. The primary goal of this comparison is to
explore the motivational factors driving these two foreign fighter groups across time and cultural
context. The study will therefore contribute to the nascent literature on foreign fighting as well as
the more developed literature on contentious collective action. It also has practical implications
for policymakers interested in better understanding and especially preventing this type of
extreme behavior.
This introductory chapter is divided into four sections. The first introduces the concept of
a foreign fighter and details the historical evolution of the foreign fighter phenomenon. Section
two explains the case selection process and introduces the methodology for exploring the cases
in comparative perspective. The third section introduces existing theories for understanding and
explaining the foreign fighter phenomenon. A fourth and final section discusses the contributions
to be made by this dissertation and provides an overview of subsequent chapters.
The Historical Evolution of the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon
Acclaimed U.S. foreign correspondent and novelist Ernest Hemingway gained
international fame for his participation in and coverage of the Spanish Civil War. Hemingway
went to Spain on four separate occasions to cover the war as a journalist. His novel, For Whom
the Bell Tolls (1940), made famous the story of the foreign fighters who fought against the
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fascist regime of Francisco Franco, most notably the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, made up of
approximately 3,000 U.S. citizens. Hemingway put to paper what he saw as an unwavering
solidarity between many U.S. citizens and those fighting for democracy in Spain. The book
became a model of military fiction with its emphasis on the themes of camaraderie and selfsacrifice, which were based on Hemingway’s close observations of the men and women who
served as members of the International Brigades (Hochschild 2016). As Hemingway detailed it,
Spain had become the theatre of a “good versus evil” struggle where love of place and love of
life were meant to triumph over threats from a political ideology that threatened the democratic
way. As Hemingway had his protagonist, Robert Jordan proclaim, as he is left behind to die at
the end of the novel: “I have fought for what I believed in…If we win here we will win
everywhere. The world is a fine place and worth the fighting for and I hate very much to leave it”
(Hemingway 1940, 485).
The fictional stories and true accounts of foreign fighters in the Spanish Civil War are
very similar to the accounts of men and women who fought for ISIS in the Syrian Civil War.
One Tunisian office worker, for example, who was interviewed by The New York Times,
applauded ISIS as the divine vehicle that would finally undo the arbitrary borders and divisions
that were created by Britain and France at the end of World War I. “The division of the countries
is European,” said Bilal (a pseudonym), 27. “We want to make the region a proper Islamic state,
and Syria is where it will start.” Another man who was interviewed, 28-year-old Mourad
(pseudonym), who holds a master’s degree in technology, called ISIS the only hope for “social
justice,” as “it is the only way to give the people back their true rights, by giving the natural
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resources back to the people.” He continued, “It is an obligation for every Muslim.” These
stories of obligation to fellow Muslims, as well as redeeming the independence and unity of a
region that has long been plagued by a legacy of European colonialism echo the very “good
versus evil” struggles that Hemingway detailed nearly eighty years ago.
For the purposes of this dissertation, a “foreign fighter” is defined as a noncitizen of a
conflict state who travels voluntarily to that country to join an insurgency during a civil conflict
(Malet 2013; 2015). An “insurgency” is an active revolt led by rebels, or individuals who do not
hold the status of lawful combatants under international law and who are seeking to wrest
political and territorial control from a state (North 2008). A “civil conflict,” which is often used
interchangeably with “civil war” or “intrastate war,” is an armed conflict between organized
groups who both belong to the same sovereign state (Sambanis 2004).
Many civil conflicts throughout history have “gone transnational,” where rebels find
recruits and resources from outlets outside of the country (Gleditsch 2007). Although such
“transnational insurgencies” have existed for centuries, the fact that they have not been perceived
as a singular type of phenomenon by scholars is evident by the lack of any existing term used to
describe the concept. It is only recently that there has been recognition of the particular type of
actor who participates in this type of civil conflict despite the fact that transnational insurgents
have long attempted to legitimize their activities (Malet 2009). Therefore, according to Malet
(2013, 215), the term foreign fighter can be used interchangeably with the term “transnational
insurgent.” But it is the term foreign fighter that has gained increased scholarly importance in the
post-9/11 era, entrenching the concept in both the academic and public consciousness.
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Foreign fighters must be distinguished from mercenaries, or professional soldiers hired to
serve in foreign armies. They must also be distinguished from private security companies (a term
often used interchangeably with private military contractors), which are private companies that
hire personnel from diverse countries and are paid to conduct military and security operations on
behalf of a state (Avant 1994). The reason that mercenaries and private security companies are
not considered foreign fighters is that members of these types of organizations are, for the most
part, always contracted and paid by state governments and are not rebel volunteers (Malet 2013).
And even though some contractors are hired by rebel organizations and nonstate actors, the
actors are still generally operating with the sanction of the state (i.e., the contractors are not
engaged in open rebellion against the state).
Given this conceptualization, it is difficult to distinguish a combatant as “foreign” prior to
the establishment of the Westphalian international system of sovereign states. A foreign
combatant cannot join another country’s civil conflict if the concept of an independent, sovereign
country does not exist. Historically, foreign fighters were rare in that the sanctioning of foreign
military units was much more common. One of the earliest recorded uses of a foreign auxiliary
dates to Ancient Egypt. During the thirteenth century B.C.E., Pharaoh Ramesses II (also known
as Ozymandias in Greek sources) used a standing foreign army during his battles to rescue the
political kingdom of Ancient Egypt from the Nubians and Hittites, which were conquered during
major upheavals that led to the birth of the Egyptian Empire (1600 B.C.E. – 1100 B.C.E.)
(Faulkner 1953). By modern accounts, the foreign army of Ramesses II was a mercenary army in
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that its soldiers were compensated by the state to perform military service on behalf of the
Pharaoh.
The pattern of utilizing foreign resources to fill military roles remained common for
centuries. From the tenth to the fourteenth centuries C.E., the Byzantine Empire recruited
Norsemen from Scandinavia and Anglo-Saxons from England to defend the Byzantine Emperors
and to occasionally help wage war against rival monarchs (Cook 2001; Dawkins 1947). And
during the crusades by the Roman Catholic Church to reclaim the Holy Land (1095 – 1492),
several military monastic orders rose to power during the medieval period by broadly recruiting
Catholic warrior monks from around the world. The most famous Catholic military order, the
Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Salomonici, literally translated as “The Poor FellowSoldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon,” or better known as The Knights Templar,
consisted of a large, multinational contingent of “brothers” who came from parts of what is now
Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, to don the order’s red cross and fight to restore
Catholic influence over Jerusalem (Howarth 1991).
By the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 C.E., not only had the Westphalian state
system emerged but its new attendant economies of scale could support large standing militaries,
which proved to be far more effective for new states than an ad hoc collection of mercenaries
(Huntington 1964, 20-21). By the time of the next major global conflict, the Napoleonic Wars
(1803 – 1815), France and the coalition of European countries that fought against Napoleon were
primarily fighting with conventional military forces and not mercenaries (Avant 2000). The
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Napoleonic Wars were therefore significant in reducing transnational military forces,
inaugurating a new age of powerful national militaries (Cohen 1984).
There are numerous additional historical examples of transnational military activity that
can be mentioned, but the problem with detailing any of its history is that it is difficult to
empirically analyze historic cases due to a lack of data. An initial attempt by Malet (2009)
combined two well established conflict datasets; the Correlates of War (COW) Intrastate War
(1816 – 1997) dataset and the Uppsala-PRIO Intrastate Conflict (1946 – 2005) dataset. As
illustrated by the inclusive dates, 1816 is the earliest year for which systematic conflict data are
available. Therefore, the observation set begins with the Greek War of Independence in 1821, the
earliest recorded case of a civil conflict with foreign fighters. In the most up-to-date version of
Malet’s dataset (Malet 2016), there exist 92 total instances of foreign fighting in civil conflicts,
including the Syrian (2011-present), Libyan (2014-present), and Ukrainian (2014-present) civil
wars.
Malet’s (2009; 2013) work remains one of the most comprehensive scholarly treatments
of the foreign fighter phenomenon. His primary theoretical contribution was to demonstrate that
foreign fighters typically join insurgencies “to defend some transnational identity community,”
which is either ethnically or ideologically based, or both. He presents a typology (Table 1) that
delineates between type of insurgency (ethnic or non-ethnic) and the relationship of foreign
fighters to the local fighters (co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic). This results in four types of foreign
fighter involvement: “diasporans” (co-ethnics fighting in an ethnic conflict), such as those who
traveled to fight in the Israeli War of Independence (1947 – 1949); “encroachers” (co-ethnics
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fighting in a non-ethnic conflict), such as those who traveled to fight in the Texas Revolution
(1835 – 1836); “liberationists” (non-co-ethnics fighting in an ethnic conflict), such as those who
traveled to fight in the Afghanistan War (1979 – 1992); and “true believers” (non-co-ethnics
fighting in a non-ethnic conflict), such as those who traveled to fight in the Spanish Civil War
and those who fought for ISIS in the Syrian Civil War.
Table 1. Typology of Foreign Fighters
Ethnic Conflict
Type 1
Diasporans
Join with nationalist rebels to preserve shared
nationalist goals
Type 2
Liberationists
Defend anti-colonial rebels to preserve perceived
shared ideological goals

Non-ethnic Conflict
Type 3
Encroachers
Join with secessionist rebels in adjacent state to
expand political control to neighboring territory
Type 4
True Believers
Join ideological rebels to preserve institutions of
shared identity

Source: Malet, 2013

Malet created this typology of foreign fighters and then used it to pick four comparative
case studies, one from each foreign fighter type, to analyze how recruiters from civil conflicts
appealed to foreigners. He found that in each of the different conflict types, recruiters framed
their recruitment messaging to appeal to the transnational identity affiliated with each foreign
fighter type. For example, in the Israeli War of Independence, Israeli recruiters framed the fight
for Israeli independence as one that affected all the Jewish diaspora, and Jews must therefore
travel to fight to defend the nationalist objective of the Jewish cause (Type 1: diasporans). This
was the case in each of his four case studies: local communities inside of what would soon be the
Republic of Texas directed local recruitment efforts to networks of local individuals who wanted
liberation from Mexico (Type 2: liberationists), Afghan recruiters framed the conflict as an
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encroachment by Russia into Arab lands (Type 3: encroachers), and the Communist International
(Comintern) helped target and recruit foreign fighters to the cause of the Spanish Republic in the
Spanish Civil War (Type 4: true believers).
Malet’s findings are understandably parsimonious; recruiters strategically deploy
recruitment propaganda based on the type of conflict being waged. However, Malet’s methods
and data only focused on the demand-side of recruitment rather than the supply-side where
individual decision-making actually occurs. That is, in trying to find the theoretical link between
individual feeling and action, Malet does not explain how and why the individuals who received
the recruitment propaganda actually responded to the recruitment stimuli. This gap in Malet’s
work is symptomatic of the nascent literature on the foreign fighter phenomenon as access to the
data required to make inferences about individual motivation is lacking.
To fill that gap in the literature, this dissertation relies on the personal narratives of
foreign fighters to understand their motivations. Rather than examine a single case from each of
the four quadrants of Malet’s typology, the study analyzes two cases of foreign fighting from a
single quadrant as a means of conducting a more focused, in-depth comparison of individual
motivations. Two cases with different mobilization contexts that ultimately had a similar type of
foreign fighter mobilization are selected for comparison. The goal is therefore to see if,
regardless of time or cultural context, individuals were motivated to become foreign fighters by
similar factors.
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Case Selection and Summary of Methodology
Of the ninety-two recorded cases of foreign fighting, forty-eight of the civil conflicts that
involved foreign fighters involved Type 4 (true believer) foreign fighters, or roughly 52%. Six of
the ninety-two (6.5%) involved Type 3 (encroacher) foreign fighters, nineteen of the ninety-two
(21%) involved Type 2 (liberationist) foreign fighters, and nineteen of ninety-two (21%)
involved Type 1 (diasporan) foreign fighters. Not only are the majority of foreign fighter
mobilizations attributed to the true believer category, but conflicts that attract true believers also
attract the greatest number of foreign fighters (Table 2). By just analyzing the fifteen civil
conflicts that have attracted more than 1,000 total foreign fighters each, ten of the fifteen (66%)
included true believers, one of the fifteen (7%) included encroachers, one of the fifteen (7%)
included liberationists, and three of the fifteen (20%) included diasporans. Moreover, half of the
top-10 conflicts that are coded as true believers have an Islamist dimension (Syrian Civil War,
Iraq vs. the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (SCIRI), Iraq US coalition vs. Islamists, Iran vs.
People’s Mujahedin of Iran, and Somali civil war). The new totals of foreign fighters likewise
demonstrate that more individuals have historically mobilized in the name of Marx rather than
Muhammed.
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Table 2. Largest Foreign Fighter Mobilizations (1,000+)
Conflict
Spanish Civil War
Russian civil war
Syrian Civil War
Chinese civil war
Iraq vs. Kurds
Soviet-Afghan war
Israel vs. Palestinians
Iraq vs. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
Iraq US coalition vs. Islamists
Rwanda vs. Tutsi
Iran vs. People’s Mujahedin of Iran
Texas War of Independence
Somali civil war
Portuguese Liberal Wars
Angolan civil war

Dates
FF Type Number of Fighters
1936-1939
4
60,000
1917-1921
4
50,000
2011-present
4
40,000
1930-1949
4
40,000
1961-1996
1
35,000
1978-1992
2
25,000
1948-1948
1
6,000
1982-2003
4
6,000
2003-2011
4
5,000
1990-1993
1
4,000
1981-1982
4
2,500
1835-1836
3
2,000
1991-present
4
1,500
1828-1834
4
1,100
1975-1991
4
1,000

Source: Malet (2016)

I draw two cases from the true believer quadrant that are ideal case studies for
comparison. The Spanish Civil War had the largest recorded foreign fighter mobilization, and the
Syrian Civil War had the third largest foreign fighter mobilization. Approximately 60,000
volunteers from fifty-two countries joined the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil
War, making it by far the most significant foreign fighter mobilization in terms of numbers in the
twentieth century (Beevor 2006). The size, national diversity, and speed of recruitment in the
Syrian Civil War came to rival that of the Spanish Civil War as the number of foreign volunteers
for ISIS peaked at 40,000 in 2017, with volunteers coming from more than seventy different
countries, making it the most significant foreign fighter mobilization in terms of numbers in the
twenty-first century (Soufan Group 2015; 2017). As will be analyzed in more detail in later
chapters, the two cases occurred in two different regional and temporal contexts, i.e., the Spanish
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Civil War was a conflict associated with Western Europe in the 1930s while the Syrian Civil
War is in the contemporary Middle East, or nearly 80 years apart. The Spanish Civil War would
begin after an attempted fascist coup d’état against the elected, leftist government of the Spanish
Republic (Beevor 2006). The Syrian Civil War came on the heels of new calls for political and
economic change in the Middle East and North Africa in what became known as the Arab
Spring. The protest movements against the regime in Syria were violently quelled by Syrian
president Bashar al-Assad (Jones 2013).
The dissertation compares the motivations of the U.S. foreign fighters who fought for the
International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War and the Tunisian foreign fighters who fought for
ISIS in the Syrian Civil War. The U.S. and Tunisia are both the third highest contributors of
foreign fighters to their respective conflicts, have relatively similar foreign fighter totals, and the
two cases have the greatest wealth of primary source data available (Table 3).
To collect the data necessary to compare the motivations of U.S. and Tunisian foreign
fighters, the study utilized a mixed-methods approach. First, a dataset of demographic
information was created on U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighters. Second, data was collected from
the personal narratives of U.S. foreign fighters who fought for the International Brigades by
undertaking the content analysis of archival documents, specifically the diaries, letters, speeches,
public statements, and autobiographies written by the U.S. citizens who fought in the Spanish
Civil War. This archival data was collected over the course of twelve weeks of field research at
two different archives: the Tamiment Library at New York University (June 18, 2018 – July 27,
2018; October 29, 2018 – November 16, 2018) and the Ernest Hemingway Archives at the John
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F. Kennedy Presidential Library (January 7, 2019 – January 25, 2019). Third, data was collected
from personal narratives of Tunisian citizens who fought for ISIS. Data for the Tunisian case
study was gathered through a content analysis of interview and focus group data collected by
scholars at the Institut Tunisien des Études Stratégiques (Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies)
(ITES) who conducted interviews and focus group meetings with Tunisian foreign fighter
returnees (individuals who joined ISIS who have returned from battle). Further information on
Tunisian foreign fighters was gathered from original interviews with key actors in the Tunisian
security sector who work with foreign fighter returnees and from friends and family members
who knew fellow Tunisians who left to fight. Field research was conducted over the course of
fifteen weeks, divided between three research stays in Tunisia: May 11, 2015 – May 29, 2015,
January 28, 2019 – March 8, 2019, and July 26, 2019 – August 23, 2019.
Table 3. Number of Foreign Fighters by Country (Top 10)
Spanish Civil War
France
8,778-9,000
Poland
3,034-5,411
United States*
2,000-5,390
Italy
2,908-5,108
Germany**
3,026-5,000
United Kingdom
1,806-3,504
Belgium
1,500-3,000
Balkan***
2,056-4,000
Scandinavian**** 1,177-2,500
Canada
510-847

Syrian Civil War
Saudi Arabia 1,500-3,244
Russia
800-3,417
Tunisia
1,500-3,000
Jordon
1,500-3,000
Morocco
1,500-1,660
France
1,200-1,910
Turkey
600-1,500
Uzbekistan
500-1,500
Azerbaijan
900
Lebanon
900

Notes: Estimates of foreign fighters in the Spanish Civil War vary widely. Comprehensive accounts, such as the one above, are
set out in a variety of sources while other treatments of individual mobilizations have their own accounting. Ranges for the above
estimates for the Spanish Civil War are set out in Castells (1974); Beevor 2006); Delperrie de Bayac (1968); and Jackson (1994);
Estimates of foreign fighters in the Syrian Civil War are set out in Barrett (2014); Neumann (2015); The Soufan Group (2015;
2018); Zelin (2014).
*: Includes Puerto Ricans
**: Some counts include Austrians while others do not. It is estimated that roughly 1,500 Austrians fought for the Brigades
***: Nationalities included in this total include Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Yugoslavs
****: Nationalities included in this total include Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes
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Competing Theories in the Study of the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon
Trying to interpret the logic of participation in contentious political action such as mass
movements, rebellions, and violent conflict is one of the most pervasive endeavors in the
political conflict literature (Stern and Berger 2015). As will be detailed in Chapter Two, analyses
of how groups can overcome the “collective action problem” have persisted since Mancur Olson
famously documented the issue in his 1965 book The Logic of Collective Action. New
explanations have followed Olson’s lead by arguing that participation in these types of conflicts
is motivated by economic incentives (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005;
Lichbach 1994) and grievances (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Sambanis 2001). These
classic theories of collection action suggest that economic incentives, personal victimization, and
structural grievances are the dominant paradigms for understanding why contentious collective
action, especially violent political action, occurs. However, these studies have not moved beyond
such accounts to focus on value-driven explanations like duty and obligation and social
explanations like solidarity, camaraderie, and social networks. Not only that, these theories
cannot provide answers to the puzzle posed by the prevalence of foreign fighting, where the risk
of participating is higher and reward much lower, if known at all, and where the political context
of where they fought is equally as important as the political context in which they fled to fight
(Malet 2013; see also Tilly 1978).
This dissertation tests both classic theories of collective action, social movements, and
organizational behavior and new individual and social theories to understand and explain the
foreign fighter phenomenon. Six different theories are tested: (1) economic incentives: the theory
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that jobs, monetary rewards, and access to resources play a key role in motivating individuals to
participate in collective action; (2) personal victimization: the theory that individuals engage in
collective action as a response to a perceived, personal injustice; (3) structural grievances: the
theory that individuals engage in collective action as a response to perceived injustices at the
country-level; (4) sacred values: the theory that an individual’s commitment to higher moral or
ideological values ultimately lead them to make extreme sacrifices; (5) collective identity: the
theory that individuals are motivated when they hold a shared orientation with others and act on
that basis; and (6) social networks: the theory that the structures and interconnectedness of a
group or network determines the rate and extent to which values and beliefs inspire individual
action.
This dissertation finds that the dominant explanations of the collective action and civil
conflict literatures, namely, economic incentives, personal victimization, and structural
grievances, do not provide an adequate theoretical explanation for the act of foreign fighting. It
instead finds that three factors, social networks, collective identity, and sacred values, are
significant across both cases, suggesting that they are necessary factors driving the foreign
fighter phenomenon. A fourth factor, structural grievances, was significant in explaining the case
of Tunisian foreign fighters to ISIS but not U.S. foreign fighters to the International Brigades,
suggesting that the finding is not robust, but is nevertheless one that is ripe for future research.
Personal grievances and economic incentives were not significant factors in either case. These
results potentially establish foreign fighting as an act that is distinct among different types of
collective action. Ultimately, one of the key contributions of this dissertation is that it takes a
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holistic approach to understanding the foreign fighter phenomenon and understands the act of
foreign fighting as a dynamic process with individual and social logics.
Contributions, Implications, and Overview of Subsequent Chapters
This dissertation contributes to a growing literature on the foreign fighter phenomenon by
testing existing theories that seek to explain individual participation in collective action such as
foreign fighting. Each empirical step in this dissertation contributes to the broader literature
related to collective action, political violence, and international conflict and security. For
example, the archival research on U.S. foreign fighters in the International Brigades of the
Spanish Civil War contributes to an already sizeable literature on that conflict by collating, for
the first time, details about every U.S. fighter from that conflict into a demographic dataset that
will be useful for qualitative and quantitative analysis. In addition, the content analysis of the
interview and focus group data on Tunisian foreign fighters who have returned from Iraq and
Syria represents some of the first reported personal accounts of individual experiences in ISIS,
which has both academic and political implications. Not only will the collection of biographical
data on these foreign fighters provide the potential for novel comparative analyses, but the
personal narratives drawn from both archival data and the interview and focus group data will
provide a deeper, firsthand account of exactly what mechanisms drove each individual to travel
and fight.
The study will also have broad national security implications by providing a better
understanding of the precise mechanisms that drive individuals to travel and fight for a foreign
cause. For example, the conclusions could shape policy away from strictly focusing on political
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and economic incentives as a means of preventing the onset of extreme behavior and toward
more viable counter-radicalization strategies that also consider cultural context and are more
sensitive to issues of identity, beliefs, and values. As will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter Six, the dissertation is timely in that the recent dilemma posed by thousands of foreign
fighter returnees from Iraq and Syria are invoking a global policy debate regarding how to treat
these individuals who potentially threaten the peace and security of disparate countries across the
globe. Understanding their motivations for leaving can help inform policies for confronting their
inevitable return and can provide avenues for future reintegration policies. Finally, this
dissertation’s theory and methodology could be expanded and applied to other cultural contexts
to help explain participation in a wide variety of conflicts both foreign and domestic and helps
get at the answer to that all-important puzzle of individual involvement in contentious collective
action.
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds in five chapters. Chapter Two introduces the
diverse bodies of literature relating to collective action, social movements, and organizational
behavior and details the strengths and weaknesses of these literatures considering the foreign
fighter phenomenon. Chapter Three details the research design including the hypotheses,
operationalization of variables, methodology, and data sources. Chapter Four explores the case
of U.S. foreign fighters who fought for the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.
Chapter Five focuses on the case of Tunisian foreign fighters who fought for ISIS in the Syrian
Civil War. Finally, Chapter Six concludes by revisiting the primary findings of this study,
detailing the potential policy implications, and discussing the potential for future research.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
History is full of famous foreign fighters. George Gordon Byron, colloquially known as
Lord Byron, was famous for his efforts to recruit volunteers and swell support in his native Great
Britain for the cause of the Greeks in the Greek War of Independence (1821 – 1829) against the
Ottoman Empire. Lord Byron eventually gave his life fighting for the foreign cause of Greek
independence and is immortalized with his own statue near the Acropolis in Athens, Greece.
Famed U.S. frontiersman Davy Crockett, known by the famous childhood song as the “King of
the Wild Frontier,” was also a foreign fighter who fought in the Texas Revolution (1835 – 1836)
against Mexico. He gave his life at the Battle of the Alamo, fighting for the independence of the
people of Texas, which would result in the formation of the Republic of Texas and the
immortalization of Crockett in U.S. folk lore.
Both Lord Byron and Davy Crockett are today hailed as folk heroes, noted for their
romantic sacrifices for a great cause. Though theoretical explanations for collective action and
war volunteerism abound, very rarely do these explanations contend with the ideas of heroism
and self-sacrifice. Explanations instead often lean toward explaining the need for material
incentives, money, and other resource provisions to motivate individuals to overcome collective
action problems and join a collective pursuit. In the civil conflict literature, for example, many of
the most widely accepted explanations for recruitment and mobilization in civil conflicts rely on
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appeals for material gain rather than on self-sacrifice or commitment to the cause. Because of
this theoretical shortcoming, few of these studies provide explanations to the puzzle posed by the
prevalence of foreign fighting, where the risk of participating is higher and potential for reward
much lower (Malet 2013).
As highlighted in Chapter One, the foreign fighter phenomenon is still a nascent topic in
the academic literature. Little has been written about it that is theoretically based. Therefore, to
understand plausible explanations for foreign fighting, this chapter explores the extant literature
on collective action as it relates to the act of foreign fighting. The literature provides the basis for
understanding why individuals seek out groups to further a common goal, how groups form
strategies to achieve that goal, and how groups of individuals react to the social, political,
cultural, and economic milieu in which they find themselves on the route to achieving their
common goal. Foreign fighting is a collective act precisely because it brings together a group of
people who have a common interest and fight for a common goal. Therefore, the literature on
collective action provides the background by which any theoretical framework on foreign
fighting must be based.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section introduces
collective action as a concept and explores six competing theories of collective action; (1)
economic incentives; (2) personal victimization; (3) structural grievances; (4) sacred values; (5)
collective identity; and (6) social networks. These six bodies of theory represent the most
dominant explanations in the literature, each of which will be empirically tested to see if it
explains the foreign fighter phenomenon. The final section concludes by underscoring the
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importance of taking a holistic approach to understanding the foreign fighter phenomenon,
emphasizing the idea that multiple explanations are required to understand the phenomenon
completely. This final section also highlights the theoretical implications of this study and
introduces the next chapter.
Theories of Collective Action
Every social movement, protest, rebellion, riot, strike, and revolution is a different type of
collective action. Such diverse forms of collective action can therefore harbor diverse
characteristics. One form of collective action might be brief while another sustained, one
institutionalized while another disruptive to institutions, one routine while another histrionic.
Most collective action is benign, occurring routinely within institutions, on the part of constituted
groups acting in the name of goals that are hardly noteworthy. It is when collective action is used
by groups who lack regular access to institutions, seek to challenge asymmetric power relations,
and act in the name of new or previously unaccepted claims to authority that collective action
becomes contentious (Tarrow 2011). How and why collective groups rise to challenge these
relationships is one of the most discussed and analyzed topics in the behavioral social sciences,
past and present. How collective groups recruit, strategize, build organizations, respond to
opportunities, elaborate goals and ideologies, and socialize and mobilize constituents are all part
of the empirical endeavor of understanding collective action (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2008).
“Contentious collective action” is not an abstract category that exists outside of politics.
But contentious collective action is different from routine collective actions of representative
politics and market relations because it brings ordinary people into confrontation with opponents,
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elites, and authorities (Tarrow 2011). Contentious collective action is also not a category that is
new, or something that exists separate from history. Collective groups have learned to exploit
political opportunities, respond to threats, create collective identities, and bring people together
to mobilize against more powerful opponents throughout recorded history (Tilly 1986).
The background of what would become collective action theory began with early
psychological work on crowd behavior. This literature dates to the late-nineteenth century and
has roots in early psychological studies of “crowds.” Gustav Le Bon’s (1895) seminal work is
often cited as the most important study of crowds because it put forth a theory explaining how
crowd behavior affected both individual and group psychology. For Le Bon (1895), a crowd was
not a mere collection or gathering of individuals but was rather a distinctive psychological entity.
According to his theory of crowds, individuals in a crowd lose their ability to think rationally and
instead begin to behave in what Le Bon described as a “collective hypnosis.” In an oft-cited
passage (Le Bon 1895, 19), he wrote that,
…by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several
rungs in the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd,
he is a barbarian — that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the
violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings, whom he
further tends to resemble by the facility with which he allows himself to be impressed by
words and images — which would be entirely without action on each of the isolated
individuals composing the crowd — and to be induced to commit acts contrary to his
most obvious interests and his best-known habits.
Despite the focus on crowd behavior in late-nineteenth century social theory, the
semantics of “crowds” lost much of its initial fascination and distinctiveness during the twentieth
century as scholars moved away from explaining the “psychology of crowds” to the “logics of
collective action” (Borch 2006). According to these new theories, psychological studies had
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overemphasized behavior within a crowd rather than emphasizing why crowds formed in the first
place. As a result, scholars became more interested in explaining why collective action occurs,
providing new information on why collective action is something that needs to be explained and
challenging the assumption that collective action occurs spontaneously.
Economic Incentives
As introduced in the previous chapter, arguably the most significant divergence from
crowd psychology was the challenge, made by Mancur Olson in his 1965 book The Logic of
Collective Action, that individuals in groups behaved rationally. According to Olson, individuals
respond to economic incentives, which must be offered to facilitate individual involvement in
any type of collective action, especially action among large groups. Where crowd theorists like
Le Bon had assumed individuals lost all sense of rationality in crowds, Olson argued just the
opposite; individuals in groups are rationally driven to maximize group and by extension,
individual benefits, while minimizing individual costs. The theoretical reasoning behind this
proposition was that if a group was not able to offer economic incentives to individuals to
participate then individuals will become more inclined to “free-ride,” enjoying the benefits of
collective action while contributing nothing to achieve its benefits (Olson 1965, 2).
Olson’s theory was based on classic “rational choice theory.” The simplest version of
rational choice theory for understanding collective action can be set out as follows:
Ai = Pi * B – Ci
where A is the level of activism of individual i, P is the probability that individual i’s
participation will bring about the collective good, B is the collective benefits or public goods
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expected to result from collective action, and C is the costs to individual i of their involvement in
collective action (Whiteley 1995). This is the simple, mathematical way of understanding what is
known as the “utility function,” a function that ranks alternatives according to their utility (worth
or value) to an individual. The utility function owes to classic theories of utilitarianism, such as
those forwarded by moral philosophers, Jeremy Bentham (1789) and John Stuart Mill (1863).
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory that values outcomes; any action that maximizes
individual well-being, pleasure, or happiness while minimizing pain and evil is the best option
(Bentham 1789). The utility function, as adapted for understanding and explaining neoclassical
economics, is a theory that tries to understand and predict individual preference ordering over a
choice set. In the economic sense, the utility function is less concerned with explaining pleasure
as it is concerned with ordering individual choice (Harsanyi 1969).
Olson’s contribution to collective action theory was not just to diagram collective action
as a function of economic utility but to understand why individuals in large groups participate
when they could, in reality, achieve the collective benefit or public good, B, while bringing
individual cost, C, down to 0 (zero) by free-riding. This is where Olson’s idea of “individual
incentives” comes into play. Because of the free-rider problem, even under a situation of “perfect
consensus,” individuals will not mobilize for collective action (Olson 1965, 60). Incentives are
motivational and Olson argued that they are necessary to mobilize individuals in latent groups.
And while Olson acknowledged that social and moral incentives exist, he argued that only
economic incentives can provide the motivational impetus for participation. This is because
latent groups are unable to achieve the peer-to-peer contact that would make social incentives
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feasible for motivation and because moral incentives are functions of individual psychology and
he therefore argues they cannot be generalized to distinguish between those who participate and
those who do not (Olson 1965, 61). The modified utility function equation that is based on the
“Olsonian” theory of collective action would be modeled as follows:
Ai = (Pi * B) – Ci + Ei
where A is the level of activism of individual i, P is the probability that individual i’s
participation will bring about the collective good, B is the collective benefits or public goods
expected to result from collective action, C is the costs to individual i of their involvement in
collective action (which, based on the free-rider problem, could be brought to 0), and E is the
economic incentive, or “private return,” provided to an individual to facilitate participation.
The singular importance of economic incentives as elucidated by Olson gave rise to
extensive theoretical discussions and numerous new empirical examinations on the role of
individuals in collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Popkin 1979; Jenkins 1983; Marwell
and Oliver 1993; Kuran 1995; Ostrom 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Kalyvas and Sambanis
2005). Two of his findings are particularly important for the study of collective action in conflict
settings. First, individuals are instrumentally rational (i.e., they contribute to collective endeavors
only when it furthers their economic self-interest). For Olson, who was approaching the study of
collective action from an economic perspective, economic incentives were the best way to appeal
to individuals. As a result, according to his theory, appeals to morals and emotion are
insufficient. This is true at all levels of social aggregation; even the state needs to harness
economic incentives to compel individuals to comply with collective decision-making because
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without incentives, the state would have to rely simply on coercion, a point of delineation, for
Olson, between democracy from dictatorship (Olson 1965, 60). Second, collective action
naturally harbors a free-rider problem. This is especially true when large organizations are
seeking to provide a public good to their members, as the loss of support on the part of any one
member will not noticeably increase the burden on other members. As a result, the rational
individual can safely assume that their choice to free-ride will not impact the organization’s
prospects for the successful provision of the sought after public good. Hence all individuals have
an incentive to free-ride.
Economic incentives are remunerative motivations. In terms of organized conflict, such
remunerative motivations take the form of a direct, monetary payment to participate in conflict
or other financial motivations such as the chance for entrepreneurship or employment. The
armed forces in most countries offer such incentives to individuals to volunteer. For example,
French citizens receive a salary, accommodations, food, clothing, and future support in France
with mortgages, health care, and loans if they enlist in the French military. This is true of most of
the advanced militaries of the world, especially those that exist in democracies. The U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, for example, was established to assist, for life, those who enlist
in the U.S. armed forces. Again, this is common in most developed countries. One notable
exception is Israel, which conscripts its entire adult population to compulsory military service for
two years and eight months for men and two years for women. Israel has remained a notable
exception since its founding in 1948 led to successive wars with its Arab neighbors, and with a
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population in flux for many years, conscription ensured it was able to staff its military (Hanson
and Lin-Greenberg 2019).
Offering economic incentives to foreigners to join a country’s armed forces is far less
common but not unheard of. Returning to the example of France, the country offers the same
incentives to foreign volunteers who wish to join the French Foreign Legion, which has a
standing army of around 8,000, as it offers to its own citizens who joined the armed forces
(Porch 2010). It is not surprising that these types of incentives have persuaded thousands of
foreign individuals from 120 different countries to join the Legion since its inception in 1831
(Porch 2010). Only a small number of countries allow foreign volunteers to join the armed forces
and usually recruitment is limited to close allies. For example, Australia allows New Zealanders
to join their armed forces and Denmark allows Icelandic citizens to join. The U.S. allows green
card holders to join the services (see Hanson and Lin-Greenberg 2019). In all these situations,
foreign volunteers are guaranteed the same incentives as citizens for joining.
Mercenary groups have also adopted this type of incentive structure, paying volunteers a
salary, or promising a share of whatever profit they stand to receive for their service (Burmester
1978). Conflict scholars have also identified salaries, family aid, and other economic incentives
as driving recruitment in a vast array of conflict contexts (Moyar 2009). Economic reasons for
participation in these settings makes sense; these scholars, mostly economists and game theorists
borrowing from Olson, have posited that individuals who choose to become terrorists, participate
in civil wars, and even strap on suicide vests are “rational actors,” deploying cost-benefit
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calculations that propel themselves and their groups to some strategic, logical goal (Crenshaw
1985; Pape 2005).
The centrality of economic incentives to collective action has continued to expand over
the years to include explanations for individual participation in a variety of collective activity;
from social movements (Tarrow 1998; Traugott 2010) to rebellions (Mueller and Opp 1986;
Weede and Muller 1998; Collier 2000), and revolutions (Skocpol 1979; Kuran 1995; Kurzman
1996). And even though economic incentives are not as readily available in these types of
conflicts, where smaller groups, which are often the weaker side in a conflict, cannot make any
firm promises for payment, profit, or goods, such theories still represent the dominant
explanatory paradigm. Recently, in what now falls under the theoretical moniker “greed,” the
approach of examining economic incentives as an explanation for collective behavior has been
used to model individual participation in all manner of civil conflicts (Lichbach 1994; Collier
and Hoeffler 2000; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005; Regan and Norton 2005). Greed theory
postulates that a strong resource incentive, such as oil, diamonds, timber, and other primary
commodities, forms the basis over which rebels fight.
In the nascent literature on foreign fighting, the record on economic incentives is mixed.
Early findings suggest remunerative incentives play a role in foreign fighter recruitment but
whether such economic incentives are offered to all potential recruits or only to a select few is
unclear. Recent evidence from the Philippines suggests that ISIS affiliates have utilized financial
renumeration as a recruitment strategy. Since the Philippine military regained strategic control of
the city of Marawi, on the Philippine island of Mindanao, in 2017, ISIS affiliate groups like The
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Maute Group have begun undertaking financial remuneration strategies in a mass recruitment
campaign to attract new foreign fighters (UNODC 2018). In a more isolated example from
Tunisia that will be discussed in great detail in Chapter Five, a reporter found that a young
Tunisian, who had quit school in 2011 at the age of fourteen to help financially support his
family, had joined ISIS in Syria three years later, on the promise that the organization would
“transfer $1,500 by Western Union to his family back in Tunisia” if he joined (Masi 2015; 2016).
Whether or not the offer of economic incentives was a broadly organized strategy used on the
part of ISIS to recruit new members or whether some offers were targeted toward individuals
more likely to be motivated by such an incentive, these examples nonetheless demonstrate that
economic incentives potentially play a role in an individual’s decision to become a foreign
fighter.
Scholars have criticized the singular focus on economic incentives in rational choice
models and have argued that other types of selective incentives can factor into the utility function
(e.g., see Perry and Hasisi 2015; Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2016; Opp 2019). Critics of the
restrictive version of rational choice theory favor models that incorporate all kinds of preferences
and constraints on individuals. One recent alternative that is relevant for emerging theories of
foreign fighting posits that “spiritual incentives” act as a strong motivator for collective action by
helping groups overcome the free-rider problem. For example, spiritual incentives have been
shown to be a strong motivator for Islamist radicals who engage in high cost/risk activism by
increasing an individual’s perceived prospects of salvation (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2016).
But spiritual incentives are not just available and important for Islamist radicals, but for any
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ideology that promises material rewards in the afterlife for a certain behavior. In an example
from Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler (2016), even Mother Teresa’s seemingly altruistic behavior
can be explained as rational self-interest guided by spiritual incentives. The authors write,
While empathetic and self-sacrificial, Mother Teresa’s charity….was not altruistic, that
is, motivated strictly by the desire to benefit the recipient without expectation of external
reward. “Works of love,” she laid down, “are always a means of becoming closer to God”
(Mother Teresa 1985, 25)…Closeness to God, not the alleviation of human pain itself,
was the preferred religious product. Indeed in Mother Teresa’s assessment, poverty,
suffering, and death were positive occasions of divine contact and imitation.
Otherworldly incentives, or the promise of spiritual rewards in the afterlife, can be strong
motivators much like traditional economic incentives. The problem with spiritual incentives is
that there is no secular equivalent. The promise of rewards after death can help individuals
overcome collective action problems because these individuals evaluate, as a function of utility,
rewards for dying. Secular causes and ideologies simply cannot offer such rewards, meaning
death remains the ultimate cost and therefore no benefit can be guaranteed to the individual after
death. It is for this reason that Olson (1965) singled out economic incentives as the only
incentive that can be thought to motivate all people regardless of religious, political, or
ideological affiliation.
The general critique of rational choice theory stems from the simple proposition that
valuation is subjective; not everyone values monetary rewards equally, for example, and
therefore economic incentives will be a stronger motivator for some and not others. If every
individual has a different preference, it is difficult to investigate variation over a specific choice
set because the investigator is required to first determine whether an individual’s decision to act
is based on their distinct preferences. Such an investigation can foster teleological inferences
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(i.e., relating to or involving the explanation of phenomena in terms of the purpose they serve
rather than of the cause by which they arise). Furthermore, when economic incentives are not on
offer to recruits, how do you reconcile their decision to still participate? In both cases analyzed
for this dissertation, foreign fighters made the decision to join the weaker side of the conflict,
where promises of rewards were not guaranteed. As will be detailed in later chapters, rational
choice models that emphasize economic incentives have serious deficiencies as models for
diagramming human reasoning and predicting human behavior, including the decision made by
individuals to become foreign fighters (Atran and Axelrod 2008).
Personal Victimization
Theories that emphasize personal victimization have been foundational for understanding
collective action. To say that collective action is motivated by personal victimization is familiar
because it is easily recognized in our own experience. Quite simply stated, when someone
wrongs us, we want revenge for the injustice (McCauley and Moskalenko 2016). Feelings of
victimization can be exploited when an individual develops a sense of being personally harmed
and develops a hostility toward a perpetrator. Perceived injustice from a specific perpetrator is
met with anger. More abstract perceptions of injustice such as whites oppressing blacks,
landowners oppressing serfs, or Westerners oppressing Muslims, results in anger against an
entire class of people. Recent psychological research (e.g., see McCauley and Moskalenko 2017)
into the relationship between victimization and violence has shown that any punishing
experience toward an individual or group can lead to anger and an increased propensity for
aggression (see also Sabini 1995). Therefore, an individual can feel victimized, and therefore
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motivated to retaliate, as the result of harm to another person or group even though there was no
direct harm against the individual undertaking the aggression or violence (McCauley and
Moskalenko 2017).
Theories that link personal victimization to action now intersect different research
paradigms, including theories of peasant rebellion (Paige 1975; Scott 1977), civil war
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Regan and Norton 2005), and terrorism (Crenshaw 1986;
Newman 2006; Ross 1993). According to these theories, discontent over personal victimization
is necessary to explain any account of collective action because feelings of victimization provide
the primary motivational impetus for collective organization and violence (Snow 2013). New
theoretical models of civil conflict include personal victimization as part of more complex costbenefit analyses that explain participation. The most cited of these models is the Collier-Hoeffler
model (2004). While the model does assume economic rationality by recruits, it differentiates
between the demand side of recruitment and the supply side. Feelings of victimization work on
the demand side, creating a need for rebel labor with the absolute supply coming from the
expected net positive utility of individual rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 504). While
innovative in trying to identify a more robust way of explaining collective violence, the authors
nonetheless conclude that economic incentives are a more powerful motivator than personal
victimization (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 504).
In the nascent literature on foreign fighting, recruits are shown to link their sense of
personal victimization to a broader cause that motivates them to become a foreign fighter. For
example, recent research on the mobilization of French foreign fighters for ISIS found that first
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generation, French citizens of North African descent linked feelings of victimization to France’s
“oppressive domestic policy” against them as Muslims. This resulted in a desire to radically alter
global international relations by establishing an Islamic Caliphate (Bindner 2018). Studies on
U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War found similar feelings of victimization as a
motivating factor for Abraham Lincoln Brigade recruits. A popular conclusion in the literature
on U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War is that individuals linked their personal
suffering (e.g., losing their job or life savings) during the Great Depression as stemming from the
failures of global “capitalist tyranny” for which new fascist political movements (such as the one
in Spain) were propagating (Carroll 1994).
Theories linking personal victimization to collective action are parsimonious but suffer in
terms of generalizability. The degree to which personal victimization affects collective action is
difficult to discern because an individual’s reaction to being a victim is based on individual
psychology; the depth of victimization as measured by severity and length of time held is based
on the human capacity to care about abstract categories and perpetrators (McCauley and
Moskalenko 2017). If several individuals from a particular group feel personally victimized, it is
possible that this mass victimization can facilitate contentious collective action. However, as will
be shown by this dissertation, foreign fighters do not link local victimization to a broader,
transnational movement.
Structural Grievances
When deprivation is conceived as being directly attributed to structural problems and
conflicts in society, it is considered a structural grievance. In the literature, structural grievances
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are also known as “push factors.” For example, the United Nations differentiates between “push”
and “pull” factors in its publications on radicalization (UNDP 2016; see also Borum 2012). They
are called push factors because they are factors thought to be “pushing” individuals toward a
certain violent path. Structural grievances have played an important role in illustrating why
individuals seek out forms of contentious collective action in the first place.
Scholars of civil conflict have long linked the depth of structural grievances with
rebellion. Since Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) developed models of rebellion and revolution,
“relative deprivation,” or the tension between an individual’s expectations and capabilities, has
been said to translate into political violence (e.g., see Bergstrand 2014; Brush 1996; Regan and
Norton 2005). Much like Olson’s (1965) The Logic of Collective Action is to rational choice
theory, Gurr’s (1970) Why Men Rebel is the foundational text of this theory. Drawing from
literature on social psychology, specifically theories of cognitive dissonance, Gurr (1970, 23)
argued that “relative deprivation,” or the “tension that develops from a discrepancy between the
‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction” disposes individuals to violence. Gurr argued
that deprivation provoked a psychological mechanism that converted feelings into violent action.
Known as the “frustration-aggression relationship,” the greater the intensity of feeling deprived,
the greater the potential for violence, and the more widespread that feeling, the more widespread
the violence (Gurr 1970).
Gurr’s approach to understanding and explaining relative deprivation was not monolithic.
The complex interplay between what someone has, expects, and needs develops on different
levels of the individual psyche and manifests at different levels of society. It is for this reason
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that Gurr extrapolated three structural patterns of relative deprivation that help to explain
aggression and violence in many different social, political, cultural, and economic contexts. The
first, “decremental deprivation,” describes a situation in which value expectations remain
constant but value capabilities decrease with time. This pattern of deprivation fosters aggression
because an individual is not capable of achieving what they once were. The second, “aspirational
deprivation,” describes a situation in which value expectations rise with time, but value
capabilities remain constant. This pattern of deprivation fosters aggression because an individual
is hoping to achieve new levels of success or a new provision of goods, but the hope is not being
realized. And finally, “progressive deprivation,” describes a situation in which value
expectations and value capabilities initially both increase monotonically, but whereas value
expectations continue to rise, value capabilities eventually level off and may even decrease
causing individuals to feel a sudden loss in capabilities, causing aggression.
When it was acknowledged that feelings of personal victimization, detailed above, were a
difficult to measure at the individual-level, one of the common variants that emerged posited that
“economic inequality,” measured at the country-level, was a logical alternative that could explain
how grievance or deprivation impacts collective violence and was a variable that was easier to
operationalize (Midlarsky 1988; Muller and Seligson 1987). Economic inequality is based on an
empirical evaluation of a country’s distribution of economic resources between groups and
individuals (Regan and Norton 2005). Using economic inequality as a measure of structural
grievance garnered broad support in the academic literature (e.g., see Muller and Opp 1986;
Muller and Seligson 1987; Weede 1981; Shadmehr 2014) for two important reasons. First, it
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appealed to those scholars working with formal modeling to explore and explain the causes of
violence, protest, revolution, and democratization (e.g., see Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; 2006;
Boix 2003; Leventoğlu 2005). In formal models, economic inequality became one of the main
sources of discontent under dictatorships, which ultimately informed the demand for
democratization. Second, there have been numerous, publicly available datasets on economic
inequality that allow researchers to investigate the empirical implications of these theories
quantitatively, across time and space. Beyond just economic inequality, there are now several
measurement variations to quantitatively analyze the role of structural grievance. The most
common measurements continue to look at different variables that could measure economic
grievances (Gurr 1970; Muller and Seligson 1987; Regan and Norton 2005) in different ways.
The United Nations Development Programme cites economic grievances, as measured by gross
national income (GNI) per capita and education (mean years of schooling), as key to the
organization’s cross-national measure of relative standard of living and relative economic
capabilities of countries known as the “Human Development Index” (UNDP 2020). Many
scholars in the political violence and civil conflict field (e.g., see Humphreys and Weinstein
2008) use variations of this index as a predictor of collective violence.
There is a second structural variant of grievance theory that links a lack of civil and
political rights to collective violence. Beginning with Durkheim’s (1951) theory of anomie, or
the social and/or political break between individuals and their communities, the idea that lacking
access to “normal” channels for airing grievances will create violence has become a popular
explanation in the literature. Merton (1949) acknowledged anomie as a source of deviant
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behavior when he developed “strain theory” in the late-1940s, arguing that this type of behavior
resulted from a lack of legitimate opportunities. More recently, scholars have adopted variations
of strain theory to explain conflict in developing countries in the Middle East (Chalcraft 2016;
Wiktorowicz 2002) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Kaplan 1994; Richards 1996), arguing that violence
and conflict can be explained by the isolation of citizens within authoritarian countries, who are
unable to gain access to the loci of political decision-making.
Political grievances can involve the suspension of civil liberties, censorship, banning of
political parties, police surveillance, police brutality, or a general disregard to opposition (see
Hamilton 1978; Ross 1993). Political grievances can therefore be directed against a variety of
different individuals, groups, institutions, or classes including the government, individual
politicians, political parties, the police, or the military. The specific implication for collective
action, and therefore foreign fighting, is that structural grievances, whether economic (poverty,
unemployment, or lack of education) or political (lack of civil or political rights), will lead (i.e.,
push) individuals to seek out opportunities to join contentious collective pursuits. It is important
to note that an individual does not have to feel personally victimized by a structural grievance,
like theories of personal victimization stipulate, for it to motivate collective behavior. For
example, an individual can be gainfully employed and yet be aggrieved by the mass
unemployment that plagues their country. The fact that they perceive a structural grievance is
theoretically enough to mobilize that individual to act.
Structural grievances have been shown to be insufficient for explaining organized
conflict because such accounts cannot fully explicate the mechanisms that influence individuals
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to take action nor identify the methods leaders use to mobilize people, both of which ultimately
determine the extent to which conflict proliferates (Ostrom 1997). Grievance approaches that
examine structural factors are important for identifying contextual variables, such as poverty
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993), level of democracy (Sambanis and Milanovic 2011), or
ethnic fractionalization (Esteban and Ray 2008), which can create conditions under which certain
groups become more susceptible to rebel, but they cannot explain the actual mechanism that
drives an individual to action.
In the nascent literature on foreign fighting, structural grievances have been tested in
recent quantitative studies of foreign fighting (Benmelech and Klor 2018; Pokalova 2019). These
studies test for many factors emblematic of structural grievance including measures of a
country’s economic wellbeing such as GDP per capita and the Human Development Index
(HDI), a country’s political status including level of freedom as measured by Freedom House or
a country’s level of democracy as measured by Polity IV, among other variables that measure a
country’s demographic profile including percentage of youth population, population size,
percentage of Muslim population, emigration levels, internet penetration, and the presence of alQaida cells. Not surprisingly, these studies have led to competing conclusions and have so far
not been able to confirm findings at the individual-level. They do, however, provide the
foundation for testing certain hypotheses at the individual-level.
Recent scholarship on structural grievances has evolved to try to explain the phenomenon
of collective action by theorizing on the strategic micro-foundations of dissent and action rather
than adopting “structural” explanations (Regan and Norton 2005; Dixon 2014). However, even
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measured at the individual-level, structural grievances themselves may not be sufficient for
explaining foreign fighting because they do not explain why an individual chose to travel and
fight in a particular foreign conflict over another or why they did not choose another type of
collective action in which to participate. Such theories also do not account for the fact that
foreign recruits are unlikely to benefit from improved structural conditions in the country where
the conflict is taking place. A further shortcoming of such arguments is illustrated by research
that has shown that foreign fighters have historically demobilized and returned home after a
conflict’s conclusion, illustrating a potential disconnect between local, structural grievances and
their decisions to fight for a foreign cause (Malet 2015). Nevertheless, findings from this
dissertation remain inclusive in this regarding, suggesting that additional theories and
explanations are required to explain the foreign fighter phenomenon.
Sacred Values
There is a growing body of research (Baron and Spranca 1997; Fiske and Tetlock 1997;
Tetlock 2003; Atran and Axelrod 2008; Ginges and Atran 2009; Berns et al. 2012; Atran 2016)
that suggests that individuals often resist attempts to compromise values they hold as sacred,
regardless of the cost to themselves or to others. These types of “sacred values” are described as
“nonnegotiable preferences whose defense compels actions beyond evident reason, that is
regardless of calculable costs and consequences” (Atran 2016, 193; see also Ginges et al. 2007).
While sacred values often take the form of abstract concepts and objects, such as sacred cows in
Hindu culture (Harris 1966), the sacred status of Jerusalem in the three monotheistic faiths
(Atran and Axelrod 2008), or even sacred forests in India (Chandrakanth and Romm 1991), they
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nonetheless provide one of the driving reasons for human action. The concept of “sacred” in this
context does not have to carry religious connotations; rather, sacred denotes a preference for
objects, beliefs, or practices that an individual will treat as non-fungible.
Sacred values have the power to influence high cost/risk behavior as such values, when
threatened, lessen the societal costs of acting in defense of the value. Therefore, the theory of
sacred values does not say that instrumental logic does not play a role in human decisionmaking; instead, it simply states that behavior, where risk is clearly out of proportion to the
reward, must be driven by something other than instrumental reasons. A devotion to a sacred
value is the intervening mechanism that leads to value-driven (e.g., duty and obligation)
decisions that disregard self-interest (Atran et al. 2014).
The sacred implies far more than religious values but also secularized values embodied in
ideals like human rights (Spickard 1999), sovereignty (Kahn 2009), or democracy (Marietta
2008). Sacred value can also be found in transcendent ideological “isms” from the political
movements of fascism and communism to the ideological lenses of liberalism, socialism, and
anarchism (Atran 2016). Therefore, such values are also referred to in the literature as “moral,”
“ideological,” or “parochial” values because they are derived from the narrow value-systems of a
given individual or ideology. As demonstrated by the evidence suggested by classic rational
choice theory, it seems that the conventional wisdom regards these types of values as relatively
unimportant. But the link between value and commitment to a cause has been illustrated before.
U.S. servicemembers in the Vietnam War is an excellent example: Why did U.S. support for the
Vietnam War fall and why did battlefield morale of U.S. soldiers collapse and desertion rates
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rise? U.S. soldiers felt that “Vietnamization” was a “lost cause” and the potential for democracy
in Vietnam was “a joke” (Spector 1993, 71; see also Moskos 1975). But while U.S. service
members did not have a commitment to the cause of Vietnam, there is documented admiration by
U.S. soldiers of the selfless bravery of the North Vietnamese who were fighting for their cause;
as one U.S. soldier claimed, “they believed in something” (Spector 1993, 71). U.S. soldiers in the
Vietnam War were not defending a sacred value and they therefore had no cause to fight but they
did recognize the perilous efforts of the North Vietnamese to defend one.
The opposite could be said of U.S. servicemembers who volunteered to fight in the U.S.
civil war. As prominent civil war scholar James McPherson (1997) noted, “[U.S.
servicemembers] needed no indoctrination lectures to explain what they were fighting
for…When they enlisted, many of them did so for patriotic and ideological reasons” (McPherson
1997, 91-2). Clearly, devotion to a cause or value is instrumental in motivating individual action.
Especially in a volunteer unit, which the Vietnam War was notably not, it may seem that
devotion be a prerequisite for participation.
Many of the issues integral to modern conflicts are based on sacred values. New
experimental evidence shows that when material incentives are proposed to promote
compromise, such as compromises to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, violent opposition
follows. In a series of experiments with Palestinian students (see Atran, Axelrod, and Davis
2007; Ginges et al. 2007), offering material incentives predicted to be taboo, such as Israel
offering billions of U.S. dollars to Palestinians if Palestinians recognize the sacred and historic
right of the Jewish people to a state, or having Israel pay Palestinian families $1,000 dollars to
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leave and relinquish control of East Jerusalem, did in fact generate responses associated with
violent opposition. The same occurred when researchers proposed that Israelis receive material
incentives from the U.S. to give up the majority of Judea and Samaria. The response to such a
suggestion was perceived as insulting and thus resulted in a negative response that not only
defied the suggestion but caused anger. The conclusions of this research are that sacred values
are not easily compromised and when not addressed properly in a negotiation setting, can lead to
more animosity.
Early evidence from research on ISIS foreign fighters suggests that sacred values play a
key role in motivating the decision of individuals to become foreign fighters. According to
findings published in 2014, “volunteers from Europe and North Africa believe that they are part
of a great historical movement that has reestablished the Islamic Caliphate, and now must fight
to the death if necessary to secure and expand it against Alawite and Shi’ite apostates in
Damascus and Baghdad, then over to take Medina and Mecca, Jerusalem and Cairo” (Atran et al.
2014). In addition, recent interviews with one ISIS widow, who became trapped in a
concentration camp following the collapse of ISIS held strongholds in Syria, told The Sunday
Times (Loyd 2017) that she had “came to Syria as a woman wanting to be empowered by Islamic
principles” (emphasis added).
The significance of the sacred values framework has been supported by a series of other
empirical studies in different conflict contexts (Ginges and Atran 2009; Berns et al. 2012; Atran,
Sheikh, and Gómez 2014a; 2014b; Sheikh, Gómez, and Atran 2016). Comparable findings have
led scholars to postulate a new framework for understanding behavior that seems to defy the
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utility function (i.e., the “rational actor”) that is known as the “devoted actor” framework. The
devoted actor framework is one that integrates two research programs: sacred values and
collective identity (Atran 2016). Evidence from repeated tests of the framework show that
“people will become willing to protect nonnegotiable sacred values through costly sacrifice and
extreme actions when such values are associated with groups whose individual members fuse
into a unique collective identity” (Sheikh, Gómez, and Atran 2016, S204).
Devoted actors are those that are prone to extreme behavior and costly sacrifice, much
like those who choose to fight in someone else’s war when no offer for payment or goods is
available. Could the devoted actor be synonymous with Malet’s (2016) true believer, as was
detailed in Chapter One? Evidence from this dissertation suggest that an individual’s
commitment to sacred values plays a central role in the processes through which individuals go
to participate in foreign fighting. But many individuals can hold an identical value as sacred and
yet only a subset of those individuals might mobilize in defense of that value. Furthermore, only
a subset of individuals might perceive a threat to said value while another subset might not. For
that matter, different subsets of individuals might disagree over how to respond to a threat to a
sacred value. Therefore, this dissertation argues that theoretical explanations are required to
understand how sacred values become motivational and how they are triggered to influence
extreme behavior.
Collective Identity
Collective identity can be understood as the shared perception of belonging to a specific
social group. It provides that shared sense of “we” that defines individual and collective agency
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(Snow 2001). Scholars have generally examined the temporal and spatial aspects of collective
identity as such identities are often linked to a certain generation or period (e.g., the Baby Boom
generation, Woodstock generation) or to a certain space or territory (e.g., a “European” from the
European Union). Considering the internationalization of identity groups, however, it is
increasingly rare that collective identity is tied to time and place alone. There has, for example,
been shown to be an advent of certain “cosmopolitan collective identities” that are influenced by
a sort of global humanism (Pries 2013). On the other hand, recent global trends, especially in the
West, have shown that rather than an increase and overlap in collective identity across the world,
more local and micro-regional identities are also rising in reaction to the culture of globalization
(Inglehart and Norris 2016).
The psychology of identification is wide and deep in human behavior (Moskalenko,
McCauley, and Rozin 2006). Collective identities can be formed in such a way that they could
help overcome collective action problems, realized by helping decision making and social
continuity become much easier. The importance of group identity and cohesion to collective
action has been prevalent since the 1980s when Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson’s (1980)
seminal article illustrated the important relationship between social ties, as will be discussed
below, and organizational recruitment. As their argument stipulated, recruitment is not limited to
dispositional susceptibility, it instead can be influenced by three different stimuli: structural
proximity, availability, and affective interaction among members of a movement or group
(Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980, 787). Collective identities form around such
movements when personal and group identities fuse into one, unique identity to generate a
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“collective” identity (Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow 2001; Atran 2016; Trumpy
2016). Many scholars who study group dynamics emphasize the web of relationships that make
the “collective” more than the sum of its individual parts (e.g., see Dunbar, Knight, and Powers
1999). These relationships are expressed through aspects like sharing a common language or
sharing cultural symbols, rituals, and practices.
A group’s commitment to idiosyncratic beliefs and their associated values can deepen
trust by both identifying cooperators (Moya and Boyd 2016) and galvanizing group solidarity
(Atran and Henrich 2010; Atran 2016). An individual’s bond to a group’s shared values only
applies when the individual in question conceives of themselves as part of some grouping,
whether it be an ethnic, religious, or ideological grouping that organizes comprehensive meaning
(Florini and Simmons 2000; see also Geertz 1973). Stemming primarily from extant theories of
collective identity and what is known as “identity fusion” theory, when an individual’s personal
self-concept is fused with that of a collective, they will be more willing to engage in extreme,
pro-group behavior (Swann et al. 2012). Even when a group is quite large, when its members
share core physical attributes and values, individuals are more likely to project familial ties,
which enhance a willingness to fight and die for that group (Swann et al. 2012). For example,
recent evidence of this theory (Whitehouse et al. 2014) shows that “comrades in arms” have
formed such familial bonds and may explain the willingness of Islamic combatants, including
foreign fighters, in Libya to continue to fight for independence in the country’s ongoing civil
war. Other historical examples point to the significance of “comrades in arms” such as John
McManus’ The Deadly Brotherhood (2003, 279), which argued that U.S. combat soldiers in
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World War II fought for their “devoted fraternity” where men shared both dangers and hardships
on the front lines.
Collective identity is one of the theoretical strands that links self-interested individualism
with group norms of glory, self-sacrifice, and heroism (Lois 1999). As stated by theories of selfinterested individualism, no individual will want to make sacrifices for a group when those
sacrifices are ultimately costly to the individual. Therefore, scholars (Adams 1987; Edelstein
1996) have argued that the very definition of a “hero” is one who performs acts that are
independent of material rewards. However, others (Degenne and Forsé, 1994) argue that it is
only through socialization and feelings of collective identification that individuals are driven
toward such acts. Identity groups create symbolic meaning through attendant norms of behavior
and therefore create group rewards for acts of individual heroism and self-sacrifice for the group.
Heroic status, or “glory,” is therefore a symbolic reward for an act that benefits a collective
group. The theory therefore explains everything from routine volunteer behavior such as
donating blood or giving to charity all the way to sacrificing your life in an act of suicide; the
acts are performed because they perceived as communal activities and are expected by other
members of an identity group.
A founder of social psychology, George Herbert Mead (1934) argued that individuals
developed a sense of who they are, a sense of self-identity, through the reflected appraisals and
expectations of others. It is in these relations with others that identities are fostered, and
attendant norms of behavior are established. Individuals define their very identities by their “fit”
with a broader collective identity (Stets and Burke 2000, 226). For example, according to
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Charles Tilly (2002), ethnic, religious, and nationalist values and solidarity are only meaningful
when they are shared by a broader identity group rather than as individual attributes. So, to what
extent were individuals that mobilized in Spain and Syria motivated by a collective identity
group that shared a specific value as sacred? Did Tunisians mobilize for their purely sectarian
collective identity that adheres to the sacred value of Islam such as the wider Muslim community
(Ummah)? Did U.S. citizens join the International Brigades to fight on behalf of the communist
collective identity and the dream of a global communist revolution? This dissertation will show
that, in these scenarios, it is not only the value that is important (Islam and communism), but the
feeling that the value transcends the individual and pervades a broader identity group that makes
mobilization more likely.
Foreign fighter mobilizations have shown to make up only small proportions of larger
fighting forces. What potentially explains the discrepancy between high numbers of individuals
who likely identify with the collective group and the collective cause of the conflict and the
smaller number who actually choose to go fight to defend it is collective identity. However, as
described by McCauley and Moskalenko (2017, 31) “identification is cheap, and action is
expensive.” Many who do identify with a group or cause are not inclined to extend any support
beyond sympathy. It is only a few who extend resources and even fewer choose to sacrifice their
life for the group or cause. Therefore, while sacred values and collective identity are both
instrumental in explaining the foreign fighter phenomenon, there is one missing condition. It is
the tangible connections to other likeminded individuals, especially close family and friends, that
ultimately transforms individual desire into collective action.
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Social Networks
Social network analysis as it relates to social movement theory and theories of militant
mobilization emphasize the importance of preexisting social ties (Diani and McAdam 2003;
Reynolds and Hafez 2017). Social network analysis, and its emphasis on microstructural
relationships, has been influential in the social sciences (Granovetter 1973; 1983). Doug
McAdam (1986; 1988) might be the most notable scholar of social network theory. McAdam
(1986) designed a unique study that counted “ties” between participants and movement activists
in the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project thus establishing one of the first studies using
network data to explain collective action (see also Polletta and Jasper 2001; Gould 1991). In the
civil conflict literature, preexisting ties are important for militant mobilization because these
networks bring like-minded individuals together and facilitate feelings of duty, pressure, and
groupthink (Diani and McAdam 2003; della Porta 2013). In fact, recent scholarship has already
begun to show that, at least regarding the recruitment trajectory of ISIS members from Europe,
mobilizations are occurring in “networked” communities where individuals have strong
ideological ties to other individuals who are either already fighting or planning on going to fight
in Iraq and Syria (see Reynolds and Hafez 2017 on German foreign fighters to ISIS).
Arguably the most important social network factors studied have been the role of
“linkages”; linkages between individuals and organizations, between organizations and other
organizations, and between movements and settings (Zurcher and Curtis 1973; Rosenthal et al.
1985; McAdam 1988; McAdam and Su 2002). The most obvious, albeit significant, factor
associated with social network theory that contributes to individual involvement in collective
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action has been that recruits to a movement often already know others who are involved in the
movement. Preexisting ties to a movement network provide prospective recruits with reliable
information about the movement and provide solidarity incentives (McAdam and Su 2002). The
second insight associated with social network theory that contributes to individual involvement is
that collective action does not exist in a vacuum; that is, movements develop within established
social settings. For example, social networks are often connected to other movement
organizations in what are known as “multiorganization fields” (Curtis and Zurcher 1973). When
an individual has ties to multiple organizational fields, they are more likely to become recruited
for collective action. Therefore, recruits are often exposed and forced to respond to a variety of
different stimuli before joining a movement and often many recruits are in similar situations that
bring them together for collective action. The final factor associated with social network theory
that contributes to individual involvement in collective action is that movements also have
interactions with already established movements (McAdam 1986). Overlapping membership in
different collective pursuits is common; such multiorganizational fields share personnel,
information, and other resources that allow each movement to be individually successful.
Aside from having a feeling of collective association with a broader identity group, which
is important for theories of collective identity, for social network theory, it is the tangible social
ties in a conflict context that make these mobilizations possible. If networks are a primary force
for mobilizing foreign fighters, then there should be evidence of preexisting social ties prior to a
fighter’s mobilization. A good recent example of network recruitment was illustrated with
biographical records from the Iraq War (2003 – 2011). From analyses of this information, from
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what are known as the Sinjar records, more than half of the 200+ foreign recruits examined
traveled with someone else from their hometown (Felter and Fishman 2007). Furthermore, in an
examination of European foreign fighters to Iraq, it was Belgian and French foreign fighters that
made up the largest proportion of European recruits and in both cases, “two networks, the 19th
and the Kari, were responsible for sending the majority (57 percent) of these individuals to Iraq”
(Holman 2015, 604). The conclusion of Holman’s (2015) analysis of these European foreign
fighters was that not only did these networks help foster the ideological motivation that led
foreign individuals to participate in combat operations in Iraq, but these networks were necessary
in providing the logistical aid that ultimately allowed for a successful foreign fighter
mobilization.
A key shortcoming of social network theory comes from scholars who have claimed that
it is not a theory at all but a descriptive method (Granovetter 1979). Social network analysis, as a
method of distinguishing the density of links between individuals within a predefined space, was
said to be nothing more than a means of determining the structure of a network, not its content
(Borgatti, Brass, and Halgin 2014). As a theory of describing militant mobilization, it could be
said that it is difficult to discern the extent to which a network connection impacted the
motivation of a foreign fighter. It is one thing to say that an individual knew another individual
who may have been involved in a conflict, but did knowing the individual help motivate them to
act? Social network connections are an important variable when constructing networks of foreign
fighters, but further contextualization is required to fully explain why such connections were so
pervasive in influencing individual decisions. This dissertation utilizes the personal narratives of

50
foreign fighters from two different cases, which allows for not only the discovery of social
network links, but the analysis of the content of those links. The data ultimately suggest that
social networks were a necessary condition for explaining the foreign fighter phenomenon.
Conclusion
Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand famously argued that individuals “don’t allow
themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions”
(quoted from Anderson 1998, 212). Based on the background on theoretical antecedents and
given the lack of satisfying answers from classic theories to the question of why an individual
would travel to fight in someone else’s conflict, it is necessary to move beyond such
explanations to explain foreign fighting. At best, such theories provide but one step in a broader
process that can theoretically explain foreign fighting. Explanations, such as personal
victimization or structural grievances, provide the ground by which individuals come to feel that
action is necessary, but they do not provide the primary motivational impetus for their chosen
action. And when economic incentives cannot alone account for patterns of recruitment to
foreign conflicts, social theories, such as collective identity and social network theory, are shown
to better explain the patterns.
This dissertation looks at the supply-side of recruitment by analyzing personal narratives
of foreign fighters. It argues that classic theories of collective action are inadequate for
explaining the prevalence of foreign fighting. One of the key contributions of this dissertation is
that it takes a holistic approach to understanding the foreign fighter phenomenon and
understands the act of foreign fighting as a dynamic process. Ultimately, this dissertation argues
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that a combination of individual processes, such as an individual’s commitment to sacred values,
and social processes, namely social networks and collective identity, best explain the foreign
fighter phenomenon. By using personal narratives to test the six dominant theories of collective
action, this dissertation will provide a comprehensive explanation for the foreign fighter
phenomenon that will be both practically and scholastically relevant. The framework will have
implications for explaining foreign fighting; past, present, and future, and will contribute to
broader theoretical discussions about collective action. The next chapter sets out the study’s
research design, including the hypotheses, operationalization of variables, and specific method of
inquiry.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN
More than 335,000 foreign fighters have participated in ninety-three conflicts during the
last two centuries, from the Greek War of Independence to the present Syrian Civil War (Malet
2013). This dissertation compares two of the largest and most significant foreign fighter
mobilizations in history by comparing the motivations of the U.S. citizens who traveled to fight
for the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War and the Tunisian citizens who traveled to
fight for ISIS in the Syrian Civil War. As detailed in Chapter One, foreign fighters that traveled
to both Spain and Syria are categorized as “true believers” (one of the four ideal types of foreign
fighters) because they fought to preserve institutions of shared ideology. This dissertation utilizes
a comparative analysis of these two cases to test extant theories of collective action and help
better understand the foreign fighter phenomenon and test Malet’s original categorization.
This chapter presents the research design for the dissertation and is divided into three
sections. The first section explains the hypotheses being tested and the operationalization of
variables under study. The second section details the methodology for choosing and analyzing
the cases so that systematic comparisons can be made, and plausible explanations developed. It
also introduces the data and sources used to analyze each case. The chapter concludes with a
discussion of the importance of a comparative analysis of these two cases and explains how the
research design will inform the empirical chapters that analyze each of the cases in greater detail.
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Hypotheses and Variable Operationalization
This dissertation compares two of the most prominent foreign fighter cases of the past
100 years: the roughly 3,000 U.S. citizens who fought for the International Brigades in the
Spanish Civil War and the roughly 3,000 Tunisians who fought for ISIS in the Syrian Civil War.
The dissertation develops six hypotheses from the literature on contentious collective action and
tests these hypotheses using a mixed-method approach that stems from a comparative analysis of
the two cases. Specifically, the study draws from the literatures on collective action, social
movements, and organizational behavior that can be qualitatively tested and compared.
Economic Incentives
As discussed in the previous chapter, theories of collective action have been dominated
by the assumption that economic incentives are necessary to facilitate individual action in
collective pursuits. Such theories stipulate that any decision to participate in collective action is
motivated by methodological individualism, i.e., based on an individual’s own commitment to
maximizing benefits while minimizing costs.
According to Olson (1965), economic incentives are the only way to motivate individuals
in large groups. Especially in an instance like foreign fighting, where the cost of participation is
high and the chance to enforce social incentives is low, the offer of private economic gain is
what would be theorized as motivating foreign fighters. Based on this theoretical background,
the following hypothesis is developed:
H1: An individual will join a foreign conflict if they have a private economic incentive to
do so.
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Economic incentives are operationalized as remunerative motivations in the form of a
direct, monetary payment to participate or other financial motivations such as the chance for
entrepreneurship or employment. Simply stated, if an individual cites payment, chance for profit,
chance to obtain goods, or chance for employment opportunities as a reason for joining a foreign
conflict, it could be said that they are doing it for economic reasons.
Some scholars have argued that social incentives and moral incentives play into the
standard utility function and therefore belong in the rational choice framework (e.g., see
Harsanyi 1977). This is not something that is broadly accepted (for an overview see Kraus and
Coleman 1987). This analysis follows the mainstream and considers social and moral incentives
as outside of the Olsonian framework of economic rationality, which stipulates that only
economic incentives are enough to overcome the free-rider problem (Olson 1965, 61). Moral and
social theories are also tested and are operationalized as sacred values and collective identity
below.
Personal Victimization
Individuals are often driven to participate in collective movements, especially those that
harbor reactionary objectives, because of a perception of unjustified harm against them.
However, scholars indicate that feelings of personal victimization seldom act as sufficient
motivators for contentious collective action (McCauley and Moskalenko 2010). For example,
many individuals who feel victimized do not know or cannot reach the perpetrator who
victimized them. Instead, their target potentially becomes the larger group that the perpetrators
are seen to represent. In this sense, personal victimization does not always lead to contentious
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collective action unless it is interpreted as part of a larger struggle (McCauley and Moskalenko
2008).
Many individuals, especially in areas where violence and repression are high, are likely
to have some direct experience, a sense of personal victimization, brought on by an enemy. For
example, McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) cite the case of Chechen Black Widows who were
driven to use suicide terrorism because they had been widowed or otherwise brutalized by the
Russian Army and were seeking revenge (see also Granville-Chapman 2004; Parfitt 2004). In
this example, there is a direct link between the abuse suffered by the widows and the Russian
Army that they sought revenge against, but as mentioned in the previous chapter, perceived
injustices can result in anger against an entire class of people, such as the case of several foreign
fighters to the Spanish Civil War, who linked the feelings of victimization they developed
because of the Great Depression to the rise of fascism abroad. The following hypothesis is drawn
from this theoretical background:
H2: An individual will join a foreign conflict if they develop a feeling of personal
victimization that motivates them to action.
Personal victimization is in some cases easy to operationalize and in other cases quite
difficult. A victim is a person who suffers direct or threatened emotional or physical harm as a
result of someone else. So, for example, the loss of a loved one because of trauma associated
with a perpetrator is easy to identify. However, feeling humiliated is more difficult because
humiliation is personally felt, though some causes of humiliation are obvious to identify.
Victimization is often subjective, and therefore a feeling of victimization or of humiliation is

56
personal. In all cases, whether foreign fighter identifies a physical attack that causes a feeling of
victimization or identifies an action that leads them to express feelings of victimization, both will
be operationalized as personal victimization.
Structural Grievances
Explanations for collective action are understood to be structural grievances when they
deal with grievances with the social, political, economic, or cultural environment in which
individuals live. These factors often take the form of long-term conditions such as poverty and
unemployment and act as a primary motivational impetus for collective action because they
contribute to the objective grievances of any individual or group. In the literature described in
Chapter Two, structural grievances are commonly referred to as push factors, which are
described as the negative social, cultural, and political features of one’s societal environment that
push vulnerable individuals onto the path of violence.
Structural grievances such as poverty and inequality have been frequently examined in
the cross-national literature on collective violence. Other structural grievances can be found in
the political structures of society including political and legal inequality and state repression, and
in the social structures of society including religious and ethnic inequality. All are forms of
structural grievances that can motivate collective action (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Stewart 2011). From this theoretical background, the following hypothesis is
proposed:
H3: An individual will join a foreign conflict if they perceive a structural grievance that
motivates them to action.
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Typically operationalized as cross-national variables, structural grievances in this study
are operationalized as micro-foundations of dissent that are conducive to collective violence by
enabling, motivating, and by supplying triggers that lead to the commission of violence by an
individual. For example, persistent economic, political, or social inequality, unemployment,
poverty, authoritarianism, a lack of access to education, or a lack of other meaningful
opportunities can provide a motivational impetus for action. In the context of foreign fighting,
the existence of structural grievances in the fighter’s home country may not provide the reason to
join a particular insurgency but instead provide the fighter with the sense that there is nothing
keeping them in their home country, pushing them toward a new avenue abroad, such as a
foreign conflict. Furthermore, a foreign fighter can perceive of a local structural grievance as
being caused by a foreign entity for which they are going to fight against. Finally, an individual
may identify with structural grievances expressed by a group with which that individual
associates with. In all cases, the individual does not necessarily have to be directly affected by
the structural grievance, as is necessary for explaining theories of personal victimization, to
mobilize on behalf of that grievance. As in the example used in the previous chapter, an
individual does not need to be unemployed for them to be aggrieved by persistent, mass
unemployment in their country.
Sacred Values
Individuals have been shown to join collective pursuits, including foreign fighting, for
more parochial reasons, or reasons found in the moral or ideological psyche of the individual.
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Those committed to sacred values, or non-negotiable values or preferences, are said to join
collective pursuits even when the cost of such an action outweighs any potential benefit.
Sacred values have the power to influence high-risk behavior as such values, when
threatened, lessen the societal costs of acting in defense of the value. Therefore, the theory does
not stipulate that instrumental logic does not play a role in human decision-making; instead, it
simply states that behavior where risk is clearly out of proportion to the reward, such as foreign
fighting, must be driven by something other than instrumental reasons. This dissertation
hypothesizes that a devotion to a sacred value is a mechanism that leads to value-driven
decisions (Atran et al. 2014). The hypothesis is as follows:
H4: An individual will join a foreign conflict to support or defend a value they hold as
sacred.
As stated in the previous chapter, the “sacred” implies far more than religious values but
can also be found in transcendent ideological “isms” including the ideological lenses of
communism, fascism, liberalism, socialism, anarchism, and religious movements as found in the
crusades or modern jihadism (Atran 2016). Values are general beliefs about desirable ends and
represent motivational goals. If one was to think of values as being operationalized in opposition
to economic incentives, one could instead think of values as parochial incentives, in that they are
based on an individual’s narrow value system, moral incentives, in that they are based a
commitment to do what is perceived to be “just” or “right,” or ideological incentives, in that they
are based on a collective belief system that offers meaning to action (see Ginges and Atran
2009). Parochial, moral, and ideological incentives are subjective and not universal. For
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example, if one was to say that a positive relationship could be found between individual desires
to defend the communist dream in Spain and their willingness to fight for the International
Brigades in the Spanish Civil War and a positive relationship between individual desire to
institute global Sharia law in Syria and their willingness to fight for the ISIS in the Syrian Civil
War then one could say that both sets of individuals are fighting for these types of incentives.
Both represent parochial, moral, and/or ideological incentives in that the incentive is internal to
that individual or that cause.
Collective Identity
Collective identity groups are defined by their shared boundaries, interconnectedness, and
interdependence (McCauley and Moskalenko 2017). Some groups have discreet interactions and
a hierarchical organization of members while some groups have little to no interaction and no
hierarchy. Some individuals feel congeniality towards members of an identity group even when
those individuals have never met. When an individual’s personal self-concept is merged with that
of a collective, they will be more willing to engage in extreme, pro-group behavior. Individuals
derive meaning from groups; whether an action is deemed acceptable, expected, or even heroic is
derived from group preferences (Lois 1999).
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, according to theories of collective identity, a
visceral feeling of oneness with a group can encourage strong pro-group behavior even if that
group is part of an “extended” collective where strong relational ties exist without any personal
relation (Swann et al. 2012). Collective identity can be understood as the shared perception of
belonging to a specific social group and implies a cognitive, moral, and emotional connection
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with a broader community (Polletta and Jasper 2001). It provides the shared sense of “we” that
defines individual and collective agency (Snow 2001). Even when a group is quite large, when
its members share core physical attributes and values, individuals are more likely to project
familial ties which enhance a willingness to fight and die for that group (Swann et al. 2012).
From the theoretical tradition of collective identity, a testable hypothesis can be articulated:
H5: An individual will join a foreign conflict when that individual’s self-identity is
merged with a collective identity that they mobilize to defend.
Collective identity is different from other related terms in the discipline such as other
social identity, personal identity, relational identity, or social role. Collective identification is a
statement about categorical membership. A collective identity is one that is shared with a group
of others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristic(s) in common such as gender,
race, ethnicity, or shared profession like doctor or lawyer, or shared ideological preference such
as with a political party or organization (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004).
Regardless of the identity in question, the goal is to identify the way in which identification
fosters a sense of either obligation, altruism, or loyalty to a collective group.
The perceived shared commonality felt by individuals for an identity group does not
require direct contact or interchange with all others who share category membership; rather, the
positioning is psychological in nature. Furthermore, individuals can have multiple, and
sometimes even overlapping, collective identities. The goal of this study is to identify the
salience of a collective identification given the conflict in question and then identify whether an
individual is committed to a foreign conflict based on that identification. In the same sense that a
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commitment to an ideological value can motivate individuals to participate in a foreign conflict
so too can a commitment to fellow individuals who share similar values or commitments to a
cause. One example that will be discussed in Chapter Five is when a Tunisian foreign fighter
cites his commitment to his fellow Muslims and the global Muslim community (Ummah) as a
motivation for joining ISIS. Several individuals cite the defense of fellow Muslims in Iraq and
Syria as a key motivation in joining ISIS, citing a sense of collective duty (far al-kifaya) that is
borne from a collective responsibility to defend the Muslim community.
Social Networks
The concrete interconnectedness of a group is also one of the primary mechanisms that
help turn feelings into action. According to theories of social networks, when multiple
individuals share tangible ties to a network of like-minded individuals, they are more likely to
band together to achieve common goals, even when the action can be quite extreme. Social
network analysis as it relates to social movement theory and theories of militant mobilization
emphasize the importance of preexisting social ties (Diani and McAdam 2003; Reynolds and
Hafez 2017). According to the theory, if networks are a primary force for mobilizing foreign
fighters, then there should be evidence of preexisting social or kinship ties prior to a fighter’s
mobilization. Therefore, aside from having a feeling of collective association with a broader
identity group, which is important for theories of collective identity, for social network theory, it
is the tangible social ties in a conflict context that make these mobilizations possible. Thus, the
following hypothesis can be articulated;
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H6: An individual will join a foreign conflict if they have preexisting social ties and
linkages to other foreign fighters in a network.
Evidence for this hypothesis will be garnered from basic network data: Did an individual
join with a friend, family member, or colleague? Did the individual coordinate their activity with
other network members who are already active in the conflict zone? Is there evidence of
networked mobilization occurring in a specific neighborhood, organization, or social/religious
institution? Did an individual mention recruitment networks such as a mosque or local religious
gathering, in the case of Tunisian foreign fighters, that helped facilitate their recruitment into
ISIS? A “Yes” to any one of these questions could be evidence of social network playing a key
role in foreign fighter mobilizations.
Methodology
Malet (2013) presented case studies of disparate transnational civil conflicts to explore
the influence of the variables of ethnic conflict and co-ethnicity on recruitment propaganda. As
described in Chapter One, Malet (2013) chose representative cases from each quadrant of his
foreign fighter typology to perform structured comparisons. The basis of the comparative method
comes from John Stuart Mill’s (1843) Methods of Agreement and Difference, which was updated
and expanded for the contemporary social sciences by Henry Teune and Adam Przeworski’s
(1970) Most Different and Most Similar Systems Designs. The strategies presented in both works
have many parallels and can today be generally referred to as “Most Similar Systems – Different
Outcomes” and “Most Different Systems – Similar Outcomes.”
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Most Similar Systems – Different Outcome designs seek to identify independent
variables that differ among otherwise similar systems, which can be isolated to account for the
particular outcome, or dependent variable, under study. Most Different Systems – Similar
Outcome designs seek to identify independent variables that are the same among otherwise
dramatically different systems to account for similarities in a particular outcome, or dependent
variable, under study. With both strategies, the systems are selected regarding the specific
contextual conditions influencing the object under investigation (Landman and Robinson 2009).
This dissertation adopts a Most Different Systems – Similar Outcome approach and
examines two dramatically different cases from within Malet’s (2013) true believer-type of
foreign fighters. While not denying the rich results from comparing “like with like,” the price
paid for the similar research design is a lack of empirically founded answers to the question of
the effective differences and similarities in phenomena. As Tilly (2004, 8) reminded us with
specific reference to political violence, in the social sciences the value of a concept is linked to
its capacity to “point to detectable phenomena that exhibit some degree of causal coherence.”
To identify the process by which an individual makes the decision to become a foreign
fighter, this dissertation analyzes two of the most significant foreign fighter mobilizations from
the same ideal type: The U.S. citizens who fought for the International Brigades in the Spanish
Civil War and the Tunisians who fought for ISIS in the Syrian Civil War. Both cases have the
same outcome, a foreign fighter mobilization, and due to significant differences between the two
cases, several possible explanations for this outcome can be deemed unnecessary. The objective
of this dissertation is to conduct qualitative content analysis of personal narratives and interviews
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of foreign fighters from different mobilization contexts to test the six bodies of theory presented
in Chapter Two. Due to data limitations, such as a small sample size and selection bias that are
discussed in greater detail below, this dissertation’s findings cannot prove causality. Instead, if
evidence linking one of the theories to becoming a foreign fighter is found and is similar across
two otherwise very different mobilization contexts, then I conclude that there is reasonable
evidence to support the related theoretical reason contributing to foreign fighting.
The two case studies require different methods for extrapolating the necessary data to
make meaningful comparisons. Both methods have caveats that are detailed below. However,
one consideration that applies to both cases is that neither case study includes a control group by
which to compare significant differences between foreign fighters and members of the nonforeign fighter population. For both cases, I am examining the decision made by individuals to
become foreign fighters after those decisions have been made. Therefore, I am limited in my
ability to assign study conditions at random, such as would be common in experimental designs,
and therefore cannot ensure that a control group would be equivalent to the foreign fighter group
under investigation.
Appropriate steps to compare foreign fighters to the general population from which they
came were taken. Because the case of U.S. foreign fighters is historical case, it was not possible
to establish a control group by which to compare the decision-making process of individuals who
become foreign fighters with those who did not. However, comparative demographic data was
drawn from the 1930 U.S. Census as a means of comparing the demographic statistics on U.S.
foreign fighters with that of the general population. In the case of Tunisian foreign fighters, I
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attempted to overcome the lack of a control group by interviewing individuals with similar age
ranges and backgrounds, mostly Tunisian students around the same age as the average Tunisian
foreign fighter, and asked questions concerning why these individuals did not become foreign
fighters. Then, using qualitative content analysis and interviews, I suggest some differences
among the two groups. I also analyzed demographic data drawn from the 2014 Tunisian Census
as a means of comparing the demographic statistics on Tunisian foreign fighters with that of the
general population. Even without an assigned control group in either case, the results still yield
reasonable evidence. Furthermore, the methods and data used for this dissertation provide an
important benchmark to analyze comparative instances of foreign fighting across time and
cultural context.
Data on U.S. Foreign Fighters to the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War
The study analyzes archival data, specifically correspondence, diaries, speeches and
public statements, and autobiographies written by the U.S. foreign fighters who fought for the
International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War. Contrary to Malet’s (2013, 7) proposition that
“even among well documented cases, self-reported explanations for joining exist from only
dozens of recruits out of thousands in each instance,” vast documentation exists of the U.S.
citizens who fought in the International Brigades.
There is a physical and digital archive for the Abraham Lincoln Brigade known as the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives (ALBA), which includes a working database of every U.S.
citizen who volunteered. The database includes “as much accurate information as is available on
each of them” and can further “point users to related materials in the ALBA archives” (ALBA
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2017). This database not only includes extensive biographical information for each volunteer
such as name, date and place of birth and death, ethnicity, education, marital status, vocation and
job history, and service dates, which was used to collect basic information, but it also includes
documentary information and special notes about each member (when applicable) and references
to where more information can be obtained (Figure 1). In the ALBA archives alone, there are
collections of personal narratives attributed to approximately 300 individuals that document the
stories of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade volunteers in addition to yet uncategorized postcards and
oral history interviews that were used to test the hypotheses.
As detailed in Chapter One, there were approximately 3,000 U.S. citizens that fought for
the International Brigades. The cataloging of the most basic information of this population into a
dataset serves a useful purpose in that preliminary inferences can be drawn just by looking at the
descriptive statistics. However, it is not possible to draw a representative sample from the
population of U.S. foreign fighters to analyze more deeply. The empirical social scientist defines
sampling as “a procedure by which information of measurable reliability is obtained from only a
part of the total population” and a representative sample is one drawn in such a way, usually
randomly, that it accurately reflects the characteristics of the larger population (Lewinson 1957,
292). Archives are repositories of surviving records, made available to researchers selectively
based on their value and conditions (Lewinson 1957). The available archival material on the
roughly 300 U.S. foreign fighters include documents scattered across more than 400,000
individual paper categories between two different archives, with individual archival items
numbering in the millions. It also includes hundreds of hours of oral history interviews. While
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this material is extensive, and potentially illustrates many aspects of the U.S. foreign fighters
who fought for the International Brigades, it is not representative.
Figure 1. Sample Online ALBA Entry
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This dissertation analyzed more deeply a subset of the archival material by taking a sixtyperson sample from the 300 individuals where detailed information was available. A sample of
sixty individuals was taken to both make comparisons consistent with the available sample size
of Tunisian foreign fighters, which, as is mentioned below, was fifty-seven individuals, and for
convenience. The sample of sixty individuals reduced documentation down to a more
manageable subset of the archives and included more than 10,000 individual pieces of archival
material and roughly 150 hours of oral history interviews. Before selecting the sample, I
confirmed with archivists the scope of availability for all individual files, confirmed that the
documentation available across all files were relatively homogenous, and the sample was then
chosen randomly using a random number generator. This was the only way to connect the
archival sampling technique with the assumptions of sampling theory, though there is still
selection bias (Boles 1981).
The archival data available for the sixty-member sample included a mix of
correspondence, diaries, autobiographies, oral history interviews, speeches, public statements,
and biographies (Table 4). Some individuals only had a handful of surviving letters to examine.
Others had a combination of the six types of archival material. Most of the archival data came
from correspondence written by U.S. foreign fighters while fighting in Spain. Fifty-three of the
sixty individuals in the sample had correspondence to examine. Of those fifty-three, thirty had
exclusively correspondence to examine. Seven of the individuals in the sample kept diaries
during their time in Spain. Eleven of the sixty wrote some form of autobiographical account
about their time in Spain. Not all autobiographies were published. Seventeen of the individuals in
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the sample were interviewed previously by scholars about their experiences during the war and
the original, unedited audio files from those original interviews are available. Five of the
individuals gave some form of lecture or public statement regarding their motivations and time in
Spain, the transcript or original audio for which were available. Finally, two individuals in the
sample, Robert Hale Merriman and John Victor Murra, had biographies written about them.
Merriman’s was written by his wife and relied on autobiographical material kept by Merriman
himself (such as his diary, which was also available for archival research) as well as firsthand
accounts from her time with him (Merriman and Lerude 1986). Murra’s was published in a
special issue in Andean Past (2009) and was written in a series of articles from friends (Barnes
2009), colleagues (Block and Barnes 2009), and mentees (Lechtman, Wolf de Romero, Netherly,
et al. 2009) that captured Murra’s experiences both as a communist youth fighting in the Spanish
Civil War and as Professor of Anthropology at Cornell University.
Table 4. Archival Material of U.S. Foreign Fighter Sample
Correspondence
Diary
Autobiography
Oral History Interview
Speech/Public Statement
Biography
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7
11
17
5
2

Archival data was collected as systematically as possible. A checklist was established to
permit the systematic and objective collection of data (see Appendix B). Every piece of archival
material potentially contained evidence of a foreign fighter’s motivation. The archival checklist
denoted what type of archival material was being examined, e.g., letter, diary, speech, public
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statement, autobiography, oral history interview, or biography and then the potential factors
hypothesized as motivating the foreign fighter were spelled out in checklist format so that if any
of the variables presented were mentioned, they could be simply checked off. What this means is
that for any given piece of archival material, multiple potential explanations could be checked
off. In the end, numerous pieces of archival material, all attributed to a single individual fighter,
could be examined and a clear picture of their motivations could be established based on the
propensity of their explicit mentions of certain motivations.
Data on Tunisian Foreign Fighters to ISIS in the Syrian Civil War
A dataset of Tunisian foreign fighters was created using recruit dossiers known as the
“ISIS border documents.” The dossiers included biographical information on 650 Tunisians who
joined ISIS between 2011 and 2014. Twenty-four fields were included in the ISIS border
documents. They included: The individual’s name, Kunyah (nom de guerre), Mother’s name,
blood type, date of birth and nationality, marital status, address and place of residence,
educational qualification, level of obedience, level of religious knowledge, place of current work,
prior employment, travel history, point of entry into Syria, name of recommenders, date of entry,
past jihadi experience, envisioned role with IS, specialty, deposit items, date of death, place of
death, address to communicate with, and notes (Figure 2). The information in these documents is
not publicly available and while full names were given in the documents, for this dissertation and
future publications, they will remain confidential. It is important to note that the dossiers of the
650 Tunisian citizens represent approximately 20% of the roughly 3,000 Tunisians who traveled
to Iraq and Syria. Therefore, while the ISIS border documents provide the most comprehensive
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demographic picture of a Tunisian ISIS fighter, it represents a mere snapshot of Tunisia’s total
foreign fighter contingent.
This demographic information was supplemented with interview and focus group
findings produced by ITES (Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies), which interviewed eightythree individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses in Tunisian prisons, fifty-seven of
whom were (attempted or successful) foreign fighters to ISIS. ITES sought answers to a battery
of questions, including name, date and place of birth, ethnicity, education, prior military service,
marital status, vocation, and service dates. More in-depth information collected from these
interviews and focus groups measured an individual’s degree of religiosity, degree of ethnic
solidarity (i.e., identification as Arab), and degree of religious identity (i.e., identification as
Sunni) and whether the individual fought for these values. Data was also collected on relevant
socio-economic information such as the foreign fighter’s level of poverty, employment,
education, and literacy and political information such as the foreign fighter’s degree of
disenchantment with political institutions, and degree of adherence to a radical political ideology.
Identities of all individuals were kept strictly confidential in the ITES reports.
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Figure 2. Sample ISIS Border Document

It is important to note that, as was the case with U.S. foreign fighters to Spain, neither the
ISIS border documents nor the interview and focus group data on fifty-seven foreign fighters are
meant to be representative of the Tunisian foreign fighter population. There does not exist a
complete accounting of the Tunisian foreign fighters who fought for ISIS. As previously
mentioned, the ISIS border documents provide the most comprehensive demographic picture of
Tunisian foreign fighters to date. Furthermore, the sample of fifty-seven Tunisian foreign
fighters analyzed for the prison study were chosen based on convenience. These were the
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individuals who were made available to Tunisian researchers by the Tunisian government, had
met the criteria of having already been convicted of terrorism-related offenses for traveling to
fight with ISIS, and the data for which were then made available to me. However, as was
mentioned in Chapter One, this is the first-time detailed information on Tunisian foreign fighters
has been made available to a researcher. The analysis of this data therefore illustrates, if it does
not completely represent, aspects these individual’s motivations for becoming foreign fighters.
In addition to being able to analyze summaries of the ITES findings, I was able to
interview the scholars responsible for overseeing the interviews and focus groups and I was able
to probe the researchers on a battery of questions that would provide comparable data to what
was available in the archives relating to the U.S. foreign fighters. Additional interview data was
independently collected from friends, family members, and acquittances who knew foreign
fighters who joined ISIS or had returned, and from key members of Tunisia’s security sector,
including members of Tunisia’s government, to provide the fullest picture of why Tunisians
joined ISIS. This was in addition to informal, ethnographic interviews conducted over the course
of multiple visits to Tunisia. Where appropriate, the full name and title of the individual
interviewed is given with reference to the dates in which interviews were conducted. Information
on returnees was kept strictly confidential.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the hypotheses being tested for the dissertation and explained how
variables are operationalized. The chapter also detailed how the case studies were chosen and
explained the specific method of inquiry. As previously mentioned in Chapter One, the theories
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tested, and methods used for this study, make an important contribution to the nascent literature
on foreign fighting. For example, by collating, for the first time, details about every U.S. foreign
fighter that participated in the Spanish Civil War into a unique dataset will be useful for future
qualitative or quantitative analyses of foreign fighters. Furthermore, the content analysis of the
interview and focus group data on Tunisian foreign fighters who have returned from Iraq and
Syria represent some of the first reported personal accounts of individual experiences with
fighting for ISIS in the Syrian Civil War, which will help contribute to further analyses of
Tunisian foreign fighters in comparative and historical perspective.
The next two chapters analyze, in-depth, the two cases under study. Chapter Four
analyzes the U.S. foreign fighter who fought for the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil
War. The chapter begins by contextualizing the conflict in Spain with current events happening
around the world, including a U.S. population contending with the difficulties of the Great
Depression. It then provides a demographic overview of the roughly 3,000 U.S. citizens that
became foreign fighters in Spain before dissecting the specific motivations of a sample of sixty
U.S. foreign fighters. Chapter Five does the same with Tunisian foreign fighters. It begins by
contextualizing the conflicts in Iraq and Syria by analyzing more in-depth the effects of the Arab
Spring on the world and on Tunisia in particular. The chapter then provides a general
demographic profile of Tunisian foreign fighters before analyzing the motivations of fifty-seven
Tunisian foreign fighters.

CHAPTER FOUR
UNITED STATES FOREIGN FIGHTERS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES IN THE
SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1936-39)
Harry Fisher was eighteen years old and working as a department store clerk for the
women’s division of the Sears Roebuck company on October 29, 1929 when the U.S. stock
market crashed. In his autobiography, Fisher described the contrasting impacts that then had on
his life and work. He was asked by his boss to bring a note to the Bank of the U.S. for an
immediate transfer of $50,000 (approximately $750,000 in 2020 U.S. dollars) to be deposited in
another bank. Fisher expressed utter shock when the transaction was processed without delay.
Next, on the evening of that same day, Fisher came home to his working-class family to find his
mother in tears having lost the family’s $1,500 (approximately $25,000 in 2020 U.S. dollars)
savings that was being kept in the same Bank of the U.S. This series of events had a major
impact on Fisher. He cited this as a critical moment in his move toward leftist politics; Fisher
would go on to join and work for the Department Store Employee’s Union, later joining the
Youth Communist League (YCL) and the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). He
became a life-long activist of worker’s rights and progressive politics.
Robert Hale Merriman was 20 years old and working as a department store clerk, for J.C.
Penny, when the stock market crashed in 1929. Merriman experienced the effects of this market
change not through the actions of family or coworkers but through the lens of economic theory.
Merriman was an economics student at the University of Nevada when the crash occurred. He
75
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had received a full university scholarship as a member of the Reserve Officer Training Corp
(ROTC), had worked various jobs, like the one at the department store, to help secure additional
income while living away from his modest home in California, and was from a moderately
successful family where his father worked as a mechanic and mother as a fiction writer.
Merriman was fascinated by the impact the market crash had on politics and at the suggestion by
a faculty member, took up doctoral studies at the University of California at Berkeley in
economics. Unlike with Fisher, Merriman’s experience with the depression was academic rather
than personal and in 1935, he applied for and received a fellowship from Berkeley to study the
economics of collective farming in Moscow, Russia. Inspired by other left-wing academics and
critics living in Moscow at the time, Merriman became a strong proponent of progressive
economic policy.
While having come from two very different backgrounds both Fisher and Merriman, then
young department store clerks, cited these experiences as influential in their decision to travel to
Spain in 1937 to fight for the Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War. Fisher served as a
runner for Commander Oliver Law, the first African American to command an integrated
military unit. Merriman, with his ROTC background, rose to the rank of Chief of Staff of the XV
International Brigade, making him one of the highest-ranking U.S. citizens in the war. Merriman
gave his life fighting in the war, having disappeared behind enemy lines during the Great
Retreats of the International Brigades in March 1938, while Fisher lived until 2003, when he
died at the age of ninety-two while in New York City (NYC) protesting the Iraq War.
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Over the course of the Spanish Civil War, 60,000 individuals from fifty-four different
countries would volunteer to fight for the International Brigades. Fisher and Merriman, along
with a contingent of approximately 3,000 other U.S. citizens, formed the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade,1 a unit of the International Brigades made up of primarily U.S. citizens.2 These
individuals faced many barriers to participation, including a commitment of neutrality by the
U.S., a legal ban on travel to Spain, and a lack of financing and organization to make the
journey. As described in Chapter Two, classic theories of collection action, social movements,
and organizational behavior suggest that economic incentives, personal victimization, and
structural grievances are the dominant paradigms for understanding why contentious collective
action, especially violent political action, occurs. But data from this chapter suggest that the
dominant paradigms have limited explanatory value in this case. So, why did these U.S. citizens
take the extraordinary risk of participating as foreign fighters in the Spanish Civil War? This
chapter argues that the U.S. foreign fighters to Spain were primarily driven by an interaction of
three factors.
The first and most important factor was the connection of U.S. foreign fighters to closeknit social networks that helped link their local struggles to the plight of the Spanish Republic.

1

The Abraham Lincoln Brigade was the first American unit of the XV International Brigades and was also known
as the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, or the Lincoln Battalion for short. The second contingent of fighters to arrive in
Spain in 1937 formed the George Washington Battalion. The casualties of both were so heavy that in mid-1937 the
two were merged to form the Lincoln-Washington Battalion. Today, the contingent of American foreign fighters to
Spain is colloquially known as the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
In late-1937, the newly formed Canadian MacKenzie-Papineau Battalion (“Mac-Pacs”) was incorporated into the
XV International Brigades. Prior to the formation of this Canadian battalion, several Canadian volunteers were
members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Many Americans who joined at the same time as Canadian volunteers
were also placed with the Mac-Pacs. Two-thirds of the nominally Canadian unit were American.
2
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Every member except for one individual, or 98% of the sample analyzed for this study, was
linked to a network that helped foster recruitment and mobilization. As foreign sponsors of
International Brigades, the CPUSA and the Communist International (Comintern) tapped both
local and global recruitment networks of motivated individuals to help them overcome the
physical barriers to mobilization. As indicated by demographic data on U.S. foreign fighters,
these organizations targeted existing social networks for recruitment, especially trade unions and
immigrant networks in major urban centers. These associations worked together to help register
would-be U.S. foreign fighters for passports, created transit plans that helped U.S. foreign
fighters circumvent the U.S. and European travel bans, and provided the financial support
necessary to transport U.S. foreign fighters to Spain. Social networks stand out as a necessary
condition driving the mobilization of U.S. foreign fighters to Spain for without it, even the most
ideologically motivated individuals would have been unable to organize and travel successfully.
Second, U.S. foreign fighters were driven by an ideological and moral commitment to the
Republic’s cause in Spain, most notably the defense of Spanish democracy and the left-wing
political values of the Republic. The U.S. foreign fighters, therefore, conform to the original
categorization made by Malet (2016), and detailed in Chapter One, that foreign fighters to the
Spanish Civil War were, in fact, “true believers.” The commitment of U.S. foreign fighters to
sacred values was significant; 92% of the sample cited sacred values as motivating their decision
to fight for the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Specifically, the U.S. foreign fighters believed that if
they could not put a stop to the rising tide of global fascism, then the cause of global
progressivism, as embodied by values such as worker’s rights and communism, would falter.
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This commitment fostered these foreign fighters’ “will to fight” and made them susceptible to
targeted recruitment.
Third, and finally, U.S. foreign fighters associated their working-class identities to a
wider transnational collective identity that favored progressive economic and political policies.
According to the demographic data on U.S. foreign fighters, 69% where an occupation could be
determined had “blue-collar” professions and roughly one-third were members of a trade or labor
union. U.S. foreign fighters saw Spain as a battleground for worker’s rights and by defending
those rights in Spain they were fighting for those rights everywhere. This collective identity,
which was cited by 68% of the sample, ultimately helped foster collective beliefs about the war
and helped groups of individuals overcome psychological barriers that led them to the fight in
Spain.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. The first details the background
to the Spanish Civil War, both in Spain and in the U.S., to help provide situational context for the
mobilization of U.S. foreign fighters to Spain. Section two details the demographic profile of the
average U.S. foreign fighter using data on roughly 2,800 U.S. citizens who joined the
International Brigades. Section three builds on this demographic profile by analyzing available
archival data from a sample of sixty U.S. foreign fighters to test the six hypotheses presented in
Chapter Three. The final section concludes with a summary and analysis of the findings.
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Background to the Conflict
Spain before the War
On July 17, 1936, a faction of the Spanish army, led by General Francisco Franco,
revolted against the Second Spanish Republic in an attempted coup d’état. The initial attempt
failed to unseat the democratically elected Spanish government as groups of loyalists rallied to
the defense of Spain, maintaining control of the capital, Madrid, and other major strongholds
including Barcelona and Valencia. The rebels had been planning the coup d’état since January
1936, and by that summer had secured the support of around half of Spain’s Peninsular army,
about 66,000 men, as well as the 30,000-strong Army of Africa (Beevor 2006). Both parties
scrambled to generate stopgap armed support from abroad. By November of that year, Franco
returned to the capital with a faction of his forces newly accompanied by Moroccan mercenaries,
Italian tank units, and German Junkers, in a march over the Bridge of Toledo that spans the
Manzanares River in Madrid. Over 10,000 people died or were injured in what became the most
concerted and deadly effort of the war to capture the Spanish capital from the democratically
elected Spanish government. A stiff resistance, and additional counterattacks by the newly
established XV International Brigade made up of the Republic’s first foreign fighters, helped
beat back Franco and keep the capital under Republican control.
To understand why these first deadly clashes transpired, and why the subsequent threeyear long civil war was waged, it is important to understand the underlying causes of unrest and
turbulence in Spain prior to the war. At the center of this conflict was a war of ideologies. It was
a war of feudalism against socialism, authoritarianism against democracy, regionalism against
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centralization, and ultimately fascism against communism. Such ideological animosities date
back to the unification of Spain in the sixteenth century when the country was at the height of its
power. But the Spain of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, facing persistent economic
and political unrest and a ruling class that consistently resisted progressive change, became a
hotbed for radical reform movements seeking to establish a new order. In the context of rising
political extremism around the turn of the twentieth century, specifically the rise of fascism and
communism, Spain became one of the first flashpoints of what would become a global struggle
between these two political extremes.
The attempted 1936 coup d’état was a military response to new liberal and democratic
reforms in Spain. The alliance of nationalist forces that attacked the republic clung to
conservative traditions such as Catholic monarchism, a feudal economic system, and strong state
control (Beevor 2006). These traditions are best associated with the Spanish Reconquista
(Reconquest) (711-1492), when Spain was reconsolidated and unified under the Christian rule of
Ferdinand and Isabella. Under their rule, the feudal-military order that helped reunify Spain was
complemented by new Catholic political forces by way of the Spanish Inquisition, which was
formed to help oversee the conversion of Muslims and Jews to Christianity after Christian
military forces expelled Muslim governments from the Iberian Peninsula (Boase 2002). Land
rights were maintained by traditionalist Spanish landlords, all of whom were backed by the army
and the clergy, and a large peasantry received little if any help from the state, which favored
large landowners and producers (Fernsworth 1936). The traditional order was therefore
simultaneously feudal and authoritarian. In the context of modern Spanish politics, and with
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fascist political parties gaining strength in Spain in the 1930s, these traditions became the basis
of the new nationalist ideology.
Spain was an outlier among other western European countries in terms of political and
economic development. During the eighteenth century, unlike much of the continent, Spain had
rejected the Enlightenment agenda of rationalism, productivism, and meritocracy. When Spain
was invaded by Napoleonic France in the early-nineteenth century during the Napoleonic Wars
(1803 – 1815), Spaniards associated Enlightenment-era thinking with a new form of European
despotism (Boase 2002). The continued rejection of such principles ultimately stunted Spain’s
development. One extreme result of this was a series of political crises, including thirty-seven
attempted coups d’état (and counter-coups d’état) between 1810 – 1878 (twelve of which were
successful) and a series of civil wars known as the Carlist Wars fought between liberals and the
traditional order (Beevor 2006). In the course of those sixty-eight years, Spain went from a series
of provincial juntas that fought against French occupation (1810 – 1814), a traditional monarchy
under Ferdinand VII (1813 – 1833) and Isabella II (1833 – 1868), a democratic First Republic
after the Glorious Revolution overthrew the monarchy (1868 – 1874), back to monarchical order
after the Bourbon Restoration (1874 – 1931) when Alfonso XII, Isabella II’s son, ruled, until
finally the proclamation of the democratically elected Second Spanish Republic and the
abdication of power by Alfonso XIII (1931 – 1936).
Amidst all the turmoil, Spain experienced little by way of political or economic
consistency. According to historian Stanley Payne (1993, 34), by 1930 “Spain was at the level of
England in the 1850s and 1860s or France in the 1870s and 1880s. Neither mid-nineteenth
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century England nor even France at the beginning of the Third Republic had to face such severe
political tests as Spain underwent in the 1930s.” By the time the Spanish Second Republic was
established in 1931, it was against the backdrop of a period of worldwide economic depression.
So, while the Second Republic was established to herald in a new era of liberalism,
democratization, and mass politics, in an era of widespread economic turmoil, it was unable to
generate the economic growth necessary to keep up with high expectations. As a reaction to the
lack of major reform amid great expectations, the elections of November 1933 resulted in
another major shift as the majority of seats were won by the nationalists who favored a return to
the tradition of a strong clergy, strong military, and traditional feudal arrangements,
supplemented with new desires to repress Spain’s left-wing politicians. But when three years of
conservative rule again resulted in nothing but increased repression and violence, the newly
formed Popular Front alliance of anarchists, communists, and socialists won the January 1936
elections. The continued inconsistency and unrest resulted in a new plot to unseat the tumultuous
republic by force. A broad coalition of anti-Republican forces emerged, made up of Spanish
fascists, ultraconservatives, Carlists who favored traditional monarchy, and the military, whose
generals would lead the rebellion to conquer the peninsula. The 1936 coup d’état resulted in
another all-out civil war.
The United States in the 1920s and 1930s
The U.S. foreign fighters who joined the Abraham Lincoln Brigade came of age in the
1930s during the most severe economic crisis of the modern industrialized world. The crisis
began in the U.S. after two consecutive days of record financial losses. Between October 28 and
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October 29, 1929, days which became known as Black Monday and Black Tuesday,
respectively, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) saw a market drop of nearly 25% in what
remains the greatest economic downturn in financial history, marking the beginning of the
decades-long Great Depression.
Understanding the economic situation of the U.S. during the 1920s and 1930s is
important for explaining the environment in which future U.S. foreign fighters came to volunteer
in the Spanish Civil War. But the political values that ultimately inspired the older fighters had
existed long before this economic crisis. Many future foreign fighters that joined at the age of
thirty or older (twenty-nine being the average age of a U.S. foreign fighter to Spain) received
their political educations during the Great War and the anti-war peace demonstrations that
launched in response to U.S. intervention in World War I. The anti-war demonstrations were just
a subset of a wider, radical political moment in the U.S. that was marked by popular protest and
unrest (Carroll 1994). This was the era of American populism and labor protests, the rise of
socialism and communism, the peak strength of the Industrial Workers of the World, and of the
first mass movements against racial, religious, and sexual injustice. Not only did many of the
older U.S. foreign fighters participate in these movements, but these movements informed many
of the future political and economic struggles that were to greet the U.S. during the Great
Depression.
One of the products of the Great Depression was a rise, or in some cases reemergence, of
a radical political fervor revolving around communist ideals. Beginning in 1929, the year that
marked the beginning of the Great Depression, CPUSA activists formed the first “Unemployed
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Councils” (renamed “Unemployment Councils” in 1934) to protest mass unemployment and
inadequate government relief programs (Valocchi 1993). The organizers in major urban centers
worked bread lines, employment office lines, government relief offices, and flop houses to
increase membership in the CPUSA, declaring those out of work to be “the tactical key to
present the state of the class struggle” (Cox 2012). Party organizers concentrated on direct action
including holding rallies to incite mass agitation and focused on a dual approach of community
and trade union unity.
CPUSA organizers also incited the rural heartlands. In states such as Iowa and Nebraska,
newly formed groups, such as the Farm Holiday Movement, organized protest movements and
direct action such as when farmers built roadblocks on highways leading to the agricultural
markets in Omaha, Sioux City, and Des Moines to protest rising agricultural prices and lower
sales (Ganzel 2003). In Madison County, Nebraska, farmers organized into the Madison County
Plan, whose members began listening to communist organizer, “Mother” Ella Reeve Bloor who
had come to the Midwest to build alliances between urban workers and radical farmers. The
CPUSA successfully recruited thousands of rural farmers during the 1930s and party organizers
successfully provoked mass protests across the entire country, including mass demonstrations in
both urban and rural cities where CPUSA banners were adorned with slogans like “Fight—Don’t
Starve” (Cox 2012).
By 1936, the world had been ravaged by consecutive years of economic hardship and
mass unemployment. While the U.S. saw a broad expansion of communist activity in response to
economic hardships, in other countries, most notably Germany, Italy, and Japan, fascist political
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parties were achieving victory. By the time the Spanish Civil War began in the summer of 1936,
fascism and communism seemed to be on a collision course. In the Seventh (and final) World
Congress of the Comintern in 1935, the Congress officially endorsed the “Popular Front” against
fascism, which advocated for global communist political parties to align with any anti-fascist
political party. The declaration of the Popular Front had a major and immediate impact in the
U.S. It became a rallying point for millions of leftists who saw this as a chance to not only stop
fascism but also to see the establishment of new leftist governments. The declaration facilitated
the election in 1936 of Popular Front governments in France and Spain. That same year,
Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, aimed at countering the Soviet Union and
its Communist allies. By the time Franco’s forces attempted to overthrow the government in
Madrid, it was already clear that Spain was about to become the first confrontation between
fascism and communism.
Demographic Data on U.S. Foreign Fighters
Researchers interested in the foreign fighters who participated in the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade historically worked with data that was incomplete and limited to a small number of
combatants. Because of the covert nature of the recruitment of foreign fighters for the Brigades,
records were not thoroughly kept. Furthermore, many of the records that were likely kept were
either lost or destroyed at the end of the war to prevent them falling into the hands of the
victorious nationalist forces (Carroll 1994). One surviving document compiled in 1937 by the
International Brigade Commanders entitled, “General Report on 1,745 People from the United
States” (hereafter GR 1937) is the only surviving document with an accounting of U.S. foreign
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fighters. The document provides the self-reported demographic information of U.S. foreign
fighters including their ages, military experience, political affiliation, nationality (ethnic
composition), domicile (states and cities), and profession. It nevertheless is a mere snapshot of
the final population because it was compiled in the summer of 1937 before recruitment was
complete.
As introduced in Chapter Three, I was able to create an original dataset of 2,800 foreign
fighters by drawing on a new online database, the “ALBA database,” which is maintained by the
non-profit Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives (ALBA), in partnership with New York
University’s Tamiment Library. The ALBA database draws on previously published rosters of
volunteers put together by the Passport Office of the U.S. Department of State (1986) and
findings from independent genealogical researchers. The database includes a patchwork of
biographical information on 2,800 volunteers, including not only foreign fighters but also
volunteer medical staff and other personnel. However, the database is not meant to be a source
for complete demographic data on the U.S. foreign fighters. It is instead primarily used as a
reference database to help researchers find archival material on all U.S. volunteers that is housed
in the Tamiment Library.
I used the ALBA database as a starting point. I eliminated irrelevant entries, ensured
there were no duplicate entries, and then supplemented the database with estimates drawn from
other scholars and my own original research uncovered from the personal records of U.S. foreign
fighters. The result was a new, original dataset that allowed me to construct a more nuanced
demographic picture of the U.S. foreign fighters for the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. It also
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provided a more complete profile of foreign fighters according to the six sets of theoretical
explanations set out in Chapter Two.
Demographic Profile of U.S. Foreign Fighters
During the Spanish Civil War, writers and propagandists who worked to bolster the
image of the volunteer units in Spain often described the U.S. contingent as an eclectic mix of
nationalities, religions, and political affiliations. In describing what type of U.S. citizen would
join the war effort, Joseph North, a reporter working for the Daily Worker, wrote, “draw a crosssection of America and pick representatives from all strata (excluding Herbert Hoover’s friends)
and you will have it.” One spokesman writing on behalf of the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade foundation wrote that, “From Missouri, Alabama, California, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania and New York; from small hamlets and large cities; from cement foundries and
universities, men left their work to fight for democracy – Americans, all of them.” Such
descriptions were meant to paint these volunteers as “typical” or “everyday” U.S. citizens.
Propaganda cut both ways. In a pamphlet written by pro-Franco forces after the war, it
described the Americans as “deplorable,” stating that the combatants from the U.S. were
“Negroes from Broadway, Chinese from the ports of New York and Los Angeles, gangsters from
Chicago and militants from the Communist sections of Philadelphia. This battalion also included
American Indians. For enlisting, each man was given a large sum of money – some four hundred
dollars at least.” While such nationalist propaganda was meant to smear the image of the
volunteer units of the civil war, the fact of the matter was that there were grains of truth among
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the more obvious falsehoods. The reality was that these foreign fighters were not typical U.S.
citizens nor were they a mix of “deplorables.”
According to the 1930 U.S. Census, the typical U.S. citizen was likely young and
married; 55% of the population was under the age of 30 and more than 60% of adults (both men
and women) were married. Selecting a U.S. citizen at random and one would be equally as likely
to select someone from a major city or rural hamlet; approximately 55% of the U.S. population
resided in urban areas and 45% resided in rural areas. Unemployment was at an unprecedented
high in the 1930s because of the Great Depression but of the 40% of the population that was
employed, roughly 52% were employed in blue-collar jobs and 48% were employed in whitecollar ones. The vast majority, roughly 89%, of the U.S. population was categorized by the 1930
Census as “native white” or “foreign white” (i.e., of European descent) though only 21% of the
population had at least one parent that was foreign-born. To what extent do the U.S. foreign
fighters conform to the classifications of the typical U.S. citizen in the 1930s and how could the
data potentially illuminate their reasons for joining the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?
First, while foreign fighters did come from every U.S. state as well as Hawaii and Puerto
Rico (Table 5),3 these individuals did not come from small towns or hamlets. The overwhelming
majority of U.S. foreign fighters came from urban environments with a disproportionate number
of them coming from NYC (Table 6). Almost 40% of the fighters where a location could be
determined came from NYC and its environs. Factoring in the next three leading residential
areas, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, and it is revealed that 50% of the entire foreign

3

There were only 48 states in the union in 1936. Hawaii and Alaska would join the Union in 1959. Table 5 includes
49 entries: the 48 states in the Union and Washington D.C.
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fighter contingent came from just those four geographic locations. Further analyzing the
distribution of foreign fighters by population of the residential area from which they came
reveals that roughly 70% of the foreign fighters where the location could be determined came
from the largest U.S. cities, those with a population of greater than 1 million residents.
Propaganda from Spain directed against the International Brigades used racist overtones
in its description of the U.S. foreign fighters while International Brigade propaganda praised
their diversity. Many foreign fighters acknowledged this diversity, referring to the Brigade as
“the first fully integrated American fighting unit.” In 1937, U.S. foreign fighters were asked to
self-identify their ethnicity when demographic information was being collected for GR 1937.
Many of these fighters identified their ethnicity as simply “American” but a large number also
identified their ethnicity as “Jewish.” According to Spanish Civil War historian Christopher
Brooks (2017), “it is unusual to the modern eye to see ‘Jewish’ as an ethnic group,” but
according to scholars (e.g., see Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry 2012), Jews consistently report
fusing their Judaism (religion) with their ethnic identities, choosing to identify as much with the
religious traditions as with the common national and cultural traditions (both markers of ethnic
identity). As recorded by GR 1937, the largest defined ethnic groupings were “American” (403
foreign fighters) and then “Jewish” (235 foreign fighters). In my dataset, “American” is not one
of the coded nationalities since every member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade was a U.S.
citizen but because U.S. foreign fighters chose to self-identify their ethnicities as Jewish in
previous records, “Jewish” has been retained as an ethnic identifier.
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Table 5. State Data of U.S. Foreign Fighters
(in order of intensity as measured per 100,000 state population)
Raw
Total

Rate per 100,000
population

Raw
Total

Rate per 100,000
population

New York

934

7.419726

Nebraska

7

0.5079962

California

273

Washington

53

4.808665

New Mexico

2

0.4724592

3.390056

Arizona

2

0.4591653

Washington DC

15

3.080911

Wyoming

1

0.4432919

Massachusetts

122

2.870849

Delaware

1

0.4194983

Wisconsin

60

2.041507

Utah

2

0.3938194

Illinois

155

2.031281

Iowa

9

0.364234

Michigan

90

1.858611

North Dakota

2

0.2937526

Maryland

30

1.838769

Indiana

8

0.2470277

New Hampshire

8

1.648489

Idaho

1

0.2247029

Minnesota

42

1.638096

Kansas

4

0.212653

Ohio

100

1.504507

Mississippi

4

0.1990227

Pennsylvania

124

1.287462

Montana

1

0.1860098

Rhode Island

8

1.163641

Alabama

4

0.1511574

Nevada

1

1.098201

South Dakota

1

0.1443316

New Jersey

42

1.039261

West Virginia

2

0.1156601

Connecticut

16

0.995704

Tennessee

3

0.114567

Florida

13

0.885431

Arkansas

2

0.1078468

Oregon

8

0.838763

Texas

6

0.1030093

Maine

6

0.752424

Louisiana

2

0.0951659

Colorado

7

0.675812

North Carolina

3

0.094629

Oklahoma

16

0.667768

Virginia

2

0.0825815

Missouri

24

0.661272

South Carolina

1

0.0575121

Kentucky

12

0.595655

Georgia

1

0.0343819

Vermont

2

0.556157

State

State

Notes: Total foreign fighters = 2,323. Population totals are broken down by state and are based on the United States 1930 census.

Table 6. Leading Residential Data of U.S. Foreign Fighter
New York City
Chicago
Los Angeles
San Francisco (Bay Area)
Detroit
Total: 1,717

876
146
141
109
72

Philadelphia
Boston
Cleveland
Milwaukee
Seattle

68
57
51
35
31

Pittsburgh
Baltimore
Minneapolis
Long Island
Essex/Hudson Counties, New Jersey

30
28
26
24
23
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According to the dataset, 1,250 Jews from the U.S. served in the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade beside nearly 6,000 Jews from fifty-four different countries (Prago 1979). According to
population data on Jewish communities collected in 1937, Jews comprised less than 4% of the
total U.S. population in the 1930s. While a comparatively small percentage of the total
population, Jews resided overwhelmingly in urban U.S. cities with approximately 88% of the 4.6
million U.S. Jews residing in cities with a population of greater than 1 million residents. The
urban environ where the most Jews resided, measured by both total numbers and as a percent of
the total local population, was NYC, where, in 1937, 4 million Jews lived, comprising roughly
30% of the entire population of NYC (Linfield 1938).
Table 7. Ethnic Composition of U.S. Foreign Fighters
Jewish
1,250 German
35 Norwegian
Italian
201 Slavic
30 Romanian
Hispanic
137 Croatian
30 Slovak
Greek/Cypriot
91 Puerto Rican 24 French
African American
90 Armenian
19 Ukrainian
Irish
83 Hungarian
14 Armenian
Finnish
81 English
12 Serbian
Russian
68 Lithuanian
12 Native American
Polish
45 Swedish
12 Scottish
Canadian
43 Austrian
11 Bulgarian
Spanish
38 Filipino
10 Czechoslovakian

9
9
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
4
4

Danish
Mexican
Swiss
Latvian
Slovenian
Chinese
Dutch
Portuguese
Japanese
Belgian
Hawaiian

4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1

Notes: Total entries = 2,440. Some individuals have two ethnicities coded. This occurs when individuals report having
parents from two different ethnic groups.

Of the race-based propaganda that was deployed by the nationalist forces in Spain, as
well as the fascist propaganda used in Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, the most abundant
target of propaganda was Jews. For example, in a radio broadcast that aired on October 10, 1936,
Spanish General Queipo de Llano, who was working alongside Franco to overthrow the Spanish
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Republic, declared that “Our war is not a Spanish civil war, it is a war of Western civilization
against the Jews of the entire world. The Jews want to destroy the Christians who, according to
them, ‘came from the devil.’” Anti-Semitic demagogy was integral to the Nazi-fascist takeover
of parts of Europe, which was clearly influential in the lead-up to the Spanish Civil War. This
was a significant factor in influencing Jews to join the war effort, and a topic that is picked up in
greater detail below.
Roughly 80% of U.S. foreign fighters had at least one parent who was foreign-born
compared to roughly 21% of the total U.S. population that had at least one parent who was
foreign-born. This finding explains why immigrant organizations in the U.S. played such a
visible role in garnering support for the Spanish Republic, likely motivating many U.S. foreign
fighters to join the war effort. Immigrant groups were especially vocal in major urban areas like
NYC, which according to the 1930 census, had the largest density of immigrants in the country.
For example, in 1937 a group of ethnic Basques, dressed in traditional clothing, protested outside
of the German consulate in NYC after the bombing of Guernica by the Nazi German Luftwaffe’s
Condor Legion on April 26, 1937 (Ottanelli 2007). In another series of events that occurred in
NYC, groups of Italian immigrants from rival left-wing political organizations worked together
to organize regular protests outside of Italy’s consular offices, located in Rockefeller Center,
where participants chanted anti-fascist slogans and shouted messages of support for both
Ethiopia, which Italy invaded in 1935, and Spain (Ottanelli 2007). Being surrounded by this type
of political activism helped foster collective beliefs about fascism and the wars in Europe, and
likely had a strong influence on would-be U.S. foreign fighters.
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Most U.S. foreign fighters were members of a communist or socialist organization, many
of them members of either the CPUSA or the YCL. Estimates collated from various data sources
put CPUSA affiliation among the U.S. foreign fighters at 1,400 with YCL membership at 400
(Table 8). The finding corresponds to global statistics of Communist Party membership among
foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War, where scholars have estimated that well over half of all
foreign fighters were members of their local Communist Party (see e.g., McLellan 2006; Baxell
2004; Pavlakovic 2010). While communists made up a majority of members in the International
Brigades, in the U.S., the CPUSA was a minority political organization.
In 1937, membership in the CPUSA was at 38,000. This is based on CPUSA records of
“dues collections,” or regular fees paid for active membership. The difficulty in comparing
CPUSA membership with that of other major parties in the U.S. is that the major parties
(Democrats and Republicans) never developed systems to collect dues from members, instead
relying on voluntary contributions. Furthermore, in the 1930s, “party enrollment” data was not
kept at the national-level and not every locale kept such data. Therefore, one cannot adequately
compare “active” party membership. One way to highlight the membership differences between
major parties and CPUSA membership is to examine campaign finance data from the 1936
presidential election, when incumbent Democratic Franklin D. Roosevelt carried forty-six states
to Republican challenger Alf Landon’s two. The data reveals that Landon received voluntary
individual contributions from more than 100,000 U.S. citizens while Roosevelt received
contributions from over 600,000 citizens (Berdahl 1942). However, this data still does not
capture the scope of individual enrollment with major parties. For example, looking at party
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enrollment data for the 1936 Gubernatorial vote in NYC alone reveals that Democrats had 3.2
million members enrolled while Republicans had 2 million (Berdahl 1942). Regardless of which
metric is examined, these findings suggest that while CPUSA membership was growing in the
1930s, it had limited support compared to that of the dominant political parties.
While the CPUSA remained a minority organization in U.S. politics, CPUSA district
membership data can reveal U.S. foreign fighter recruitment trends. According to 1934 data on
CPUSA membership by district (no district level data was reported for 1935-36), there were
twenty-four district headquarters all located in major cities across the U.S. The three largest
headquarters were District 2 (NYC), District 8 (Chicago), and District 13 (Los Angeles), which
together accounted for 46% of all CPUSA membership in 1934. By 1937, the CPUSA had
expanded to thirty-five district offices across the U.S. However, even with broader geographic
coverage and a roughly 66% increase in membership over the three-year period, Districts 2, 8,
and 13 increased membership by an even greater degree to account for more than 60% of
CPUSA’s total membership (see Gregory 2020).
Further analyzing CPUSA membership data alongside the recruitment rate by state of
U.S. foreign fighters (refer back to Table 5) reveals that, by looking at the top ten states by rate
of recruitment (New York, California, Washington, Washington DC, Massachusetts, Wisconsin,
Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, and New Hampshire), six of those ten states (New York,
California, Washington, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Michigan) were home to the six largest
CPUSA district offices in the U.S. However, the four states without major district offices,
Washington DC, Wisconsin, Maryland, and New Hampshire, all had close, multi-regional offices

96
housed in nearby major cities: Philadelphia covered Maryland, Delaware, and Washington DC,
Boston covered all of New England (including New Hampshire), and Minneapolis was
categorized as covering Wisconsin (though Chicago acted as an additional regional office as it
was closer to Wisconsin’s urban center of Milwaukee). This data suggests the CPUSA and
Comintern targeted their own backyards for recruitment, strategically tapping networks of
willing, communist participants for war. This finding is further bolstered by data on the overall
trend in CPUSA membership throughout the 1930s, which was seeing an expansion in the late1930s, providing a larger recruitment pool for Spanish Civil War recruiters (Figure 3).
Table 8. Official Political Party Affiliation of U.S. Foreign Fighters
CPUSA
1,400
YCL
400
Anarchist
200
Socialist
30
Labor
9
Democratic
7
No Party
78
Unknown
880
Total: 2,124
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Figure 3. Communist Party, USA Membership by Year (1922-1943)
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Note: Data is based on “dues collections per year.” There was a limited collection of dues collected in 1935 and 1936
because of the Great Depression. Data was also not collected between 1940-42 because of World War II (see Gregory
2020).

The average age of a U.S. foreign fighter to the Spanish Civil War was nearly thirty years
old (Table 9), approximately three years older than the average U.S. male citizen in 1930. What
skews this average is the fact that so few volunteers under the age of twenty-one became foreign
fighters. This is surprising considering that individuals usually volunteer for the armed forces, at
least in the U.S., at the age of eighteen, and usually only serve on tours lasting for approximately
four years, at which point the volunteer would be twenty-two. Most of the U.S. foreign fighters
were single when they joined the war effort. Best estimates from available data indicate that at
least 1,260 (75%) foreign fighters where a marital status could be determined were single,
another fifty-two (3%) were divorced, eight (<1%) widowed, and only 364 (22%) were married
when they joined. This is significantly different from the 60% of U.S. adult men that were
married in 1930.
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Table 9. U.S. Foreign Fighter Age
Age
17-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-59
60+
Average
Entries

Frequency
30
539
577
292
165
95
36
10
7
2
29.7
1758

Most of the foreign fighters, approximately 69% where occupation could be determined,
would be considered “blue-collar” or “working-class.” Though unemployment in the 1930s was
at an all-time high in the U.S., based on census data from 1930, those who were employed were
almost equally as likely to be employed in blue-collar professions as white-collar ones (53% and
47% respectively). It is difficult to discern how many of the U.S. foreign fighters were members
of labor unions prior to joining. According to Rosenstone (1965, 330), who analyzed newspaper
data relating to Abraham Lincoln Brigade activity prior to the war, event data suggests that
“more than one third of them [U.S. foreign fighters] had witnessed violence and often death on
the picket lines,” suggesting that at least one third of U.S. foreign fighters were not only union
members, but active ones. Comparatively, U.S. union membership was historically low in the
1930s. U.S. Department of Labor (2020) statistics reveal that union membership was only at
about 7% of the total labor force in 1935 and was below 5% in 1930 (data is reported every five
years). However, U.S. union membership was increasing in two trade unions during this same
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period; the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), both of which represented transport workers. The two most
prominent occupations in the demographic data on U.S. foreign fighters were maritime
worker/seaman and truck driver (Table 10), which are both transport professions that saw high
union membership. Both unions also have a history of being described as “militant” and
“radical” (see Nelson 1990), an issue that will be discussed in greater detail below.
Table 10. U.S. Foreign Fighter Occupation
Maritime Workers/Seaman
Truck Driver
Unskilled Worker
Clerks
Steel/Metal Worker
Automobile Worker
Machinist
Student
Unemployed
Food/Restaurant Employee
Union Organizer
Teacher/Professor
Mechanic
Painter

228
104
86
84
71
59
59
48
41
39
31
30
29
28

Cook
Packing House Worker
Electrical Worker
Miner
Lumber Worker
Fur Worker
Day Laborer
Actor/Director
Construction Worker
Newspaper Employee
Communist Party Organizer
Fireman
Accountant
Dentist/Technician

23
23
23
21
19
19
19
17
17
17
16
16
15
15

Printer
Civilian Conservation Corps
Carpenter
Office Worker
Social Worker
Tailor
Oil Worker
Public Employee
Taxi Driver
Garment Worker
Attorney
Statistician

14
13
12
11
11
11
9
8
8
7
6
6

Total: 1,313

One of the more difficult demographic characteristics to establish is the level of
educational attainment of the U.S. foreign fighters. There are several answers to why this might
be the case. The first is that most of the foreign fighters were drawn from the working class and
did not have a need for formal education outside of high school. Another explanation is that
many individuals who were enrolled in higher education during the Great Depression were
forced to discontinue their education in favor of employment. Finally, many individuals at this
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time attended specialty schools such as a local trade school or a “workers school” sponsored by
the CPUSA. However, a cursory search of available records reveals that at least 200 of the
volunteers attended at some college though it is nearly impossible to establish the percentage that
graduated. Because of how occupational data has been previously collected, it is also difficult to
ascertain which professions may have necessitated at least a college degree. Of the occupations
listed in Table 10, it can be inferred that some jobs, for example “attorneys,” required a college
degree. However other positions, for example “clerks” or “office workers,” may or may not have
required college-level education.
The cross section of U.S. foreign fighters tells a fascinating story of the U.S. foreign
fighters to Spain. The “average foreign fighter” was unlike the “average American” or “average
American man” in the 1930s, which helps explain why this subset of individuals became foreign
fighters. The average U.S. foreign fighter was in their late-twenties and lived in an
urban/industrial environment where the CPUSA, trade unions, and large immigrant populations
flourished. The average foreign fighter was more likely than the average U.S. citizen to be a
member of the working class experiencing the perils of the Great Depression and struggling to
unionize. The average foreign fighter was also a communist, though if not, was predisposed to
left-leaning values, and he was likely swept up in the fervor of the large political and social
causes of the day. It is not surprising that a large portion of recruits came from urban centers like
NYC, with its high density of blue-collar union workers, communists, immigrants or firstgeneration U.S. citizens, and Jews, which were all common demographic traits of the U.S.
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foreign fighters. The next section analyzes the specific motivations of a sample of U.S. foreign
fighters to try to explain why this demographic went to Spain to fight in the Spanish Civil War.
Why U.S. Citizens Fought in the Spanish Civil War
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study relies on a sample of sixty U.S. foreign
fighters to test six theories that may explain why individuals take the extraordinary risk of
joining a foreign conflict. Due to the patchwork of available information on U.S. foreign fighters
and the fact that there exist surviving records for only a small subset of the fighters, it was not
possible to draw a representative sample. It is therefore important to highlight the demographic
differences between the sixty-member sample and the total population of foreign fighters
analyzed in the previous section. The first difference is that fifty-seven of the sixty foreign
fighters, or 95% of the sample, were dues paying members of either the CPUSA or YCL before
their arrival in Spain. Roughly 65% of the total foreign fighter population where party affiliation
could be established were members of either the CPUSA or YCL. Another difference is that
forty-four of the sixty-person sample, or 73%, were Jewish whereas from the total foreign fighter
population only one-third identified as Jewish. A final difference is that the average age of the
sample is twenty-five. Data collected for this study and from the more conservative GR 1937
census both put the average age at twenty-nine.
Many of the other characteristics of the sample align with that of the foreign fighter
population. In the sample, where marital status could be determined, forty-one, or roughly 68%,
were single, two divorced, and nine married. In the U.S. foreign fighter population, 75% were
single. Forty, or roughly 67%, were from NYC compared to 42% of the foreign fighter
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population that came from NYC. Five members of the sample were from Boston and its
surrounding suburbs, four came from San Francisco, three from Cleveland and its surrounding
suburbs, three from Detroit and its surrounding suburbs, and one each from Chicago, New
Jersey, Knoxville, Pittsburgh, and Superior, Wisconsin. The sample is like the U.S. foreign
fighter population in that most of the foreign fighters came from urban environments though only
eleven of the fifty states are represented. Finally, there are similarities between the sample and
the population in terms of the occupations of the foreign fighters. Like the population, maritime
workers/seamen are well represented in the sample. However, unlike the population, there is a
predominance of students in the sample. Otherwise, there is a diverse mix of professions among
the fighters with the majority of them also being employed in blue-collar professions.
Overview of U.S. Foreign Fighter Motivations
Historian of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Peter Carroll (1994, 14), wrote that, to pose
the question of why U.S. foreign fighters enlisted in the Spanish Civil War, “is to broach nearly
3,000 biographies, each linking a personal choice to a social background or an ideology.” While
every foreign fighter has a distinctive story and background, general trends can be found in the
archival data relating to the decision-making of the U.S. foreign fighters.
The general trend regarding U.S. foreign fighter motivations is presented in Table 11. In
creating this tabulation, an individual can cite multiple motivations for becoming a foreign
fighter, but each motivation can only be cited one time. Every hypothesis is represented at least
once. While the general findings suggest that the U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War
joined primarily because they had concrete relationships with other fighters, recruiters, or
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individuals that motivated them to join (98%), because they had a strong commitment to sacred
values (92%), and because they felt a shared orientation and connection to a collective group
fighting in Spain (68%), it is the interaction of these variables that tell the story of the U.S.
foreign fighters. Below, I further contextualize these findings, use qualitative content analysis to
analyze how these variables interact to create a more robust explanation for foreign fighting, and
discuss the relevance these trends have for the theories being tested.
Table 11. Motivations of Sixty U.S. Foreign Fighters
(in order of most to least significant)
Hypothesis
Total Percentage
98.3%
H6: Social Network
59
91.6%
H4: Sacred Values
55
68.3%
H5: Collective Identity
41
20%
H2: Personal Victimization
12
5%
H3: Structural Grievances
3
1.6%
H1: Economic Incentives
1
1.6%
Unidentified Reasons
1
Notes: Categories correspond to the hypotheses detailed in Chapter Three. Each category has an upper limit of 60 because each
foreign fighter from the sample can only fit into a category one time. It is possible for an individual to cite more than one
motivation for becoming a foreign fighter.

Social Networks
Max Schwartz believed he was the perfect candidate for the war in Spain because of his
lack of personal ties. In a diary entry dated December 12, 1937, Schwartz wrote, “Spain needed
men, and I was the sort of comrade who could go easily. I had no strong ties here – no wife –
father and mother dead” (Max Schwartz, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York
University). Schwartz’s feelings of alienation led him to believe that his life could be more easily
expended for the cause. But while Schwartz may have cited alienation as a reason for joining in
this specific diary entry, in a later entry he writes that it was a speech given by Earl Browder,
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General Secretary of the CPUSA, that he heard while at a meeting with fellow members and
friends at the State Office of the YCL, that ultimately drove his decision to go to Spain. Six
members from that branch would ultimately go on to become foreign fighters with Schwartz. In
addition, Schwarz was supported by his sister Francis, “Francis is a comrade – levelheaded. She
thought I was doing right,” and by his friends and fellow communists, Charlie, Lillie, and
Johnny, “‘You are exceptional,’ they tell me. ‘You are better than the average communist,’”
Schwartz wrote in a January 10, 1938 diary entry. What Schwartz’s diary reveals is that the
decision to become a foreign fighter was far from being solely an internalized communion with
ideology, alienation, and personal circumstances, but was made in a social context, alongside
networks of friends, family, and colleagues.
The archival data on U.S. foreign fighters provides overwhelming evidence that social
networks were a necessary condition for the U.S. foreign fighter mobilization to Spain thereby
supporting the hypothesis laid out in Chapter Three (Hypothesis #6), that an individual will join
a foreign conflict if they have preexisting social ties and linkages to other foreign fighters in a
network. Evidence from the personal accounts of the sixty-member sample of U.S. foreign
fighters reveals that fifty-nine, or 98%, of them had a personal connection to someone that was
also involved in the Spanish Civil War.
While it was difficult to determine with certainty the type of relationship a foreign fighter
had with a networked connection in Spain (e.g., was the connection a close friend or simply a
colleague?), when a concrete relationship could be established between one or more individuals,
a social network connection was coded in the dataset. Using this strategy, numerous connections
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were made by analyzing the life histories and writings of U.S. foreign fighters. One example
begins with the brothers, Joe and Leo Gordon. Born Joe and Leo Mendelowitz, the two were
born a year apart in 1914 and 1915, respectively, and were raised in the Williamsburg
neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York. The two brothers spent their youth traveling together on
the west coast, working jobs in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas until eventually finding work
with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), working jobs out of Tennessee, Idaho, and
Wyoming. Together the two adopted the name “Gordan,” which Joe referred to as their “red
name,” prior to sailing to Spain to become foreign fighters. Joe sailed to Spain first, in December
1936, at the age of 22 and Leo followed his brother seven months later in July 1937, also at the
age of 22. Because of the difference in sail date, the two brothers ended up not serving together
in the International Brigades, but they both kept in contact with the same cousin back home, Gus,
and were able to keep regular tabs on each other via letters between themselves and other
volunteers.
The fascinating thing about the Gordon brothers is not the connection to each other. It is
the connections they also had to other members in the sample. Joe and Leo knew from their
Williamsburg neighborhood four other foreign fighters from the sample: Elias Begelman, Jack
Freeman, Jack Friedman, and Jacob Shafran. Leo was close with, and joined and served
alongside, Hy Stone, a U.S. foreign fighter who was not in the sample, but happened to be close
friends with Harry Fisher, who grew up in a different Brooklyn neighborhood with his other best
friend, Butch Entin, another member of the sample. Fisher and Entin were both members of the
Local 1250 of the Department Store Employees Union and took part in several militant protests

106
that were organized by Jack Shafran, whose leading role in the protests would land him in Rikers
Island for 90 days. Nine other individuals from Local 1250 also became foreign fighters. Fisher
had also attended Commonwealth College, a labor college specifically aimed at the industrial
worker, in Polk County, Arkansas in 1932. Forty-three alumni of Commonwealth College
became foreign fighters, including two additional members of the sample, Marion Noble and
Paul Sigel, who attended the college with Fisher. Paul Sigel was close friends with two other
members of the sample, Ernest Arion and Harold Malofsky, all from NYC, who became foreign
fighters together. Arion and Malofsky were both comedians who were involved in an
International Workers Order theater group called the “Convulsionaries” in NYC and wanted to
bring their talents to Spain to not only fight but to entertain the troops by writing songs and
performing for them. All three men, Arion, Malofsky, and Sigel, joined the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade together and wrote letters to Miriam “Mim” Sigel, Paul’s sister.
The web of interconnectedness established among these twelve members of the sample
(Arion, Begelman, Entin, Fisher, Freeman, Friedman, Gordon, Gordon, Malofsky, Noble,
Shafran, and Sigel) that were connected to no less than forty-four additional U.S. foreign fighters
not in the sample, is emblematic of how networks influenced recruitment for the Spanish Civil
War. Expanding the analysis to the rest of the sample reveals several trends that were common
among the foreign fighters. First is the importance of geography. As previously mentioned, most
of population of U.S. foreign fighters came from urban environments. In the sample, 65% of the
foreign fighters came from NYC. One explanation for this trend is the density of CPUSA and
union networks that were present in NYC at the time. The CPUSA and the Comintern were vital
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in organizing the physical journey of foreign fighters to Spain and their networks of recruitment
in urban areas, especially in NYC, were crucial in spreading the word about recruitment
(Kirschenbaum 2015). While 95% of the sample were dues paying members of the CPUSA,
100% of the U.S. foreign fighters from NYC were dues paying members. In addition to
involvement in the CPUSA, it can be determined that at least twenty of the sixty individuals in
the sample were also members of a union and among the NYC residents in the sample, fourteen
of the forty can be confirmed as being members of a union.
The importance of organizations like the CPUSA, Comintern, and labor unions cannot be
understated. From an organizational perspective, the U.S. foreign fighters to Spain never would
have been able to make the journey had it not been for the CPUSA and associated organizations
like the Comintern. These organizations funded the trip of nearly every U.S. volunteer, helped
U.S. foreign fighters obtain passports (both legally and illegally), and helped U.S. foreign
fighters circumvent the U.S. and European travel bans by helping the fighters navigate first
through France and then into Spain through the Pyrenees Mountains. Not only did the CPUSA
and Comintern organize the technical aspects of U.S. foreign fighter recruitment, but these
organizations also fostered an environment where foreign fighter recruitment networks
flourished. An active strategy of recruitment was for members of the CPUSA and YCL to recruit
their friends through word-of-mouth and have them sign up for the brigades at their local office
to be later referred to CPUSA leadership. This process was described by numerous U.S. foreign
fighters in oral history interviews conducted by both John Gerassi, who conducted oral history
interviews in 1980, and Manny Herriman, who conducted oral history interviews in 1985-86, and
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were themselves both veteran foreign fighters. In an interview with John Gerassi, veteran foreign
fighter John Gates spoke about his friend, who he described as “the guy who indirectly was the
cause of my becoming a communist,” as the reason he joined the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
After many discussions relating to Spain, Gates admits that “…of course, this is what he was
waiting for, you know, waiting for me to volunteer.” After Gates had been contacted by the
CPUSA, he was told he had to continue to recruit other potential fighters; “even then, before I
could go, I had to try and recruit other people to go to Spain, which I did succeed getting a
number of others from the area who went with me.” Ultimately, the strategy succeeded in linking
many friends and acquaintances together as recruits, which can explain why so many recruits
knew one-another and why recruitment nodes are so easily identified.
Union membership and union recruitment networks represent another important aspect in
the story of U.S. foreign fighter recruitment. In the early years of the Great Depression, the
future of organized labor was bleak. By 1933, labor union membership had fallen from five
million members at the end of 1929 to approximately three million. The labor movement, which
began at the end of the nineteenth century, had so far failed to organize the much larger number
of laborers in the steel, textiles, mining, and automobiles industries, which are considered the
“mass production” industries or “industrial unions,” instead organizing most of its membership
from skilled “craft unions,” most of which were affiliated with the American Federation of Labor
(AFL) such as carpenters and shoemakers (Nelson 1990). The lack of growth in industrial union
membership would vastly change with the passage of the New Deal, a series of public works
programs and financial reforms enacted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. The
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Roosevelt administration adopted a strong, pro-union stance. First, the National Industrial
Recovery Act (1933) provided for collective bargaining and the National Labor Relations Act
(also known as the Wagner Act, 1935) required businesses to bargain in good faith with any
union supported by their employees. Union membership would grow exponentially in the mid to
late-1930s.
One of the most militant and politically conscious sections of the new American labor
class were maritime workers (Nelson 1990). This reputation, in large part, stems from the 1934
West Coast waterfront strike, also known as the “Big Strike,” which lasted eighty-three days and
stopped all work out of the San Francisco port for four straight days. East Coast maritime
workers have garnered a similar reputation, having been immortalized in Hollywood movies
such as Bud Schulberg’s On the Waterfront (1954), which depicted the tale of violence and
corruption amongst the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) in places like Boston,
New Jersey, and New York. As previously mentioned in this chapter, maritime workers are the
most represented occupation among the U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War. Four
members of the sample were maritime workers, including Bill Bailey, who happened to have
been from Hoboken, New Jersey where the film On the Waterfront takes place.
There have been numerous studies on why maritime unions were some of the most
militant unions in the U.S. (e.g., see Nelson 1990; Broeze 1991; Darlington 2009) and the
reasons suggested by these studies also apply to their enlistment in the International Brigades.
First, maritime workers endured arduous working conditions that kept them in superior physical
condition, making them ideal recruits for military service. Second, due to the requirement that
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they spend much of their time at sea, maritime workers often had few family responsibilities,
most having never married or had children. Third, all maritime workers carried Seamen’s
Protection Certificates that were notarized documents that acted as proof of citizenship and in the
1930s could be used in lieu of a passport. Finally, maritime workers and their associated unions
were closely allied with the emerging CPUSA, especially in place like NYC and San Francisco.
Therefore, many maritime union workers were also members of their local communist party,
which fostered broad associational links with the different members and associations that
encouraged recruitment to Spain (Nelson 1990).
The recruitment trend of U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War illustrates the
central role theories of collective action and social movements play in explaining this foreign
fighter mobilization. “Dense networks,” or those networks characterized by pre-existing channels
for recruitment and overlapping membership in like-minded organizations, were clearly tapped
by organizers. This explains why urban areas such as NYC, Chicago, and Los Angeles had the
highest rate of recruitment, even when controlling for their large populations. These urban areas
had the highest levels of CPUSA membership, were home to the largest and most militant labor
unions, the ILA and ILWU in NYC and Los Angeles, and the IBT in Chicago, and already had a
legacy of activism, as illustrated, especially, in areas like NYC and San Francisco.
In addition to exploiting environments already conducive for recruitment, the CPUSA
and Comintern also actively and strategically targeted certain groups for recruitment that could
broaden the appeal of becoming a U.S. foreign fighter for the International Brigades in a strategy
that is known in the collective action literature as “snowballing” (Chwe 1999). One example that
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illustrates this network recruitment strategy of the CPUSA and Comintern is the case of Catholic
foreign fighters. Two members of the sample, Bill Bailey and Stanley Postek, were raised
Catholic. There had long been tension between the Catholic Church and the CPUSA but when
the war broke out, and the Church appeared to show loyalty to Spanish nationalists, the CPUSA
sought to convince Catholics that they had a “common bond” with communists. In an issue of
New Masses dated March 3, 1938, Robert E. Kennedy wrote that, “true Catholics in Spain
remain loyal to the Republic,” while only a few “reactionaries and fascist sympathizers” in Spain
supported the nationalists. To help attract greater Catholic support, the CPUSA sought out
recruits who could serve as clear examples of Catholic assistance for the Republic.
More than any other group, the CPUSA sought out Irish Catholics, like Bill Bailey, to fill
this role and the propaganda efforts were on display in the communist magazines, the Daily
Worker and New Masses. Each of the publications profiled Irish volunteers. One example from
outside the sample was the profile of the Flaherty brothers, three communist brothers from
Boston, who fought in Spain, and who returned to the U.S. from Spain together during the war to
go on a speaking tour to help swell support for the Republic. Their tour became controversial
when the former Governor of Massachusetts, James M. Curley, refused to speak with them on
account of their CPUSA affiliations, a feud that drew the attention of The New York Times,
leading to two successive back-to-back profiles of the brothers and the Boston ordeal in August
1937. The fact of the matter was that Irish volunteers like the Bill Bailey and the Flaherty
brothers had long abandoned the Catholic church and were not fighting in Spain in defense of
other Catholics. This, however, did not stop the CPUSA and the Comintern from exploiting their
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involvement to bolster support and recruitment in diverse parts of the U.S., a strategy that
increased recruitment throughout New England.
The predominance of network connections in the sample suggests that social networks
played a critical role in the recruitment of U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War. All but
one individual in the sample had a networked connection and joined with fellow friends,
colleagues, or comrades. Without the logistical support and targeted recruitment of individuals
by the CPUSA and Comintern, it is possible that not only would there have been fewer, if any,
U.S. foreign fighters to Spain, but the International Brigades may not have existed at all. With
several barriers to participation enacted to prevent a mass mobilization of individuals, the
recruitment of volunteers, especially from across the Atlantic Ocean, required a concerted
strategy and networks of willing participants. The evidence provided above provides
overwhelming support for the hypothesis (Hypothesis #6) that individuals will become foreign
fighters when they have links to other members in the foreign fighter network.
Sacred Values
A commitment to sacred values was a central factor, the second strongest reason, for
explaining why U.S. foreign fighters joined the Spanish Civil War. As hypothesized in Chapter
Three (Hypothesis #4), an individual will join a foreign conflict to support or defend a value they
hold as sacred. Fifty-five of the sixty individuals in the sample, or roughly 92%, explicitly cited a
sacred value as influencing their decision to join the Spanish Civil War, thereby strongly
supporting the hypothesis. The ideological congruence between anti-fascism and progressive
values was a strong motivator for the U.S. foreign fighters who went to Spain. Forty-five of the
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fifty-five individuals who cited sacred values cited anti-fascism while twenty-three of the fiftyfive cited communism. A third type of sacred value, democracy, was also heavily represented
among fighters, with fifteen of the fifty-five individuals citing it as a reason for joining.
Recall from Chapter One that, according to Malet (2013), foreign fighters to the Spanish
Civil War were categorized in his typology as “true believers,” or foreign fighters that joined a
civil conflict to preserve institutions of shared ideology. Other observers during and after the
Spanish Civil War argued that the International Brigades were not made up of true believers but
were instead made up of communist “dupes” who were co-opted by the Comintern to start a
communist revolution in Spain (Baxell 2014). But according to the U.S. foreign fighters
themselves, such as Robert Klonsky, the idea that “we were fighting the war under false
pretenses and were all a bunch of communists who actually were not interested in defending
democracy there – that we were just riding the coat-tails of the fight for freedom and democracy,
and against fascism, in order to impose a communist dictatorship” was a complete “historical
distortion” of the Spanish Civil War (Robert Klonsky, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment
Library, New York University). In an interview conducted in 1987, after the events of the IranContra Affair (1985 – 1987) were made public, Klonsky stated that “the myth of Soviet
domination, communist domination, and communist control over all of these events – from Spain
to Cuba to Vietnam, to Nicaragua and El Salvador today” arguably begins with the historical
distortion of Spain (Robert Klonsky, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York
University).
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The fact of the matter was that more of the U.S. foreign fighters, in their own words,
conceived of themselves as crusaders of communism than as defenders of democracy. However,
many of the U.S. foreign fighters who were communists, and were fighting to further communist
values, firmly believed that a democratic form of government was the best way to achieve
political equality for left-wing parties. For example, upon receiving his passport in the mail on
January 20, 1938, Max Schwartz, a member of the YCL who wrote passionately about his
commitment to communist values, also wrote a passage in his diary about his commitment to
fighting and dying for democracy. Schwartz wrote,
A memorandum had come with the book – a warning against enlisting in a foreign army.
And stamped on one of the pages of my passport in English, Spanish, and French was the
sentence, ‘Not valid for travel in Spain.’ I wondered if this was stamped in all passports
nowadays, or were the gentlemen of the passport division paying me the compliment of
suspecting that I looked like the sort of young man who would go to Spain?
Curious. In 1917 young fellows like me were sent across the Atlantic by the thousands to
fight for democracy. Today we are told to mind our own business. Why? If democracy
was worth defending with our lives in 1917, why shouldn’t it be worth defending in
1937. At least why shouldn’t those of us who believe democracy in Spain to be in serious
danger, and who are willing to defend it with our lives, be given that privilege? (Max
Schwartz, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
Many U.S. foreign fighters echoed the sentiments of Schwartz in their writings, but U.S.
foreign fighters may have conceived of the defense of democratic values in a different way. U.S.
foreign fighters knew that the threat to democratic values came from the threat of global fascism.
As detailed in Chapter Two, the theory of sacred values stipulates that the likelihood of
mobilizing in defense of a sacred value is amplified by the perception of high threat to that value
or to a group of like-minded individuals holding said value (Sheikh et al. 2012). More often than
not, U.S. foreign fighters contextualized their motivations as being defenders of democracy
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against fascism; “I am…on the battlefield of international fascism and democracy; Spain,” wrote
Sid Rosenstein to his wife Gertrude upon arriving in Spain in July, 1937 (Sid Rosenstein, Box 1,
Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University). Or as Joe Dallet described it in a
May 31, 1937 letter to his Mother defending his decision to fight in Spain,
Unfortunately, there is no other way to beat Fascism than to beat it on the battlefield. To
let them get away with Spain would only whet their appetites for attacks on other
democratic countries. Mussolini’s Ethiopian adventure only encouraged him to attack
Spain. A victory for him and Hitler here would mean next an attack on Czecko-Slovakia
or France or both, prelude to an attack on the USSR. THAT, entirely aside from all
questions of “idealism”, is why we must beat them here. And talking to them won’t do
the trick. Only bullets can do it. (Joseph Dallet, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment
Library, New York University)
David Miller articulated his motivations in a similar way in a letter to his friend Dan on April 30,
1937,
We understand fully the significance of the Spanish Civil War – to Spain and to the
world. We know what it means to face death and to inflict death. Nevertheless we cannot
stomach the adolescent attitude of a young nitwit who has taken it into his head to gloat
over the destruction of human life. There is no need to cast a roseate glow of romanticism
over our task. Our enemy is fascism; we know it. Our objective is the preservation of
democracy and its ultimate fulfillment; we know it. We also know that fascism is not an
abstract social theory with neither material shape nor form. Its oppressiveness is
expressed through the human beings who are its instruments. That is why it is impossible
to destroy fascism without pitting ourselves against those human beings who have
become its tools. (David Miller, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York
University)
And in his July 4, 1937 pamphlet, written after he returned from the frontlines of Spain, David
McCelvy White compared the fight against fascism in Spain to the fight for the revolutionary
fight for freedom and democracy by U.S. colonists in 1774,
Today, in more ways than one, the Spanish people are fighting the battles of democracy.
We in Spain knew that in the heat and horror of warfare we were once again recrossing
inch by inch the battlefields of 1776. The armies of the Spanish Republic are fighting not
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only that governments may derive their powers from the consent of the governed; they
are fighting also for the power of the governed to make their consent known, free from
the obstruction of the legal tricks, the hired thugs, the bribery and corruption and
concentration camps of reactionaries and fascists. (David McKelvy White, Box 1, Folder
1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
Regardless of whether U.S. foreign fighters conceived of themselves as defenders of
democracy or crusaders of communism, the value that united all of them was their anti-fascism.
Scholars have debated whether anti-fascism is best categorized as an ideology or as a movement,
with the consensus agreeing that anti-fascism is an ideology because it can take on both active
and passive forms and is based on the ideological belief that “fascism is antithetical to
Enlightenment concepts of humanity and society” (Copsey and Olechnowicz 2010, xviii). This
has been described as the “anti-fascist minimum.” Therefore, anti-fascism becomes an
ideological unifier, where agents from different ideological backgrounds, be it communist,
liberal, or conservative, oppose fascism on the basis that fascism is a negation of human dignity,
natural rights, and a threat to other values. So, while fewer U.S. foreign fighters may have
explicitly cited democracy as a value they were fighting and dying for, the prevalence of antifascist justifications among 92% of the U.S. foreign fighters in the sample suggests that the
threat of fascism to sacred values was far more important to fighters than simply communism.
When communism was front and center in a foreign fighter’s mind, many connected their
desires to fight for democracy with their dual desires to see a socialist government established in
Spain. For example, Alfred Amery wrote in his autobiography,
We were fighting for democracy, the purest and cleanest democracy possible, where all
parties, including the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, as well as some majority
liberal parties, would participate…So we Communists were really idealists. There was
nothing selfish in our efforts. But of course in the backs of our minds we hoped, and
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more or less believed, that we were fighting for socialism eventually. (With Joe Stalin’s
help. We thought that guy would work wonders!) (Alfred Amery, Box 1, Folder 1,
ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
Others, such as Jack Friedman, were more direct in their defense of communist values in Spain.
Friedman wrote as such in a letter to his friend George in February 1937 on his decision to leave
for Spain. Friedman wrote,
Ever since I accepted the communist solution as the correct one for suffering humanity, I
have always been of the firm conviction that we would some day, somewhere, have to
express our ideas in a most positive and active fashion. That day has come and the place
is Spain. Sometimes it is necessary to sell Daily Workers on a street corner, we do that.
At times we must educate from the soap box, we do that, then there are leaflets and
strikes and demonstrations etc. We do all these things because it is necessary and
important. Today it becomes vital that some of us go to “work” in Spain, and of course
we go in the same manner. (It does not take silver-tongued orators or loud brass bands
and flag waving to send us on our way, rather we hide and sneak and work in an
undercover manner in order to offer all we can to a cause that is right. Rather we are
pushed on by the certain knowledge that we are enlisted in a struggle that is for all
humanity and one that must some day triumph.) (Jack Friedman, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA,
Tamiment Library, New York University)
The data suggests that regardless of whether most of the U.S. foreign fighters were
communists, or whether they may have secretly hoped, as Alfred Amery did, that socialism
would thrive again in Spain, the most prominent ideological value U.S. foreign fighters cited was
anti-fascism. And while the threat of fascism may have represented a “marriage of convenience”
between radical communists and more moderate defenders of democracy, it nevertheless became
the ideological rallying point of U.S. foreign fighters in Spain. This finding bolsters the previous
finding regarding the central importance of social networks in explaining the U.S. foreign fighter
mobilization. According to theories of militant mobilization, social movement recruitment is
only successful when members of the recruitment network already have a strong identification
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with the movement’s values prior to activism (McAdam 1986). The existence of such values
within a network helps create strong, effective ties not only to other fighters but to the cause,
helping foster a willingness to fight. There is, therefore, ample evidence to support the
hypothesis (Hypothesis #4) that individuals will become foreign fighters to defend a value they
hold as sacred.
Collective Identity
The final factor that was significant for explaining the U.S. foreign fighter mobilization
to Spain was a strong feeling of collective identity, which was the third most cited reason for
U.S. foreign fighters who joined the Spanish Civil War. In Chapter Three, it was hypothesized
(Hypothesis #5) that an individual will join a foreign conflict when that individual’s self-identity
is merged with a collective identity that they mobilize to defend. The identification that was most
broadly felt among the foreign fighters, and which they claimed to be fighting on behalf of, was
a sense of connection with the “working-class” or the “proletariat.” All forty-one of the sixty
U.S. foreign fighters (or roughly 68%) that cited a sense of collective identity cited workingclass or proletarian solidarity as a reason. Twenty of the forty-one individuals that cited
collective identity also cited solidarity with the people of Spain and eleven of the forty-one
individuals cited communist solidarity. Five of the forty-one invoked their Jewish identity as a
reason for becoming a foreign fighter. While not as significant a factor as social networks and
sacred values, collective identity is an important variable linking an individual’s sacred values to
social action, thereby supporting the hypothesis.
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As detailed in Chapter Two, collective identities can be formed in such a way that they
can help overcome collective action problems, realized by helping decision making and social
continuity become much easier. Overlapping identities can help galvanize trust among potential
movement actors and can trigger collective desires for action (Sheik et al. 2012). Taken together
with the previous findings on social networks and sacred values, an individual’s commitment to
idiosyncratic beliefs and their associated values can deepen trust by both identifying cooperators
and galvanizing group solidarity. Therefore, beyond the physical connections that are critical for
theories of collective action that emphasize social networks, the feeling of solidarity is also
important for strengthening ties and motivating action.
The feelings of identification expressed by U.S. foreign fighters were complex and
multifaceted. As illustrated in a letter written by “Butch” Entin to his mother on June 21, 1937,
…remember, that we volunteered to fight (and for a damn good reason), whereas in other
wars, workers are forced to fight. I could have stayed in the U.S., and been perfectly safe.
Certainly, but what a stinking traitor I would have been to the working class, and to my
Spanish brothers and sisters, and to the glorious Soviet Union. (Bernard Entin, Box 1,
Folder 28, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
In this passage, Entin identifies with the working class, Spanish “brothers and sisters,” and with
the Soviet Union. Some combination of these three collective identities were present in the
writings of all forty-one U.S. foreign fighters who invoked their feelings of collective identity as
a driving factor in their decision to go to Spain.
Amongst the U.S. foreign fighters, a sense of working-class solidarity was broadly felt
within the ranks of those fighting in Spain. As described by Mito Kruth upon his arrival in Spain
in a June 3, 1937 letter to his wife, Helen,
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Everywhere we are met with a raised fist in the workers salute. Little kids in mothers
arms even raise their little fist. Crowds of people at every station and our necks get tired
from watching so intently and cheering and saluting them. One thing impressed all of us
at the stations and that is the deep understanding of the workers cause among the
children. (Mito Kruth, Box 1, Folder 10, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York
University)
While not every U.S. foreign fighter was a member of the working-class, the feelings of
solidarity were so broadly felt that some members attempted to hide their upper-class
backgrounds. One U.S. foreign fighter in the sample, Joseph Dallet, attempted to do just that to
be more accepted by his working-class comrades. Dallet was born into an affluent family and
was raised on New York’s Long Island. He attended the Woodmere Academy, a private
independent school in Woodmere, New York, prior to high school, was accepted and enrolled at
Dartmouth University, and his parents provided a childhood filled with cultural and educational
opportunities and travel. As described by veteran U.S. foreign fighter Steve Nelson in his
autobiography, many accounts of Dallet contend that he worked hard to conceal his wealthy,
educated background, and even performed an exaggerated “proletariat identity,” complete with
“deliberately ungrammatical speech” (Nelson, Barrett, and Ruck 1981, 197). According to
historian Cecil D. Eby (2007), “No one detected the change in Joe Dallet more quickly than the
men in the Mac-Paps. They were mystified by his mercurial behavior bullyragging and
threatening one moment and fawning and apologizing the next. His tantrums may have derived
from his upbringing as a spoiled child, alien to most of the men.”
This working-class identity was broadly felt, not just by U.S. foreign fighters, but by all
members of the International Brigades as the identity became a rallying point for international
volunteers. As Robert Klonsky pointed out in an oral history interview about his time with the
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International Brigades, “there were Irish, Polish, and Italian unemployed working-class people”
who went to Spain. “Many of them didn’t even fully understand…It was more an emotional
feeling, a nationalistic feeling, a feeling of… ‘Hey, they’re hurting my people! My people!’”
(emphasis my own, Robert Klonsky, Box 1, Folder 2, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York
University). The reason a sense of working-class solidarity was so broadly felt was because it
was the central political issue of the different ideologies present in the International Brigades. As
described by veteran Herman Rosenstein in a July 8, 1937 letter to his sister after arriving in
Spain,
The composition of the men that make up the IB is of the highest order. We have
Communists (a majority, I’m proud to report), Socialists, Trade-Unionists, members of
the ALP, members of the IWO and other workers’ organizations. We all faced many
difficulties in reaching our objective. Especially is this true of those from Germany and
Italy; and there were many. Almost every nation is represented by its best blood in the
IB…As far as Spain goes, the youth here are united organically. The Communist Party,
our party, is forging the bonds of unity with the Socialist Party, thruout all of Spain to
form that great United Party of the Proletariat which is so necessary to crush fascism and
wipe it out. That day is not long off…From the beginning of the struggle our position has
not wavered, we were consistent and correct for we are a true Marxian Party. Thru the
last crisis of the govt, we showed the way and the people followed. (Herman Rosenstein,
Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
And while the members of the International Brigades represented an ideological mixture, Marx
was the prominent ideological language. As illustrated in a letter from veteran Sidney Rosenblatt
to friend, and future CPUSA leader and activist, Estelle Katz, written on October 21, 1937,
The conclusion remains that this war must be fought to the finish, we must continue our
offensive and fierce attacks, and thousands of our lines will necessarily be sacrificed here
and now. Otherwise, what will happen is that the Fascists will ravage the rest of the
country (applies to the rest of the world simply “turn the other cheek”) and not thousands,
but hundreds of thousands, will be murdered. They’ve already done that, and are
continuing assassinating huge portions of the population in the territory which they
control. The class struggle is stormy and dangerous, and the Spanish people have to (and
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they will!) face the facts. And we I.B.ers here in the trenches, and all class-conscious
revolutionaries the world over, have to face the facts, too, with chin up and fearless.
(Sidney Rosenblatt, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
U.S. foreign fighters also connected their sense of working-class identity with a perceived
sense of connection with global communists and the Soviet Union. As previously mentioned,
fifty-seven of the sixty U.S. foreign fighters in the sample were dues paying members of the
CPUSA or YCL before they traveled to Spain and eleven of the forty-one foreign fighters that
cited collective identity as a reason for joining the Spanish Civil War mentioned an identification
with fellow communists or Soviets. The U.S. foreign fighters that expressed a sense of collective
identification with global communism believed that they were part of a wider revolutionary
struggle. In a passage from Alvah Bessie’s diary dated June 14, 1938, he reprinted a song that
members of the International Brigades frequently recited together in Spanish, which he translated
to English in his diary. The translation reads,
We are Communists, revolutionaries
Who together fight for liberty.
We want an end to the many injustices
And we want inequality to disappear
Ay ay ay, tossing off the bourgeoisie
Ay ay ay, how bad you’re going to look
Ay ay ay, long live our union
Because we are Communists to our very hearts!
(Alvah Bessie, Box 1, Folder 9, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
The U.S. foreign fighters that invoked a sense of communist or Soviet identity saw themselves as
active participants in a broader progressive social revolution that began with the Russian
Revolution (1917 – 1922) and the establishment of the Soviet Union (1922) and continued with
the establishment of the Popular Front (1935) and then the war in Spain.
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Upon arriving in Spain on January 12, 1937, Elias Begelman wrote to his friend Mike
back home about his impressions of Spain, “…this town is run by a united front committee
composed of Communists, Socialists and Anarchists, and moreover the latter continuously lose
influence and go over to our side. Mike, I will not write anymore of all my impressions, only to
say that I am in the thick and thin of a social revolution, and we are moving, daily, hourly”
(emphasis added, Elias Begelman, Box 1, Folder 3, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York
University). Begelman was capturing a common mood that was felt by many U.S. foreign
fighters that arrived in Spain in the early months of 1937 that reinforced their decisions to
become foreign fighters as part of this social revolution. Many letters from U.S. foreign fighters
sent back home during this time were filled with optimism about the composition of the
International Brigades, the political climate among the Spanish workers, and the hope that they
would quickly win the war against fascism and advance their progressive movement. In another
letter from Begelman to Mike while Begelman was still in training on February 20, 1937,
This army is really an international army, you think New York where you have Greeks,
French, Germans, Cubans, Czechs and what not – well, here we have them from 52 lands
and if there were a 53rd they too would be represented. You call Chapayev when he was
asked can he lead an army of all the countries…the language came up but we solved it.
We have Frenchmen and Italians and Germans that baby with hands all kinds of signs.
Oh we get along swell. But really we speak back home of Internationalism, here it’s in
practice. Words fail me to describe the love and devotion for one another. It’s gigantic.
Above all it is more vivid because all of us are the rank and file who directly face the
enemy at home and here the fascists. (Elias Begelman, Box 1, Folder 3, ALBA,
Tamiment Library, New York University)
One important reference in Begelman’s February 1937 letter is his reference to
“Chapayev.” Chapayev, or Vasily Chapaev (the correct spelling in Russian), was a famous and
widely celebrated commander of the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. Begelman was not
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the only U.S. foreign fighter to mention Chapaev in their writings; three other foreign fighters
refer to the Russian war hero, citing him as inspiration for their becoming a foreign fighter. A
film entitled, Chapaev, a fictionalized depiction of the heroic death of Chapaev at the hands of
the enemy White Army that was released in Russia in 1934, was regularly screened for
International Brigade volunteers. The film has been described as a propaganda piece that worked
to foster a “Soviet identity” in the wake of the Russian civil war, an identity many U.S. foreign
fighters came to associate with. U.S. foreign fighter Mito Kruth saw Chapaev at least twice while
in Spain, likening the experience to watching a “wild west” picture; “When the enemy gets
licked a great cheer goes up” (Mito Kruth Box 1, Folder 12, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New
York University). Republican reporters and propagandists expected Spanish troops to not only
identify with the revolutionary heroes on screen but to also imitate them. And to make sure
soldiers understood what they were supposed to take away from these films, commissars
organized “explanatory conversations” after each screening (Kirschenbaum 2015).
Another collective identity that acted as a motivating factor for U.S. foreign fighters was
their perceived sense of collective identification to the people of Spain, one that transcended
national and linguistic boundaries. Referring back to the ethnicity data presented in Table 7, few
U.S. foreign fighters had Spanish ancestry and yet twenty of the forty-one foreign fighters that
cited collective identity as a motivator mentioned an identification with the Spanish people, one
that clearly transcended borders, ethnicity, and ancestry. As mentioned in Chapter Two, theories
of collective identity have discussed the centrality of transnational collective identities, those that
transcend place- or time-specific markers, as important for transnational collective movements
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(Scholte 1996). Morris Kornblum4 described the importance of transnational collective identity
in a letter dated June 14, 1938 referencing his desire to defend the people of Spain, “These
people are the same as us. We have no right to stand aside & let them be trampled over &
crushed by the fascists” (Morris Kornblum, Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New
York University). And in a more detailed account of this sense of connection between foreign
fighters and the people of Spain, Jack Friedman connected the struggle of the Spanish people to a
broader struggle for all of humanity against fascism, in a February 1937 letter to his friend
George;
Today it becomes vital that some of us go to “work” in Spain, and of course we go in the
same manner. (It does not take silver-tongued orators or loud brass bands and flag
waving to send us on our way, rather we hide and sneak and work in an undercover
manner in order to offer all we can to a cause that is right. Rather we are pushed on by
the certain knowledge that we are enlisted in a struggle that is for all humanity and one
that must some day triumph.) Let me tell you, George, that to see the happily envious
faces of the comrades who remain is in itself a great reward. But it is folly to think only
on the barricades can one serve. Great is the honor that we must pay to those in Spain
whose tireless work made the barricades possible. (Nelson and Hendricks 1996, 43)
These findings on U.S. foreign fighters’ feelings of collective identity challenge the
argument that foreign volunteers were duped by the Comintern into helping the Soviet Union
“Sovietize” Spain (see Kirschenbaum 2015). Such an interpretation was originally made by
George Orwell (1938, 56) in Homage to Catalonia when he wrote that the “whole Comintern
policy is now subordinated (excusably, considering the world situation) to the defense of the
USSR.” Orwell believed that the Soviets were more interested in quashing the revolution than
winning the war to ensure Soviet security via cooperation with France and the rest of Europe,

4

During the McCarthy era, Kornblum changed his name to Martin Balter because he worried that his service during
the Spanish Civil War would make him the target of the FBI.
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countries that had maintained neutrality throughout the war. The collective identity that most
U.S. foreign fighter associated with, and mobilized on behalf of, was their working-class
identity, an identity that manifested during the Great Depression, the rise of trade union
organization, and the expansion of local, left-wing political parties and not because of Soviet
indoctrination. Furthermore, with so many Jewish volunteers, and five individuals invoking their
Jewish identity as a reason for becoming a foreign fighter, foreign fighters identified with a
diverse array of collective identity groups that influenced their decisions and appealed to
different rationales not directly related to Soviet political or military strategy. A sense of
collective identity, therefore, acted as a strong motivator for U.S. foreign fighters, supporting the
hypothesis (Hypothesis #5) that an individual will become a foreign fighter when their selfidentity is fused with a collective identity that they mobilize to defend.
Personal Victimization
In Chapter Three, it was hypothesized (Hypothesis #2) that an individual will join a
foreign conflict if they feel a sense of personal victimization that motivates them to action. Only
twelve of the U.S. foreign fighters, or 20%, cited a feeling of personal victimization as a reason
for volunteering to fight in the Spanish Civil War. This finding suggests that theories linking
personal victimization to collective action are insufficient for explaining the U.S. foreign fighter
mobilization to Spain. In three of the cases, the primary mechanism linking a fighter’s feelings of
personal victimization to their decision to fight in Spain was a personal trauma that they
experienced that they came to relate directly to their decision to become a foreign fighter. One
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significant exception was that nine of the twelve foreign fighters in the sample that cited personal
victimization were Jewish and felt victimized as a result of their religious affiliations.
Harry Fisher felt a sense of personal victimization when he found out that his family had
lost their entire life savings while his employer was able to secure his fortune when the stock
market collapsed on October 29, 1929. Not only did this event spark Fisher’s desire to join the
CPUSA but it influenced him to become an ardent anti-fascist. After four years as a member of
the YCL and CPUSA helping assist members of the working class who had lost their jobs and
homes, Fisher read about the burning of the German Reichstag, Germany’s house of parliament,
on February 27, 1933. Germany’s courts found a group of communists guilty of the arson, which
many believed was a “false flag” that led to the Reichstag Fire Decree that would officially
suspend most civil liberties in Germany; an act which would not be undone until the fall of Nazi
Germany after World War II (Hett 2014). Fisher came to associate fascism with the ills of the
world, including his personal economic hardship and the war in Spain, which Fisher followed
closely beginning in 1936. As Fisher recounted in his autobiography, “Soon it became clear that
Germany and Italy were behind the rebellion in Spain. If they won, what a boost to fascism all
over the world, including the United States! I worried about it and read all the newspaper
accounts avidly…My anger was so strong, I knew I had to go. Fascism simply had to be
stopped” (Fisher 1998, 15-6). Fisher’s anger is emblematic of the mechanism that scholars have
argued links personal victimization to action (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011) but such
feelings of trauma were not very widespread among Fisher’s fellow fighters.
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Bill Bailey, who had gained a certain level of notoriety among working class seamen
even prior to his going to Spain for having ripped the Nazi flag from the German Bremen that
had docked in Manhattan in 1935, described a similar connection between a feeling of personal
victimization for a loved one and his decision to go to Spain. Like many of the U.S. foreign
fighters in Spain, Bailey had written a letter to his mother to be delivered to her in the event of
his death on the battlefield. Bailey survived the war, so the letter was never sent, but he reprinted
the letter in his autobiography to best reflect his reason for becoming a foreign fighter at the
time. In a telling passage from that letter detailing his rationale for going to Spain, Bailey (1993)
wrote:
I can recall the first time I missed your presence at home and discovered that you were
out hunting for a job scrubbing floors in order to bring home some food for the family. I
knew that something was very wrong with life, but I had no idea what to do about it to
make it any different. It was only when I grew up and I too had to go around begging for
work to live that I realized the wrongs had to be corrected.
In Spain there are countless thousands of mothers like yourself who never had a fair
shake in life. Their whole existence has been one of trying to get enough food to stay
alive for another day. One day these people did something about that. They got together
and elected a government that really gave some meaning to their lives and promised to
make it so that the millions of mothers like you would never again have to bend their
knees and beg to exist in a world that had plenty for everyone.
But it didn’t work out the way the poor people expected. A group of bullies decided to
crush and wipe out this wonderful thing the poor people had accomplished and drive
them back to the old way of life.
That’s why I went to Spain, Mom – to help these poor people win this battle so one day it
would be easier for you and the mothers of the future.
Later in the letter, Bailey goes so far as to say that his reasons for going to Spain had nothing to
do with communism, only that he wanted to do right by his mother who had gone through hard

129
times and misery. Theories that link personal victimization to collective action, especially
militant action, stipulate that individuals are prone to mobilize against a perpetrator not only
when they are victims, but they perceive their friends and loved ones as victims. Again, however,
the presence of such feelings was not widely felt among other U.S. foreign fighters, suggesting
that foreign fighters were not internalizing feelings of victimization and such feelings were
exceptions to otherwise broader recruitment trends amongst foreign fighters.
One important exception that explains a smaller trend in the data were U.S. foreign
fighters that felt personally victimized because of their religious affiliations. An important
statistic explaining how U.S. foreign fighters came to link their feelings of personal victimization
with their desire to become a foreign fighter is that nine of the twelve foreign fighters in the
sample that cited personal victimization were Jewish and were afraid of religious oppression and
persecution. In an unpublished interview conducted in 1987, Robert Klonsky, a Russian Jew
from NYC who was one of the first U.S. foreign fighters to join the Abraham Lincoln Brigades
in February 1937, recalled growing up with unemployed parents who “fought desperately to feed
a family of eight” (Robert Klonsky, Box 1, Folder 2, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York
University). “Problems of political thinking and political action were present at a very early stage
in our lives,” declared Klonsky, “If we hadn’t been living the kind of life we were forced to live
during that period, 300 men from my community alone would not have gone to Spain…to fight
fascism.” Later in his interview, Klonsky continued, “Consequently, the issues of Nazism and
fascism were central to their thinking and their feelings. Their fellow Jewish human beings were
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being slaughtered over there, and the impact was felt at home.” And in a letter written to his
parents written from the front lines on March 19, 1937, Klonsky wrote,
I promise you that next Passover I’ll be back home with all of you, and I’ll drink a toast
to you with Papa’s wine that I miss very much. Meanwhile, my place, I believe, is here,
doing my bit to make sure that in the future no race of people, whether Jew or Gentile,
will have cause for mourning their dead. I know that you will agree with me, when I say
that I am doing more for both my race and my class, here in Spain, helping in the fight
against Fascism, than I could possibly do at home. (Robert Klonsky, Box 1, Folder 20,
ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University)
Many Jews who volunteered in Spain shared Klonsky’s sentiments because arguably
more than any other group, Jews not only feared for their personal wellbeing but for the
wellbeing of their entire nation. As summarized by veteran foreign fighter Martin Krauss in a
public lecture, “I went to Spain…because I had a special revulsion for fascism and all that it
stands for. As a Jew, we as a people were facing a fight for our very survival” (Martin Krauss,
Box 1, Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University). As a result, U.S.-Jewish
foreign fighters rationalized their motivations for going to Spain as a need to put a stop to
fascism before it came to victimize U.S. Jews. As written by Morris Kornblum in a letter to his
father and mother dated June 14, 1938,
It’s clear that if the fascists win here (which they are not going to) they will get bolder &
bolder. If Mexico should ever become fascist (which means Hitler dominated – do you
realize that Hitler is out to dominate the whole world?) – then our own U.S. is in danger –
What did fascism bring to the Jews of Austria? (ask Lester) what will fascism bring to all
of us? We are answering that question by preventing it from ever coming to the U.S. and
to prevent it there it must be smashed here. (Morris Kornblum, Box 1, Folder 2, ALBA,
Tamiment Library, New York University)
As defined in Chapter Three, a victim is a person who suffers direct or threatened
emotional or physical harm as a result of someone else. Arguably more than any other group,
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Jews had a reason to feel victimized by fascist governments, around the world and in Spain, and
these feelings of victimization were clearly strong motivators for the Jewish members of the
International Brigades. Otherwise, a feeling of personal victimization played a limited role in
influencing the decision of U.S. citizens to become foreign fighters. Only three of the twelve
foreign fighters who cited a feeling of personal victimization cited something other than their
religious affiliation. Absent of feeling victimized because of their religious affiliation, foreign
fighters are unlikely to have experienced victimization at home that could be linked to political,
social, or religious perpetrators abroad. The hypothesis (Hypothesis #2) linking personal
victimization to foreign fighting is therefore not supported by the data on U.S. foreign fighters to
Spain.
Structural Grievances
Only three of the sixty U.S. foreign fighters in the sample, or 5%, identified structural
grievances, or perceived injustices at the broader country or societal level, as a motivation for
joining the Spanish Civil War. This finding suggests that the hypothesis laid out in Chapter
Three (Hypothesis #3), that an individual will join a foreign conflict if they perceive a structural
grievance that motivates them to action, is not supported by the data on U.S. foreign fighters.
After returning from the front lines to become the Chairman of the Friends of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade (FALB), David McKelvy White, on July 4, 1938, wrote a pamphlet
that summarized the many resemblances U.S. foreign fighters saw between Spain’s struggle for
independence and that of the U.S.’s, and how injustice and tyranny motivated U.S. citizens to
fight in both conflicts. McKelvy began the pamphlet by writing, “The root of both conflicts lay
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in an economic oppression which had direct and immediate results in the limiting of human
rights…When a nation fights for its life against injustice and tyranny, it is inevitable that men
from all over the world should come to its active assistance.” McKelvy concluded by writing, “It
is natural and right that the United States should be generously represented in the International
Brigades…These are the reasons why they are there, and why the American people must support
them and the cause for the sake of which they are prepared to face not alone death but also the
unspeakable terror and exhaustion of the battlefield” (David McKelvy White, Box 1, Folder 28,
ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University).
The three U.S. foreign fighters that cited structural grievances as a motivator for fighting
in Spain cited the “tyranny” or “dictatorship” of fascism and its “authoritarian” nature. “It should
be quite simple for you to understand then, why I and tens of thousands of other anti-fascists
from more than 52 nations throughout the world, have come here to Spain to do part of our share
in stamping out Fascism,” Bernard “Butch” Entin wrote to his mother in a May 31, 1937 letter
(Bernard Entin, Box 1, Folder 28, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University). He
continued, “We came here to help the Spanish people fight fascism and we are not leaving until
we are victorious.” Entin was writing a series of letters home to his mother trying to justify
becoming a foreign fighter, who at the time did not know he had gone to fight and Spain. Each
letter expanded on the evils of fascism; “Fascism is the last phase of capitalism. Fascism is the
open dictatorship, the most brutal oppression of the working people,” Entin wrote in another
letter dated June 6, 1937. Harry Fisher, Entin’s best friend, shared many views about fascism and
the war in Spain. In an April 26, 1937 letter to family back home, Fisher wrote, “I feel I must do
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my part in the fight against fascism…That’s why I’m glad I’m here” (Harry Fisher, Box 1,
Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University). In a follow-up letter to his family
on May 14, 1937, Fisher wrote,
I realize that what I am here for is a thousand times more important than all these
beautiful luxuries. If you ever saw the two little children in bandages, wounded by fascist
bombs, if you ever saw a thousand people forced to live in holes of a mountain because
their lives are not safe in their homes continuously being bombed then beds and fine
foods and pretty girls would seem insignificant as they do to me.
The U.S. foreign fighters to Spain have infamously been referred to as the “premature
anti-fascists” (Gerassi 1986), a label that many of the U.S. foreign fighters who survived the war
rejected. Bernard Knox, who was a poet, Professor of Classics at Yale University, and veteran
foreign fighter of the Spanish Civil War, wrote upon first hearing the phrase, “I was taken aback
by the expression. How, I wondered, could anyone be a premature anti-fascist? Could there be
anything such as a premature antidote to a poison? A premature antiseptic? A premature
antitoxin? A premature anti-racist? If you were not premature, what sort of anti-fascist were you
supposed to be?” (Knox 2001). Anti-fascism was an ideological rallying point for International
Brigade volunteers who had come from all over the world, but as previously mentioned, antifascism is not a structural grievance. The structural grievances U.S. foreign fighters cited were
the structural ills that they believed fascism produced that motivated U.S. foreign fighters. For
example, at various points in his autobiography, Harry Fisher cites the rise of greater economic
inequality, mass unemployment, lack of meaningful opportunities, and mass poverty as structural
grievances foreign fighters associated with creeping fascism that ultimately amplified their desire
to fight in Spain (Fisher 1998). However, having never lived under fascism or having
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experienced the “ills” as written about by Fisher, most foreign fighters never developed specific
grievances. Instead, U.S. foreign fighters framed their motivations as an ideological resistance to
fascism. There is therefore limited support that U.S. foreign fighters were motivated by structural
grievances.
Economic Incentives
Arguably the most dominant explanation in the literature on contentious collective action
for the past half-century has been the need for economic incentives to motivate individuals. It
was hypothesized (Hypothesis #1) in Chapter Three that an individual will join a foreign conflict
if they have a private economic incentive to do so. There is no evidence that economic incentives
acted as a motivator for U.S. foreign fighters. The U.S. foreign fighters who fought in the
Spanish Civil War were not soldiers of fortune. They received no compensation for their efforts.
Though nationalist propaganda attempted to portray the International Brigades as a band of
mercenaries, bought and paid by the Comintern, the fact was that many of the foreign fighters
who went to Spain wrote of financial hardship while on the frontlines and even wrote home
asking for money to be sent to cover their expenses in Spain while not on the front lines
illustrates that these claims were fabrications. This propaganda became an especially sore spot
for many veterans both because it was obviously untrue based on what we now know about the
day-to-day lives of the foreign fighters in Spain but also because such claims invalidated the
cause for which they claimed to be fighting.
A noteworthy confrontation among foreign fighters that occurred in a French jail prior to
their arrival in Spain illustrates this point well. As retold by U.S. foreign fighter Joe Dallet in an
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April 9, 1937 letter to his wife, he and twenty-five U.S. foreign fighters had been arrested for
trying to illegally cross into Spain and among the prisoners already jailed were foreign fighters
from other countries who had apparently suffered police brutality. According to Dallet, these
other foreign fighters seemed ready “to confess to anything the authorities demanded.” When
Dallet learned that a badly frightened Italian foreign fighter had told the French police that he
had volunteered because the French Communist Party “offered him 10,000 francs and 50 francs
per day to go to Spain” – a confession that even the public prosecutor did not believe – Dallet, in
front of the other men, denounced and insulted the informer, recounting to his wife that, “He
hung his head and was too scared to speak. We all threatened him and I was surprised how well I
could curse in French. I found out yesterday that when they got him back to jail they beat him up
and completely ostracized him” (Joseph Dallet, Box 1, Folder 11, ALBA, Tamiment Library,
New York University). The very implication that a foreign fighter might be doing this for their
own monetary benefit was something the U.S. foreign fighters would not stand for.
There is only one individual, James Lardner, that mentioned joining the war effort for a
remunerative purpose; that purpose was the promise of future monetary rewards or promise of
future employment from writing a book about the war. James Lardner was born on May 18, 1914
in Chicago, Illinois, the second of four sons born to the well-known journalist Ringgold Wilmer
Lardner. As a result of his father’s literary connections, Lardner counted among his friends and
acquaintances figures such as F. Scott and Zelda Fitzgerald and Dorothy Parker. Lardner went to
Harvard University and in 1935 got a job as a reporter for the New York Herald Tribune. Finding
the job “dull,” Lardner asked to be transferred to the Tribune’s Paris bureau where he would
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report on the situation in Spain and on the U.S. foreign fighters joining the Spanish Civil War. In
March 1938, Lardner traveled to Barcelona in the company of fellow journalists Ernest
Hemingway and Vincent Sheean to observe the conflict firsthand. After witnessing the dire state
of the International Brigades in 1938, Lardner decided to join.
Unlike Hemingway and Sheean, Lardner was one of the few journalists covering the war
to take up fighting in the Spanish Civil War. However, like Hemingway, Sheean, and other
journalists in Spain at the time, Lardner’s priority was gathering material for his job and to one
day gather enough good material to write a novel or play about the experience. In a letter to his
Mother written from Barcelona and dated May 3, 1938, Lardner wrote a list of the very specific
reasons for enlisting in the International Brigade. Among them, Lardner wrote, “Because I want
to find material for some writing, probably a play” (James Lardner, Box 1, Folder 2, ALBA,
Tamiment Library, New York University). This might seem, at first glance, to be uncompelling
evidence of a remunerative incentive given that among Lardner’s other cited reasons for later
joining was an ardent anti-fascist attitude and a desire to help the Spanish people. However, there
were many who criticized Hemingway for coming to Spain with such a motive (i.e., gathering
material simply to write a book). Many Abraham Lincoln Brigade veterans called Hemingway
“politically naïve” (Carroll 2012) and Milton Wolff, himself a novelist and arguably one of the
most politically active veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade after the war, criticized
Hemingway in an exchange of letters, calling him a “Tourist in Spain” (Milton Wolff, Box 1,
Folder 1, ALBA, Tamiment Library, New York University; Ernest Hemingway, Box MS59, File
759, JFK). While many of the foreign fighters praised the reporting done by correspondents for
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outlets like New Masses and Daily Worker, the profiting from the novelization of the Spanish
Civil War afterwards remained something of a controversial topic among veterans, for similar
reasons as Dallet’s opposition to the lying Italian volunteer from the French prison (see e.g.,
Cohen 2018). While this remunerative reason might not have been the most influential in
Lardner’s decision to join, it could explain his late entry into the Brigades, as he was later
referred to by Sheean (1939) as “the last American to enlist.” Lardner was also the only foreign
fighter in the sample to even suggest a remunerative motivation, therefore providing limited
support for the hypothesis (Hypothesis #1) that a foreign fighter will join a foreign conflict if
they have a private, economic incentive to do so.
Unidentified Reasons
Explicit motivations for becoming a foreign fighter could not always be determined by
examining the available archival material. There was only one individual in the sample where a
specific motivation could not be established and that is the case of William Colfax Miller. Many
of the details surrounding Miller’s life during and after the Spanish Civil War remain unverified.
What is known is that Miller was born in Lake Andes, South Dakota, became a member of the
CPUSA in 1933, and lived in Hollywood, California before sailing to Spain in 1938 where he
contracted tuberculosis and was sent home a year after he left. The archival material available on
Miller from his time in Spain included a disbound scrapbook that consisted primarily of photos,
leaflets, and flyers as well as postcards to unknown individuals that were never mailed.
According to historian Diana Anhalf (2001), after returning from the war, Miller left the U.S.
and went to Mexico to become a film director because his Marxist leanings were preventing him
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from finding adequate work in Hollywood. Many of his accomplishments, including having
participated in more than 150 films in Mexico, remain unverified. One notable exaggeration
regarding Miller’s life that Anhalf (2001) personally investigated was that Miller claimed to have
been personally involved in the attempted assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico City in May
1940, though this claim could never be verified.
In an unattributed obituary written about Miller in El Ojo del Lago, the magazine of the
Lake Chapala region of Mexico, it was said that “Bill was…deeply admired for his commitment
to political causes. In the ‘30s, feeling that fascism was destroying the great cultures of Europe,
he joined the famed Lincoln Brigade and fought in the Spanish Civil War.” While the obituary
clearly states that Miller went to Spain to fight fascism, much like the rest of his background, this
claim could not be independently verified from material written or spoken by Miller himself. His
motivation for joining the Spanish Civil War is therefore categorized as unidentifiable.
Analysis and Conclusion
Classic theories of collection action, social movements, and organizational behavior
suggest that economic incentives, personal victimization, and structural grievances are the
dominant paradigms for understanding why contentious collective action, especially violent
political action, occurs. The findings from this chapter suggest that these dominant paradigms do
not largely explain the mobilization of 3,000 U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War.
Economic incentives and structural grievances played an especially limited role, with only one
individual citing an economic incentive and three individuals citing a structural grievance as a
reason for becoming a foreign fighter. In addition, feelings of personal victimization, another
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dominant paradigm in the literature, played a slightly greater, though still limited, role in
motivating U.S. foreign fighters, and was more relegated to a particular sect of U.S. foreign
fighters, namely the Jewish foreign fighters, who felt a sense of personal victimization because
of specific fascist policies that sought their extermination.
The findings from this chapter instead suggest that there is a strong social logic to foreign
fighter mobilizations. More than an individual, ideological decision, U.S. foreign fighters were
influenced by their sense of connection to fellow working-class volunteers who were also putting
their lives on the line in Spain. Forty-one of the sixty individuals in the sample, or 68%, cited a
sense of collective identification with a peer group as a reason, with all forty-one of them citing
solidarity with the working-class. However, more than a sense solidarity felt by this broader
identity group, it was the physical connections of the individuals in the sample that was the most
dominant factor. Approximately 98%, or fifty-nine of the sixty foreign fighters in the sample,
knew someone that was in Spain or was going to Spain prior to their joining the war effort.
As detailed in Chapter Two, one of the most important social network factors that has
been analyzed to explain collective action and social movements has been the role of “linkages,”
or connections between individuals and organizations, between organizations and other
organizations, and between movements and settings. The propensity and strength of diverse
network linkages is one of the most robust predicators of militant mobilization in the literature
(McAdam 1986). The demographic and archival data presented in this chapter together explain
how dense the linkages among U.S. foreign fighters were. The demographic data show that U.S.
foreign fighters likely did not just have one connection to an individual associated with the war,
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but likely had several, overlapping connections because of their membership in organizations
like the CPUSA, a labor union, or other ethnic community grouping. As a result of the
recruitment strategy of the CPUSA and Comintern, these individuals were likely inundated with
information about the war in Spain, and as more of their friends and colleagues began to sign up
for the war, they too were motivated to participate. As was detailed in many of the archival
materials collected on U.S. foreign fighters, these social network organizations helped coordinate
every aspects of a U.S. foreign fighters’ transit to Spain. Therefore, without these dense social
networks, it is very likely that, regardless of how motivated individual foreign fighters were, they
would never have been able to overcome the barriers of entry into Spain that were set up by both
the U.S. and other neutral European powers.
While the social aspect of the foreign fighter phenomenon as it relates to U.S. foreign
fighters to the Spanish Civil War is the most significant factor, socially connected individuals
still needed to have congruent values that motivated their desire to fight in Spain in the first
place. Sacred values, as represented by the ideological, moral, and parochial values of
individuals, were cited by fifty-five of the sixty individuals in the sample, or 92%. Of those fiftyfive individuals, 82% cited anti-fascism as the dominant ideological reason for their
participation. The other two dominant values U.S. foreign fighters cited were a commitment to
communist values (53%) and commitment to democratic values (27%). As detailed in Chapter
Two, the sacred values framework is a relative newcomer to the collective action and social
movement literatures but is one that stands diametrically opposed to classic, rational choice
theories of militant mobilization, which assume individuals are rational actors who require
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incentives, especially economic incentives, to overcome psychological barriers to collective
action. As previously mentioned, there was no incentive, economic or otherwise, for U.S. foreign
fighters. Rather than conforming to the rational actor assumption, the U.S. foreign fighters would
instead be considered “devoted actors,” or individuals who make costly sacrifices, where cost is
clearly out of proportion to the potential reward, in the name of values they hold as sacred. In the
case of the U.S. foreign fighters to Spain, knowing that, because of a global travel ban to Spain
and a declaration of neutrality by the U.S. and the other democratic countries of Europe, they
were the weaker side in the conflict, these individuals nevertheless put their lives on the line for
their values, which they felt were being threatened by the rise of global fascism.
In conclusion, the U.S. foreign fighters to the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil
War mobilized for a mix of individual and social logics. These foreign fighters were both
morally and ideologically committed to the cause of the International Brigades and had both a
metaphysical and physical connection to other individuals who shared those commitments. With
the help of organizations that strategically recruited and facilitated travel, these 3,000 U.S.
foreign fighters were able to join 60,000 other foreigners from around the globe to aid the
Spanish Republic. A song, chanted by members of the International Brigades and reprinted by
Robert Klonsky in a May 3, 1937 letter home, captures these congruent sentiments well:
For in a very short, short while,
To Fascism we’ll put an end
Then workers will no longer Heil
For Hitler to hell we will send!
(Robert Klonsky, May 3, 1937 letter. Box 1, Folder 1).
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In the next chapter on Tunisian foreign fighters to ISIS, I begin by contextualizing the
Syrian Civil War and analyzing the effects of the Arab Spring on the world and on Tunisia, in
particular. The chapter then provides a general demographic profile of Tunisian foreign fighters
before analyzing the motivations of the Tunisian foreign fighters to ISIS.

CHAPTER FIVE
TUNISIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA
(ISIS) IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR (2011-PRESENT)
Marwan al-Dwiri, better known to many young Tunisians as Emino and to his ISIS
counterparts as Abu Ameen al-Tunisi (his nom de guerre), was a rapper from Tunisia who
became famous after the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings for posting photos of himself on social
media doing drugs and posing with scantily clad women. He was arrested in 2012 on charges of
marijuana possession and sent to prison for two years in what his lawyer categorized as a clear
example of Tunisia’s “rampant political and economic corruption.” After his early release eight
months later, Emino published a series of songs critical of the regime. He collaborated with
fellow Tunisian rapper, Weld el 15 on a song called “Boulicia Kleb” (Cops Are Dogs), the music
video of which finds the two in front of Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior referring to Tunisian
police by derogatory names. After a warrant was again issued for his arrest, Emino disappeared.
It would later be revealed that he had taken refuge with a jihadi-Salafist network in Douar
Hicher, part of the Manouba district of Tunisia, which he had gained access to thanks to
acquaintances he had met in prison. Time with this network would begin to change him. In
October 2013, he released a song that was uncharacteristic of his style entitled, “Allahomma
Amin” (Oh God Hear Me) where he sang, “We don’t like to bring down our hearts, [but] we die
like Saddam Hussein, Oh God Hear Me.” The song described how bleak life was in Tunisia, and
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the Muslim world in general, where even powerful men like Saddam Hussein were victims of
Western injustice. After a nearly two-year hiatus, Emino revealed on his Facebook page that he
had joined ISIS in Syria, surprising many who believed he had a promising music career ahead
of him, a rare thing in a country where nearly 40% of youth are unemployed (World Bank
2018).5 So why did Emino, along with 3,000 fellow Tunisians, join ISIS? The chapter argues that
Tunisian foreign fighters to ISIS in the Syrian Civil War were primarily driven by an interaction
of four factors.
The first and most important factor was the prevalence of local, close-knit social
networks that helped link the local struggles experienced by Tunisians to the plight of Muslims
all over the world. Demographic data on 650 Tunisian foreign fighters analyzed for this chapter
shows that 96% of the fighters were actively recruited by high-ranking members of jihadiSalafist networks with links to ISIS. Furthermore, interview and focus group data analyzed as
part of the Tunisian prison study reveals that every individual, 100% of the fifty-seven Tunisian
foreign fighter returnees that were interviewed, were members of a local jihadi-Salafist
organization with active ties to ISIS prior to becoming foreign fighters. These jihadi-Salafist
networks developed both local and global recruitment campaigns that targeted individuals to join
their networks throughout Tunisia, which were freely operating because of new religious
freedoms that resulted from the 2011 Tunisian revolution. It was these networks that later helped
individuals overcome the physical barriers to mobilization. As was the case in the previous
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This is still available on Emino’s Facebook fan page: https://www.facebook.com/emino.0fficiel?fref=nf.
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chapter on U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War, social networks acted as a necessary
condition driving the mobilization of Tunisian foreign fighters to ISIS.
Second, Tunisian foreign fighters came to adopt a new religious identity in opposition to
their national or local identities. All fifty-seven of the Tunisian foreign fighters (100%)
interviewed for the Tunisian prison study associated themselves with a transnational Islamist
collective identity because of their involvement with jihadi-Salafist organizations. According to
the fighters, this new identity was based on collective ideas about ISIS and its struggle in Iraq
and Syria. Coupled with the government crackdown of these organizations in 2013, these
identities ultimately helped Tunisian foreign fighters overcome the psychological barriers to
mobilization.
Third, individuals that had joined jihadi-Salafist organizations also adopted new, radical
sacred values that helped foster Tunisian foreign fighters’ “will to fight” abroad for ISIS.
Tunisian jihadi-Salafist organizations, most notably Ansar al-Sharia, already had links to ISIS
that stemmed from clandestine foreign fighter recruitment campaigns that took place during the
Iraq War (2003 – 2011). These organizations worked to spread the “ISIS ideology,” one that all
the Tunisian foreign fighter returnees who were interviewed for the prison study recited,
including the belief that world powers (especially the U.S.) are conspiring against the nation of
Islam and they have a strong commitment to return their civilization to the legal environment of
the time of the Muslim conquests (seventh-century CE). Demographic data on Tunisian foreign
fighters further reveals that most of the fighters did not have advanced religious knowledge,
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making them susceptible to the “Prophetic methodology” of ISIS, which had been distilled in a
way to make it more palatable to eager, young recruits.
Finally, Tunisian foreign fighters were driven to radical religious values as the result of a
general disillusionment with their country after the 2011 revolution. Tunisian foreign fighters
cited structural grievances, mostly associated with the country’s political and economic situation,
as strong motivators for their action. Many of the foreign fighter returnees interviewed for the
prison study, 69%, said the 2011 revolution in Tunisia was not a success and 89% of respondents
said the Arab Spring, encompassing the entire movement that spread throughout the MENA
region, was not a success. Tunisian foreign fighters connected this lack of success to a general
lack of economic and political opportunities in Tunisia, which forced them to seek out radical
groups and eventually join ISIS.
It turns out that Emino’s profile and rationale for joining ISIS fits with that of an average
Tunisian foreign fighter described in this chapter. Emino announced that he had joined ISIS in
March 2015, which would have made him twenty-five years old; roughly the average age of a
Tunisian foreign fighter. He was single, did not have a college degree, and did not have a
salaried job, all of which are revealed to be common traits of a Tunisian foreign fighter. He was
not very religious prior to joining ISIS and was recruited by a jihadi-Salafist network that
predated ISIS, both of which were common trends among Tunisian foreign fighters.2 Finally,
Emino, like many Tunisian foreign fighters, was highly critical of his country, citing structural
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Jihadi-Salafism, also known as Salafi jihadism and jihadist-Salafism, is a transnational religious-political ideology
based on a belief in "physical" jihadism, or the act of fighting infidels, and Salafism, a movement based on a desire
to return to what adherents believe to be “true” Sunni Islam (Hegghammer 2009; Hafez 2014). Salafists can be nonviolent in the sense that belief in a return to true Sunni Islam does not require military conflict with non-believers.
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grievances like political and economic oppression after the 2011 revolution as a major influence
on his decision to join ISIS. Emino was killed in an aerial attack on a radio station he was
working at in Mosul, Iraq on December 5, 2016.
This chapter analyzes the motivations of the Tunisian foreign fighters that joined ISIS in
the Syrian Civil War and is divided into four sections. The first details the background to the
Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War to provide situational context for the mobilization of
Tunisian foreign fighters to ISIS. Section two details the demographic profile of the average
Tunisian foreign fighter using data on roughly 650 Tunisian citizens who joined ISIS. Section
three builds on this demographic profile by analyzing interview and focus group data from a
sample of fifty-seven Tunisian foreign fighters to test the six hypotheses presented in Chapter
Three. The final section concludes with a summary and analysis of the findings.
Background to the Conflict
The Arab Spring and the Rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria
The Assad family has ruled the Syrian Arab Republic since 1970 when Hafez al-Assad
took power in a bloodless coup d’état, becoming first Prime Minister and then President of Syria
(Drysdale 1981). His militarized Ba’ath party, which Hafez himself helped strengthen over a
career in the Syrian military service, allowed him to maintain power as Syria’s authoritarian
strongman until his death on June 10, 2000 when his son, Bashar, took power. Little changed in
Syria when Bashar al-Assad took power. There was hope for democratic reform during the
transition from Hafez to Bashar as groups of intellectuals began holding political meetings and
rallies throughout Syria in what became known as the Damascus Spring (Lesch 2011). Optimism
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for reform quickly soured, however, as Bashar began to employ the same strongman tactics as
his father to control the population. The permanent emergency military law established under
Hafez to suppress calls for greater political participation was maintained and under its guise the
Syrian military began arresting Syrian intellectuals and quelling political protests.
Calls for reform remained quiet in Syria until the Arab Spring broke-out throughout the
Middle East in late-2010. Syria was not part of the initial wave that saw governments in Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya overthrown in January and February 2011.3 It was not until March that the
uprisings came to Syria. They began when a group of teenage protestors painted anti-Assad
graffiti on their school’s walls in their hometown of Daraa, Syria. The regime responded in force,
arresting and in some cases torturing the teenagers responsible for the graffiti (Yacoubian 2020).
News of this strong state response led to demonstrations across the city, which drew even greater
ire from the state and resulted in the killings of several demonstrators. The unrest and response
from the state triggered nationwide protests and by July 2011, hundreds of thousands of
demonstrators had taken to the streets in small towns like Daraa and in major hubs like the
capital, Damascus (Heydemann 2013). The at first peaceful demonstrators would come to form
local militias to defend themselves, their families, and their towns from the violent reaction of
the Syrian regime to the protests. The country soon descended into civil war.
By the time of the Syrian uprising, the seeds of what would become ISIS had already
been sown in Iraq. In response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a new offshoot of al-Qaeda,
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was formed by known terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Stern and Berger

“Arab Spring” is the common terminology used to refer to the protests that challenged authoritarian rule in the
Middle East and North Africa. Other terminology that is often used includes “Arab Uprisings” or “Arab Revolts.”
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2016).4 The group operated throughout the country, growing in numbers, eventually changing its
name to the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). With a series of unrelated but highly influential events
occurring throughout 2010, including the death of first ISI leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (April
11, 2010), the withdrawal of U.S. special operations forces from Iraq (August 11, 2010), and the
beginning of the Arab Spring in Tunisia (December 18, 2010), ISI became emboldened. During
the early months of 2011, when the Syrian protests began to evolve into an armed insurgency,
ISI’s new leader and future Caliph of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, took advantage of the
regional instability and began sending operatives into Syria to form rival militia groups and
recruit disgruntled Syrians for a newly envisioned “Islamic state” (Yacoubian 2020).
In the proceeding years, ISI backed militias successfully led a series of prison raids in
Iraq and Syria that freed jihadi veterans of AQI and began to take control of parts of Syria. In
2013, ISI and its affiliates took control of major strongholds in Syria, including Raqqa, and in
Iraq, including Fallujah and Ramadi. In January 2014, the group declared Raqqa the capital of a
new Islamic state. And in June 2014, after the group took over the Iraqi cities of Mosul and
Tikrit, it officially declared itself the worldwide Caliphate and rebranded itself the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (Stern and Berger 2016).
As ISIS’ territory expanded so too did its ranks and resources. By the time the Caliphate
was announced in June 2014, ISIS had a fighting force of more than 100,000, at least 20,000 of
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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a then unknown entity in Iraqi jihadi-Salafist circles, was made famous when he was
described, in Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 speech to the United Nations Security Council, as the link between
Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, where Zarqawi operated. It was later revealed
that Zarqawi and bin Laden hardly knew each other, and the link was erroneously made to justify U.S. intervention
in Iraq (see Stern and Berger 2016).
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which were foreign fighters. The territory ISIS took over in Syria put the organization in control
of an estimated 60% of the country’s oil production capacity. The group sold this oil in black
markets throughout the Middle East including, according to some reports, to the Assad regime
itself (Cronin 2014). ISIS’ revenue from oil was estimated to be between $1 million and $3
million per day. Every time ISIS seized control of a new city it looted the banks and plundered
antiquities to sell on the black market (Stern and Berger 2016). As a result of its control over
major cities and transportation sectors throughout Iraq and Syria, the organization was able to
operate a wide-ranging tax system that targeted individuals and businesses throughout its
territory, taxing everything from small family farms to large enterprises such as cell-phone
service providers and utility companies. The rise and success of ISIS led one commentator to
declare that ISIS was not a terrorist organization, it was a “pseudo-state” with a complex
administrative structure, tightly controlled territory, and was led by a conventional army (Cronin
2014). At its peak later in 2014-15, ISIS had a fighting force close to 200,000, 40,000 of which
were foreign fighters (Cronin 2014). Between 1,500 and 3,000 of those foreign fighters came
from Tunisia. The next section details the political and social changes happening in Tunisia
during and in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, when ISIS was recruiting most of its
foreign fighters.
Tunisia, the Arab Spring, and the Syrian Civil War
Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on December 10, 2010 in front of the Governor’s
mansion in Ben Arous, Tunisia is considered the triggering event that started the revolution in
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Tunisia.5 Bouazizi was a twenty-six-year-old street vendor, a member of Tunisia’s informal
economy, unmarried and without a college degree. He was born and worked near Sidi Bouzid, a
rural town in Tunisia’s interior that is known for corruption and high rates of unemployment.
The town would become known as the birthplace of the Arab Spring because of the protests that
were launched in response to his death, but it had before that been a hub for jihadi-Salafist
recruitment and activity (Merone 2020). Protests spread quickly after Bouazizi’s self-immolation
and became even more rampant when he was pronounced dead on January 4, 2011. Ten days
later, on January 14, 2011, Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia and
became the first Arab dictator to fall to mass protests.
Tunisians revolted against the authoritarian tendency of the Ben Ali regime and the
rampant political and economic repression that accompanied it. But Tunisia’s foreign fighter
mobilization is best understood as a product of the immediate post-revolutionary environment,
after the Tunisian population successfully ousted the former dictator. When Ben Ali fled, an
interim government was established, senior security officials were forced out of power, and
police and security agencies came under increased public scrutiny for their roles in decades of
abuse against the Tunisian population (Zelin 2020). The newly established interim government,
led by Ennahda, Tunisia’s predominant Muslim democratic political party, attempted to start
anew and build an inclusive democratic society that corrected the wrongs of the previously
administration. However, in addition to new elections and a promise to improve Tunisia’s
economy, part of this “break with the past” included the release of thousands of political

In Tunisia, the Arab Spring is often referred to as the “Jasmine Revolution” or “Jasmine Spring,” named after
Tunisia’s national flower.
5
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prisoners that had once threatened the political power of the Ben Ali regime (Zelin 2018). The
combination of newly freed jihadi-Salafist prisoners, a weakened security force, and a
democratizing country still facing high levels of political and economic uncertainty, allowed
jihadi-Salafists organizations, such as Ansar al-Sharia and other groups linked to terrorist
organizations abroad, to begin proselytizing across the country, recruiting vulnerable individuals.
Tunisia’s new freedoms would be one mechanism influencing an emerging foreign
fighter movement. For over a year after the 2011 general prison amnesty granted freedom to
thousands of radical clerics, untold numbers of preachers and recruiters for the future Islamic
state openly toured Tunisia, recruiting young and impressionable individuals. Ansar al-Sharia,
because of its size and organizational capacity, became the primary arm of ISIS recruitment in
Tunisia. Its leaders and members openly spread ISIS rhetoric on the streets, operated their own
mosques and local religious gatherings, conducted open interviews with local and foreign
journalists about the cause of ISIS, and even appeared on Tunisian television and radio to
disseminate their message live (Zelin 2018). By late-2013, when Ansar al-Sharia was officially
designated by the Tunisian government as a terrorist organization, the message of ISIS was
already widespread throughout Tunisia and large movements of foreign fighters had already
begun to mobilize. When Tunisian security forces began to crackdown on the group’s activity,
Ansar al-Sharia recruiters mobilized out of the country and began spreading their message on the
internet from ISIS held strongholds inside of Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Turkey.
When the first estimates of foreign fighter totals by country were released in 2014 (ICSR
2014), Tunisia was clearly ahead of the rest of the world in terms of foreign fighter numbers.
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Though, as detailed in Chapter One, other countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia have
reported estimates that are now greater than that of Tunisia, in 2014, with the first ever direct
presidential election scheduled to be held in November, Tunisia, the only country in the region
that seemed to be progressing quickly to a consolidated democracy after ousting their former
dictator, became known as the hotbed of ISIS radicalism. As noted by one commentator, Tunisia
quickly turned “from Jasmine to Jihad” (Cook 2018). The remainder of this chapter answers the
question of why so many Tunisians took up arms and joined ISIS during this period.
Demographic Data on Tunisian Foreign Fighters
Demographic information on Tunisian foreign fighters was collected from leaked
dossiers of ISIS foreign fighters known as the ISIS border documents. These documents were
first leaked to NBC News in March 2016 and they include demographic information on
approximately 25,000 foreign fighters that joined ISIS between 2013 and 2014. Recruit dossiers
were meticulously recorded and kept by senior ISIS recruiters in Iraq and Syria. Foreign fighters
had to fill out a prepared document that contained a set of twenty-four fields. As detailed in
Chapter Three, these fields included the individual’s name, Kunyah (nom de guerre), Mother’s
name, date of birth and nationality, marital status, address and place of residence, educational
qualification, level of obedience, level of religious knowledge, place of current work, prior
employment, travel history, point of entry into Syria, name of recommenders, date of entry, past
jihadi experience, envisioned role with ISIS, specialty, deposit items, date of death, place of
death, address to communicate with, and notes.
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I isolated the subset of the dossiers that belonged to Tunisian citizens and eliminated
duplicate entries. Once completed, there remained a total of 650 unique Tunisian foreign fighter
dossiers to code. Not all fields were filled across all documents and some of the fields, like level
of obedience, date of death, and place of death, were always left blank to presumably be filled
and updated later. This demographic data represents the most complete demographic profile of
Tunisian foreign fighters available. Each foreign fighter entry was given a code number and their
dossier information was translated into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Some data included in the
documents was not relevant for the purposes of this study. For example, the notes or address of
communication fields usually included arbitrary information or simply just phone numbers.
Other fields, such as Mother’s name and blood type, were devoid of any analytical value and
were therefore not reported. Though this demographic data represents a different subset of
foreign fighters than what was collected during the ISIS prison study that will be analyzed in the
next section, this data is more complete and therefore provides a more accurate picture of the
average Tunisian foreign fighter. The 650 dossier entries represent 25% – 50% of the total
number of Tunisians who joined ISIS.
Before detailing the demographic profile of Tunisian foreign fighters, it is important to
demonstrate general demographic trends in Tunisia as a means of comparing the available data
from the ISIS border documents. According to Tunisia’s 2014 census, 50.2% of the Tunisian
population is female compared to 49.8% of the population that is male. Roughly 52% of the adult
Tunisian population is single, 43% married, 4% divorced, and 1% widowed. The average
Tunisian is thirty-two years old. Geographically, most Tunisians live in urban environments in
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Tunisia’s northern and central governorates. Roughly 70% of the population resides in urban
environments compared to roughly 30% of the population that resides in rural environments and
48.7% of the population lives in northern governorates, 36.7% in the central governorates, and
14.6% in the southern governorates.
Analyzing comparative 2014 data from the International Labour Organization reveals that
51.6% of the Tunisian population is employed in the service industry, 33.6% in the industrial
sector, and 14.9% in agriculture. The African Development Bank estimates that between 30%
and 45% of Tunisian workers are employed in the “informal economy,” or individuals who do
not have labor contracts and do not pay taxes to the state, with 60% of working men and 83% of
working women under the age of 40 employed in this sector (African Development Bank 2021).
According to the 2014 census, Tunisia’s unemployment rate is 14.8%. The demographic group
with the highest rate of unemployment are Tunisian youth. The age group with the highest rate of
unemployment are those in the 20-24 age group (51%) followed by the 15-19 group (50%), the
25-29 group (39%), and the 30-34 group (20%). The subgroup with the highest rate of
unemployment broken down by level of education are university graduates in the 25-29 group,
which accounts for 49% of the total unemployed in the entire 25-29 age category. This rate is
worse for female university graduates, which account for 62.6% of the total unemployed for that
age category, than it is for males, which accounts for 33.8% of the unemployed in that same
category. Among males, specifically, high school graduates account for a higher rate of
unemployment in all age categories. In the 20-24 age category, male high school graduates
account for 63.3% of the unemployed in that age category compared to 51.8% in the 25-29 age
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category, and 41.2% in the 30-34 age category. More detailed unemployment rates, based on
governorate data from the 2014 census, will be highlighted below.
One of the data fields in the ISIS border documents required foreign fighters to report
their level of religious knowledge. Arab Barometer Surveys on religiosity in Tunisia suggest that
religiosity, in general, is decreasing in Tunisia. Almost all Tunisians, over 99% of the
population, identify as Muslim (Arab Barometer 2019). However, recent surveys from 2018
suggest that 33% of Tunisians now identify as “non-religious” compared to 2013 data when only
12% of Tunisians identified as such (Arab Barometer 2019). One of the more surprising findings
from the Arab Barometer survey data is that 46% of Tunisian youth identify as “not religious.”
While this trend, of increasing numbers of youth identifying as not religious, exists in other
Arab-Muslim countries, the trend is far more drastic in Tunisia. Compared to other North
African countries, roughly 30% of Libyan youth, 25% of Algerian youth, and 20% of Egyptian
youth identify as not religious (Arab Barometer 2019).
Comparing these general demographic trends with data from the ISIS border documents
tells an interesting story about recruitment trends in Tunisia around this time. Breaking the
recruitment totals down by governorate, for example, shows that the highest raw number of
foreign fighters came from populated northern neighborhoods like Tunisia’s capital, Tunis, and
its surrounding suburbs like Bizerte. Tunisia’s affluent coastal areas, such as those of Sfax and
Gabès, produced foreign fighters at a much lower rate (Table 12). However, it is the south of
Tunisia, which, as previously mentioned, is far less densely populated, that has seen some of the
highest recruitment rates. Unemployment figures and past recruitment trends from these regions
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suggest that joblessness and a history of violent activism play a significant role in recruitment.
The governorate with the highest rate of ISIS recruitment was Kebili, which is in the south of
Tunisia, near the Algerian border. Kebili relies heavily on the agriculture and service industries
and has one of the highest rates of unemployment in the country, at roughly 25%. Tatouine,
another city in the south of Tunisia that has the highest rate of unemployment in the country at
roughly 30%, saw the fourth highest rate of ISIS recruitment. Medenine, the southeastern
governorate of Tunisia near the Libyan border with an unemployment rate of 18%, does not have
as high of an unemployment rate as Kebili and Tatouine, but it has long been a hotbed of foreign
fighter recruitment for previous conflicts due to the presence of organizations like Ansar alSharia. Ben Guerdane, a city in the Medenine governorate, is also a well-known transit hub for
Tunisian foreign fighters crossing the border into Libya.6
Table 12. Governorate Data of Tunisian Foreign Fighters
(in order of intensity as measured per 100,000 governorate population)

Kebili
Bizerte
Tunis
Tatouine
Medenine
Ariana
Monastir
Sidi Bouzid

Raw
Total
31
77
112
15
41
44
41
32

Rate per
100,000
19.75
13.55
10.60
10.04
8.55
7.64
7.47
7.44

Manouba
Kasserine
Sousse
Gafsa
Siliana
Kairouan
Mahdia
Ben Arous

Raw
Total
28
29
38
17
10
24
17
25

Rate per
100,000
7.38
6.60
5.63
5.04
4.48
4.21
4.14
3.96

Zaghouan
Nabeul
Béja
Gabès
Kef
Jendouba
Sfax

Raw
Total
7
28
5
5
3
3
4

Rate per
100,000
3.96
3.55
1.65
1.34
1.23
0.75
0.42

Notes: Total = 636. Population totals are broken down by governorate and are based on Tunisia’s 2014 census.

6

Ben Guerdane is seen as an important strategic point for ISIS due to its proximity to Libya. In March 2016, ISIS
forces attempted to capture the city but were repelled by the Tunisian military, which had been stationed in the
region to prevent active recruitment and attack planning.
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Foreign fighter recruitment from Tunisia’s southern governorates corresponds to
historical discrimination trends that have plagued the country since the era of French
colonization (Challand 2020). Even after the country’s southern areas played an important role
during the Arab Spring uprisings, these governorates still lack structure and authority from the
state. The absence of “municipalization” in these areas has led to increases in unemployment and
poverty, a growing informal economy, and a population that remains disconnected from national
politics (Challand 2020, 252). The absence of the state in these areas keep locals from
developing a feeling of national identity, the absence of which, as will be discussed below, can
lead to new sectarian identities becoming more pronounced.
The historical trends of discrimination and disenfranchisement in Tunisia’s south make it
all the more surprising to see that many of Tunisia’s northern neighborhoods also have
comparatively high recruitment rates. However, historical demographic trends in these
neighborhoods can help explain this finding. Ariana, for example, is one of the more affluent
neighborhoods in Grand Tunis and has a 12% unemployment rate, lower than that of the country
average, which, as previously mentioned, was 14.8% in 2014. But like Medenine in the south,
Ariana was a highly active protest hub during the Arab Spring, and it was the first hub of Greater
Tunis to have active protests in 2011 (Sterman and Rosenblatt 2018; Zelin 2018). Furthermore,
Ariana is a governorate with stark differences in levels of socioeconomic development. For
example, the town of Ettadhamen, located in the Ariana governorate, has an unemployment rate
that is nearly double that of the affluent town of Ariana and was known in the 1990s as being an
active, covert recruitment hub for Ansar al-Sharia (Volpi, Merone, and Loschi 2016). The same
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is true for the governorate of Bizerte, which, as will be detailed below, has a legacy of foreign
fighter recruitment that dates back to the Iraq War (2003 – 2011).
The geographic distribution of Tunisian foreign fighters shows that regional
characteristics, such as unemployment, discrimination, and past levels of violent activism, play
an important role in understanding ISIS recruitment trends. Another important factor that
contributes to this observation is the trend regarding foreign fighter occupation. Roughly 25% of
the foreign fighters, and the largest portion in the border documents, considered themselves some
form of day laborer, while only 8% of foreign fighters noted that they were unemployed at the
time of signing up to join ISIS (Table 13). In Tunisia, being a day laborer is common. These
individuals are a part of the informal economy in that they rely on daily wages and do not have a
contract for a regular salary. They are usually hired for construction projects, work in factories,
or perform the roles of trash collectors or street cleaners. Their employment and income are
therefore always inconsistent. This pay structure is the same for those who identified themselves
as merchants or street vendors, the second most cited occupation. Together with the common
occupations of agricultural worker and food service employee, these four categories illustrate
how pervasive recruitment has been from Tunisia’s informal economy, which since 2011, has
been the hardest hit by poverty and unemployment (World Bank 2014). Just these four sectors
account for roughly 50% of the occupations of Tunisian foreign fighters.
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Table 13. Occupation of Tunisian Foreign Fighters
Day Laborer
158 Engineer
Merchant/Vendor
103 Food Service
Student
91 Religious
Business/Private Sector 52 Education
Unemployed
50 Agriculture
Driver/Mechanic
47 Medicine

28 Sports/Athlete 6
27 Public Sector 5
17 Jihadi
3
10
10
6

Notes: Total = 627. Occupations are self-reported, so non-traditional occupations (such as Jihadi) are included if that is the
occupation the foreign fighter identified.

Another large segment of Tunisian foreign fighters were students. Roughly 15% where
occupation could be determined identified as students. It is unclear what type of school these
foreign fighters were leaving to join ISIS, but the level of educational attainment (Table 14)
shows that roughly 40% of the foreign fighters had already completed high school at the time of
joining. The second largest proportion of Tunisian foreign fighters, 25%, had already completed
their bachelor’s degrees by the time they joined. It is therefore likely, based on the statistics on
age and level of educational attainment, that most foreign fighters that categorized themselves as
students were college students and were dropping out of college to join ISIS. This finding tracks
with the previously described trend in Tunisia, where males between the ages of 25 and 29 with a
high school-level education had some of the highest rates of unemployment in the country.
University graduates in this age group were the second most likely to be unemployed. As will be
described in greater detail below, the lack of opportunities was an important motivation among
Tunisian foreign fighters who sought out alternative opportunities with jihadi-Salafist groups in
Tunisia during this time.
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Table 14. Level of Education of Tunisian Foreign Fighters
Elementary
83
Middle School 38
High School
254
Diploma
4
Bachelor
134
Postgraduate
15
Notes: Total = 528

The average age of a Tunisian foreign fighter was twenty-six, which means these
individuals were part of the age groups hardest hit by Tunisia’s economic hardships (Table 15).
In addition, 69% of the foreign fighters were single, 16% were married, 2% were divorced, and
13% of the entries did not report a marital status. Together with the statistics on occupation and
level of education, these trends potentially illustrate Tunisia’s persistent problem with a general
lack of meaningful opportunities, which as detailed in Chapter Two, can be heavily influential in
motivating individuals to participate in contentious collective action. Informal employment
amongst this demographic group presents another potential factor in motivating foreign fighters.
As documented in an OECD report on Tunisia’s informal economy, “high unemployment rates
give only a partial view of the poor labour-market outcomes in Tunisia…informality affects one
in three workers in the private non-agricultural sector and one in two in the private agricultural
sector” (OECD 2015). In rural areas, such as in Tunisia’s south in governorates such as Kebili
and Medenine where recruitment was highest, day labor contracts are the most common form of
employment (World Bank 2014). In more urban areas, where there are a larger portion of college
graduates, it takes an average of six years for these individuals to find stable employment, and by
thirty-five years of age, half of those with college degrees remain unemployed (Angel-Urdinola
2014). These findings contribute to the overall trend in findings from survey research conducted
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around 2014 in Tunisia that the majority of the country, regardless of age group or occupation, is
pessimistic about Tunisia’s economic future and consider the situation to be “bad” or “very bad”
(see e.g., Pew Research 2014; International Republican Institute 2013). These findings also
explain why most Tunisian foreign fighters were unmarried. Marriage traditions in Tunisia still
require men to pay dowries to the wife’s family before the wedding. A lack of sufficient income
to make those payments means that Tunisian men are unable to marry and start a family,
furthering preventing Tunisians from feeling like they have a place in their home country.
Table 15. Tunisian Foreign Fighter Age
Age
15-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
Average

Frequency
65
237
227
86
17
10
2
1
26.3

Notes: Total = 645

There was a field in the border documents for foreign fighters to name a “recommender”
or “facilitator,” the high-ranking recruiter who was recommending them for service in ISIS.
Almost every individual in the border documents, 96%, named a recommender illustrating how
important active recruitment for ISIS in Tunisia was. Furthermore, while it was difficult to
discern exactly how many unique recommenders appear in the forms as some individuals go by a
similar nom de guerre, the data suggests that there were only between twenty and thirty unique
recruiters responsible for all the recruitment of the Tunisian foreign fighters named in the border
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documents. Some of these high-ranking recruiters had direct links to Ansar al-Sharia, which, as
was previously mentioned, was the most prominent jihadi-Salafist organization operating within
the borders of Tunisia. For example, Kamal Zarrouk (3), Abu Omar al-Tunisi (21), Ali al-Harzi
(2), and Abu Zubair (27) were all high-ranking members of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and
together recommended fifty-three individuals (Zelin 2018). There is evidence that some of the
recommenders operated in a single geographic location while others had a more wide-ranging
influence on recruitment. For example, Abu Ibrahim al-Tunisi, a Tunisian who became a
religious official in ISIS’ Diwan al-Dawa wal-Masajid (Administration of Preaching and
Mosques) in Abu Kamal, Syria (Zelin 2018), recommended forty-two Tunisians to ISIS. While
there were a few of Abu Ibrahim al-Tunisi’s recruits who came from the same governorate, there
is no clear pattern among the forty-two in terms of geography.
For other recruiters there is a clear geographic trend in recruitment that is linked to the
jihadi-Salafist recruitment networks that predate ISIS. The Ansar al-Sharia leader, Abu Omar alTunisi, recruited almost exclusively in northern Tunisia. Nine of the sixteen individuals he
recruited came from Bizerte, six from Tunis, and one from Ariana. The case of Abu Omar alTunisi illustrates the continuity between Ansar al-Sharia’s networks and the new networks
established to recruit ISIS foreign fighters. First, Abu Omar al-Tunisi, whose real name was
Tariq al-Harzi, was a known recruiter of foreign fighters from this network during the Iraq War
(2003 – 2011). He is listed as a recruiter several times in the Sinjar Records, which were leaked
dossiers of nearly 700 foreign fighters that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007
(Fishman and Felter 2007). It was later discovered that Tariq was still recruiting and facilitating
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the travel of foreign fighters to ISIS in 2013 (U.S. Department of Treasury 2014). What is most
noteworthy, however, in terms of relevance to Tunisia’s networks of foreign fighter recruitment,
is that Tariq tapped the same locations that Ansar al-Sharia long operated throughout Tunisia,
notably in the northern part of Tunisia, especially, as previously mentioned, Ariana and Bizerte.
Furthermore, Tariq’s brother, Falih al-Awni al-Harzi, who was also a member of Ansar alSharia, had fought in Iraq during the previous decade, and participated in the 2012 attack on the
U.S. consulate in Benghazi, would eventually join his brother in Syria sometime in late-2013,
after Ansar al-Sharia members were forced out of Tunisia (Zelin 2018).
In the theoretical literature on social networks and collective action, the existence of
preexisting ties to a network that has previously engaged in a certain type of collective behavior
demonstrates that such activity has already been “institutionalized” within the organization or
network (Perliger and Pedahzur 2011). In the context of the findings on Tunisian foreign
fighters, if these individuals were recruited into a network where the act of foreign fighting was
already institutionalized, the process by which new recruits are likely to engage in that type of
activity is expedited. As will be highlighted in the next section, this finding suggests that, even if
Tunisian foreign fighters were not originally brought into the network to become foreign
fighters, when it became necessary for individuals to leave Tunisia for the frontlines of Iraq and
Syria, they had already been conditioned for that type of behavior.
The final relevant fields of the border documents asked recruits to identify their desired
role with the organization and level of religious knowledge. All new recruits to ISIS were
expected to participate in some form of physical jihad. Regardless of their specialty or level of
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education, all recruits had to choose whether they wanted to join in the role of “fighter,”
“martyr,” or “inghimasi.” Most recruits, roughly 85%, signed up to join the normal rank-and-file
of ISIS as fighters (Table 16). There is a slight definitional difference between a martyr and
inghimasi. In the context of the border documents, those who signed up to be a martyr wanted to
participate in martyrdom operations, or suicide bombings. These types of attacks target civilian
populations and guarantee the death of the individual carrying out the operation. Inghimasi
operations are slightly different. In inghimasi operations, the perpetrators usually wear explosive
belts and charge into enemy positions to inflict as much damage possible and break the enemy
ranks (Winter 2017). While the end of the operation usually ends in the perpetrator denotating
their explosive belt, if they first succeed in breaking the rank of the enemy, they do not denotate.
Therefore, the perpetrator’s death is not certain. In the Islamic faith, and especially in jihadist
circles, martyrs, or Shahids, are thought to be the most devout as they have chosen to willingly
give up their life for their faith (Thayer and Hudson 2010). Given the recent findings from Arab
Barometer Surveys regarding the decrease in religiosity among Muslim youth in Tunisia, it is not
surprising that only fifty individuals signed up to be martyrs, or roughly 8%, and thirty-six
signed up to be inghimasi, or roughly 6%. Four individuals said they would be willing to play a
dual role.
Table 16. Tunisia Foreign Fighters’ Envisioned Role with ISIS
Fighter
530
Martyr
50
Inghimasi
36
Fighter/Martyr
2
Fighter/Ingmasi
2
Notes: Total = 620
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The ISIS border documents suggest that experienced recruiters were drawing from a new
crop of young Tunisians who had limited religious knowledge. Of the individuals that claimed a
level of religious knowledge on their recruitment form, 76% described their level of knowledge
as “simple” (Table 17). It is important to note that respondents only had three categories to
choose from so selecting simple was the lowest level of knowledge a foreign fighter could
choose. Furthermore, less than 5% of the Tunisian foreign fighters who responded to the field
regarding past jihadi experience noted that they had been involved in a previous conflict. Of
those twenty-nine, twelve were involved in the conflict in Libya, nine in Syria, four in
Afghanistan, two in Iraq, and two in Mali. As will become clear, this comparatively low level of
religious knowledge and a lack of jihadi experience was consistent with the smaller subset of
Tunisian foreign fighter returnees interviewed for the prison study. The lack of more advanced
knowledge of Islamic principles made fighters more susceptible to the “ISIS ideology,” which
distills down Islamic principles to make them more digestible for young and impressionable ISIS
recruits.
Table 17. Religious Knowledge of Tunisian Foreign Fighters
Simple
425
Average
118
Advanced 19
Notes: Total = 562

The profile of a Tunisian foreign fighter is a familiar one and one that tracks with
broader demographic trends happening in Tunisia during this time. The average Tunisian foreign
fighter was in their mid-twenties, unmarried, did not hold a college degree, was either
unemployed or underemployed, worked in a non-specialized job, and likely had a very limited
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knowledge of Islam. In the post-revolutionary environment of Tunisia, where policing and
security was diminished and where experienced foreign fighter recruiters could work openly, one
can see how Tunisia became one of the most prominent producers of ISIS foreign fighters. But
this demographic profile of the young, unmarried, unemployed, and not religious Tunisian
foreign fighter is consistent with the profile of the average Tunisian youth around this time. How
and why did a subset of this demographic make the extraordinary decision to become a foreign
fighter for ISIS? The next section analyzes interview and focus group data on a subset of fiftyseven Tunisian foreign fighter returnees to test the six hypotheses introduced in Chapter Three to
answer this question.
Why Tunisian Citizens Fought for ISIS
This dissertation draws on a sample of fifty-seven Tunisian foreign fighters to test six
theories of collective action: economic incentives, personal victimization, structural grievances,
sacred values, collective identity, and social networks. It was not possible to draw a direct
sample from the ISIS border documents detailed in the previous section. Tunisian terrorism laws
consider any individual who joined ISIS a terrorist so any individual who joined ISIS and
returned is now imprisoned or returned covertly. Instead, I was able to analyze original data from
interview and focus group findings from what I refer to as the Tunisian prison study. As
described in Chapter Three, the research study was sanctioned by the Tunisian government and
conducted by independent researchers affiliated with ITES (Tunisian Institute for Strategic
Studies). The researchers conducted interviews and focus groups with eighty-two individuals,
seventy-nine men and three women, in Tunisian prisons all of whom were convicted of
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terrorism-related charges. Fifty-seven individuals in the sample attempted to travel or traveled to
Iraq and Syria to become foreign fighters during the 2011-15 period.7 I draw on this data and
supplement it with my own original interview findings with researchers, members of Tunisia’s
security sector, members of the Tunisian government, and friends and family members of foreign
fighters, collected over fifteen weeks of fieldwork in Tunisia between 2015 and 2019.
As detailed in Chapter Three, ITES researchers sought information regarding the decision
of individuals to become foreign fighters. They probed questions regarding an individual’s
degree of religiosity, degree of ethnic solidarity (i.e., identification as Arab), and degree of
religious identity (i.e., identification as Sunni). Interview and focus group questions also probed
relevant socio-economic information such as the foreign fighter’s level of poverty, employment,
and education, and political information such as the foreign fighter’s degree of disenchantment
with political institutions, and degree of adherence to a radical political ideology. The research
team asked about the subjects’ family backgrounds, history with drugs, suicide, and other
traumas, and the values and events they internalized. Identities of all individuals were kept
strictly confidential in the ITES reports.
Overview of Tunisian Foreign Fighter Motivations
The demographic characteristics of the Tunisian prison study sample were nearly
identical to the sample analyzed as part of the ISIS border documents. The average Tunisian
foreign fighter in the Tunisian prison study was in their mid-twenties, single, and only had a

7

Researchers for the Tunisian prison study included in their sample non-foreign fighters to isolate significant
differences between those convicted of domestic terrorism charges and those who explicitly wanted to become
foreign fighters.

169
secondary school education. The governorate with the highest rate of Tunisian foreign fighter
recruitment was still Kebili, though Sidi Bouzid had the second highest rate, and Tunis and
Bizerte fell to fourth and fifth highest, respectively. The affluent coastal areas were still not
heavily represented. In fact, Gabès is the only governorate in the Tunisian prison study that is not
represented. Many of the foreign fighters in the sample came from the informal sector with 38%
reporting being a merchant or street vendor and 16% reporting being a day laborer. Level of
religious knowledge was not explicitly reported in the prison study though statistics that will be
discussed below suggest that these foreign fighters were not devout Muslims prior to joining
ISIS. There is also no evidence that any of the respondents had ever participated in jihad prior to
joining ISIS. The findings begin with the most significant to least significant factors measured by
number of respondents that cited a specific hypothesis as motivating their decision to become
foreign fighters.
Social Networks
There is overwhelming evidence to support the hypothesis (Hypothesis #6) that an
individual will become a foreign fighter if they have preexisting social ties and linkages to other
foreign fighters in the network. As previously mentioned, 96% of Tunisian foreign fighters
analyzed as part of the ISIS border documents reported having a recommendation from a highranking individual linked to ISIS illustrating the important social aspect of becoming a foreign
fighter. The Tunisian prison study provides further evidence that interpersonal networks
facilitated the radicalization, indoctrination, and recruitment of foreign fighters for ISIS. All
fifty-seven, 100% of the foreign fighters interviewed as part of the prison study revealed that
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they were members of organizations that Tunisian researchers characterized as jihadi-Salafist
organizations with active ties with ISIS.8
To understand how networks became so prevalent in the recruitment of Tunisian foreign
fighters, it is first important to understand how these recruitment hubs were able to grow and
become so prominent. The rise of recruitment hubs began in 2011, when, as previously
mentioned, hundreds of former jihadi-Salafists and ideologues were released from Tunisia’s
prisons. This environment provided them with the ability to, for the first time, organize in the
absence of an authoritarian state. In addition to a weakened security establishment, during the
revolution residents in numerous neighborhoods throughout the country raided the local party
offices of the Ben Ali regime. According to Rosenblatt (2019), these political offices housed
detailed information about the former dictator’s Mukhabarat (intelligence services).
Furthermore, according to Wolf (2014), during the raid,
…residents uncovered a trove of documents naming the government’s informants in the
neighborhood. These documents did not just include the names of the neighborhood
informants, it listed what their salaries were and what information they were expected to
provide. All the imams in this neighborhood were included in this list because they were
an integral part of the state’s mass surveillance of Tunisia’s conservative religious
community.
When information about the imam spies was made public, they were forced to flee not
only their mosques but their neighborhoods, leaving them wide open for new, radical imams to
step in. According to sources inside the Tunisian government, the state “lost control” of 400 out
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For security purposes and to protect the identities of the prisoners, Tunisian researchers for the prison study
declined to report which organizations the foreign fighters were members of. The researchers did confirm, however,
that the organizations mentioned by foreign fighters would be categorized as jihadi-Salafist organizations as defined
at the beginning of this chapter.
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of 5,000 mosques throughout the country to jihadi-Salafists (cited in Wood 2014). In areas that
had a history of jihadi-Salafist activity and that were historically more heavily watched by the
state, such as in Douar Hicher, in the Manouba district where Emino was radicalized, it was
reported that ten out of the neighborhood’s eleven mosques were controlled by Ansar al-Sharia
by 2011. With the ruling Ennahda party unwilling to adopt the same security measures as the
previous regime to limit the growth of jihadi-Salafist activity and recruiting, the mosque became
the locus of Ansar al-Sharia control throughout Tunisia.
Researchers for the Tunisian prison study asked detailed questions regarding the
recruitment and travel process of foreign fighters. According to Sami Kallel, an independent
psychologist with twenty-eight years of experience working with Tunisian prisoners and one of
the primary authors of the Tunisian prison study, the recruitment process followed a distinct
pattern. First, recruiters from these networks would make local connections to learn about
potential new recruits before approaching them to join. A recruiter would approach them,
sometimes in public spaces such as cafés or sometimes, if more intimate contacts could be
established to initiate a meeting, at the home of the potential recruit. Once they initiated contact,
they would adapt their pitch to align with what they found to be the target’s primary desires or
concerns (e.g., joblessness, lack of money, or lack of meaning), often making it difficult for the
recruit not to at least consider joining the organization. The initial encounters rarely involved
becoming a foreign fighter. They first involved becoming a closer member of the religious
community and mosque. After subsequent visits, more time spent with other potential recruits
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and veterans, and after gauging the level of trust between a recruit and the recruiter, the offer to
travel abroad for jihad was made.
The individuals who were recruiting for these groups were “selling” a lifestyle, a lifestyle
that entailed full emersion with the religious group, and included nothing but prayer, mosque
visits, and religious meetings. Current research on foreign fighter recruitment trends suggests
that the individuals who “bought” into the lifestyle were those most suffering from an “identity
crisis,” which recruiters exploited to interject their ideology (Chassman 2017). This is evident by
the “full-immersion” practices of these networks where foreign fighters mentioned spending
hours watching TV stations that had jihadi-Salafist propaganda on it, visiting social networking
sites of jihadi-Salafists, reading ISIS propaganda such as the magazine Dabiq, and engaging with
a broader network of jihadi-Salafists online and in-person. The ideology became their entire
world.
To understand how this process was viewed from the outside, and to explain why not
every individual was receptive to the recruitment strategy, I talked to several Tunisian students
who were studying for their master’s degrees in Common Law, knew individuals who had joined
these networks, and who were actively recruited themselves. Nour, one of the students I
interviewed who had just finished her Common Law degree, told me that she knew young men
in her neighborhood who started going to mosque very early in the morning (first prayer is at
4:00am) and not returning until evening, therefore avoiding interaction with anyone else in the
neighborhood. She said this was common for new members being recruited into jihadi-Salafist
groups. “You basically stop seeing them or interacting with them unless you are also a part of
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that group,” she told me (Interview with Nour, August 7, 2019). Yosra, another current student,
said that she would regularly hear her friends talking about their new “families,” “friends I knew
were talking to Salafists on WhatsApp [a chat messaging platform for cellphones] and going to
the mosque in the morning with them” (Interview with Yosra, August 7, 2019). Yosra said she
knew fellow classmates that stopped going to class and only spent time with others who had
started going to the new mosques with them, “it was surprisingly common in my neighborhood,”
she said. Another Common Law student, Iheb, who described being actively recruited by a
member of Ansar al-Sharia, told me that they used all sorts of methods to try and convince him
to join, “money and jobs, religious appeals, a new family, peer pressure; these were all methods
they used on me” (Interview with Iheb, August 6, 2019). However, Iheb admitted that, “once
they knew I wasn’t [sic] interested, they left me completely alone. There are so many willing
people that they don’t [sic] bother to spend the time on a hopeless cause.”
When asked why these students were not receptive to the offers made by recruiters, their
answers all echoed the same idea; they had something in Tunisia to work for. For example, Iheb
told me that he had his calling already, “to become an international lawyer,” and he had the
support of his family and friends inside his law program (Interview with Iheb, August 6, 2019).
Nour, who had just finished her degree, was already working as a Legal Assistant for an
intellectual property firm in Tunisia. In fact, most of the individuals I spoke to for this study
were either students or individuals that were gainfully employed. This was quite different from
the roughly 50% of the foreign fighters that reported being members of the informal economy
and the merely 30% of them that reported earning an income of 700 TND (approximately $250
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in 2020 USD) or less a month, which is just barely enough to give them the status of “middle
class.” As will be demonstrated in greater detail below, Tunisian foreign fighters did not cite
economic gain as a primary reason for joining ISIS, but the lack of economic opportunities made
Tunisians more susceptible to radical recruitment strategies.
It was not the case that foreign fighters came from broken homes. Most reported coming
from families that cared for them. In fact, 86% of Tunisian foreign fighters in the prison study
described coming from “normal” families, where both parents were married and lived together
and 99% reported having mutual respect for their brothers, sisters, and parents. In fact, members
of a potential recruit’s family were often aware that something was going on when their young
son or brother was no longer home and was changing his way of speech, dress, and who he
associated with. Mohammed Iqbel, who founded the Association de Sauvetage des Tunisiens
Bloques a l'Étranger (Rescue Association for Tunisians Trapped Abroad) in 2013 and whose
younger brother joined ISIS in 2012, explained that he could sense something was amiss when
his brother, who normally did not go out much, was more frequently leaving the house. “I only
noticed the odd behavior about a week before one day he just didn’t [sic] come home,” Iqbel told
me. He later found out that most of his brother’s early contact with jihadi-Salafists was online,
and due to a physical handicap, he did not go to the frequent religious meetings until the week
before he knew he was going to be leaving for Syria (Interview with Mohammed Iqbel, February
13, 2019). Rosenblatt (2019), who interviewed the mothers of several foreign fighters, described
how mothers knew and actively tried to counter the recruitment process. He reported that these
mothers knew intimate details about the recruitment process, even having hosted jihadi-Salafist
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recruiters in their own homes. According to Rosenblatt, the mothers and family members that
knew to intervene likely prevented many Tunisians from ultimately making the decision to join
ISIS;
…mothers and family members are often the reason why recruits ultimately decide not to
go. Ibtesem [one of the mothers] said she keeps telling her son ‘Be patient, things will
change. But it’s hard to say that you should be patient when conditions are so bad…I
don’t want to push him…because I am afraid I will drive them into the arms of these
people. My son uses very harsh language with me; he is very aggressive. I know he is
under a lot of stress so I don’t push him.’ (Rosenblatt 2019, 18)
As previously mentioned, the recruitment of Tunisians into organizations like Ansar alSharia persisted for more than two years in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, virtually
unopposed by the Tunisian government. When the government began to crackdown on
organization activity in late-2013, the decision by jihadi-Salafist organizations to move their
networks overseas seemed like a natural progression in their religious evolution. Most
commentators have focused on the statistics on foreign fighters who successfully made it to Iraq
and Syria, but this misses an important component of the wider mobilization potential.
According to official estimates, nearly 30,000 individuals from jihadi-Salafists networks in
Tunisia attempted to join ISIS between 2012 and 2017 and were prevented by state security
forces (Zelin 2018). It is this figure that illustrates the reach of the radical social networks
throughout Tunisia and the impact those networks had on individuals throughout the country.
An important concluding note about the importance of social networks in the recruitment
process of Tunisian foreign fighters involves the role these networks played in facilitating
foreign fighter travel abroad. Prior to 2013, when Ansar al-Sharia was declared a terrorist
organization and members were closely watched, travel to Iraq and Syria was relatively easy.
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High-level recruiters with Ansar al-Sharia already had contacts with ISIS affiliates in Turkey,
which was the first major transit hub into Iraq and Syria for Tunisian foreign fighters. Prior to
2013, recruiters simply helped Tunisian citizens gain access to legitimate travel documents such
as passports and visas, and then these individuals were able to board flights to Turkey to meet
local contacts on the ground and negotiate land entry into Iraq or Syria. This process was briefly
documented in one of the focus groups in the Tunisian prison study: After securing enough
money to fund their travel to Turkey, recruits were directed to Urfa (Şanlıurfa), a Turkish city on
the border with Syria, where their arrival was already known to local contacts. They were
welcomed, given instruction, and directed to a border crossing with directions on how to enlist
with ISIS.
After 2013, recruiters developed new strategies to smuggle fighters into Iraq and Syria
from Tunisia. The primary difference was that direct flights to Turkey became impossible
because the Tunisian government mandated that all Tunisian men under the age of thirty-five
submit at the airport a letter either from their employer or father stating their purpose for travel
(Rosenblatt 2019). The new process, arranged by ISIS’ broad social network, included raising
roughly 2,000 TND (approximately $730 in 2020 USD) to help transport and smuggle the
foreign fighter into Libya. Recruits would be driven to the Tunisian border near the town of Ben
Guerdane and would then drive 17 hours to Derna, Libya, which came under complete ISIS
control in 2014. There they would spend two months training before flying to Turkey to cross
into Iraq or Syria in much the same manner as pre-2013 recruits.
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The evidence of an active recruitment component amongst Tunisian foreign fighters
suggests that social networks played a critical role in their recruitment to ISIS. All the foreign
fighters interviewed as part of the prison study described being a member of this type of network
prior to joining ISIS. Without the logistical support and targeted recruitment of individuals by
jihadi-Salafist organizations, it is possible that not only would there have been fewer, if any,
Tunisian foreign fighters to ISIS, but ISIS’ global recruitment numbers may have been
significantly lower. With several barriers to entry enacted by state governments to control the
flow of foreign fighters, the recruitment of foreign fighters required a concerted strategy and
global networks of willing participants to facilitate travel. The hypothesis, that an individual will
become a foreign fighter if they have preexisting social ties and linkages to other foreign fighters
in a network, is therefore strongly supported by these findings, which further suggest that social
networks were a necessary condition driving the Tunisian foreign fighter mobilization to ISIS.
Collective Identity
There is clear evidence to support the hypothesis (Hypothesis #5) that individuals are
more likely to become foreign fighters when their self-identity is merged with a collective
identity that they mobilize to defend. Tunisian foreign fighters associated their identities with an
Islamist collective identity that they mobilized to fight to defend. In interviews and focus groups
conducted as part of the prison study, Tunisian foreign fighter returnees were explicitly asked
about how they identify with different groups, including the Islamic nation, their family, their
country, and their community. Respondents were also asked to rank the groups they most closely
identified with and in all cases (100%) the foreign fighters perceived their identities as Islamist
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first and Tunisian last. The common trend was summed up by one respondent who said, “my first
belonging is to the Islamic nation and then to the family and close people…This is what our
religion recommends.”
There is strong theoretical evidence that in the absence of a strong national identity,
individuals can begin to associate more strongly with sectarian identities (Dodge 2020).
Individual identities change as part of the process of socialization and national identities are
often fostered as part of the state-making process (Hinnebusch 2018). Since decolonization there
has been tension in the MENA region between national and sectarian identities. Part of the
variation among MENA states is whether strong, inclusive institutions were established after
colonization that favored more inclusive, national identities. Prior to the Arab Spring, ethnic and
religious identities played a minor role in Tunisian national politics and the country was not
historically vulnerable to sectarianism due to a half-century of heavy state repression of Islamism
(Koplow 2011; Rørbæk 2019). After the Arab Spring, the combination of loosening restrictions
on Islamist organization and an ineffective state struggling to consolidate new and legitimate
democratic institutions left many Tunisians feeling, at best, ignored and at worst, betrayed, by
the state (Rørbæk 2019). This feeling was acutely felt in Tunisia’s south (Challand 2020). The
findings from the Tunisian prison study suggest that, in this new political and cultural milieu,
and with newly released jihadi-Salafists organizing in Tunisia, many individuals that
encountered these organizations constructed a new collective identity built along sectarian lines.
The close connection Tunisian foreign fighters expressed toward their perceived religious
community is both emblematic of their close association with the values espoused by ISIS and a
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product of their feelings of disillusionment with the state. Tunisian foreign fighters described
feelings of personal victimization by the state as motivating them to become interested in
religion and become foreign fighters with 90% of respondents in the prison study associating the
image of Tunisia as “the country of injustice.” A related finding that came out in the focus
groups was that many of the foreign fighters felt that the state was ignoring them and did not care
about them. Numerous foreign fighters said that they had no relationship with the state, declaring
that “the state does not exist” in their neighborhood. In addition, 54% of respondents believe that
being a good citizen and following the laws of Tunisia will lead to “individual failure.” This
explains why Tunisian foreign fighters did not develop a strong national identity and likely
sought out other identity groups to fill that void.
There is strong evidence that Tunisian foreign fighters closely aligned with the religious
identities that they fought to defend. Roughly 90% of the respondents expressed support for the
Palestinian cause, with 60% advocating that the cause was a pillar of the Arab-Muslim nation
and should be actively defended. Like the Palestinian cause, foreign fighters agreed that violence
is a legitimate reaction to aggression directed against “brothers in Islam.” Tunisian foreign
fighters went even further in formulating the way violence could be enacted, with some
individuals saying that “terrorist attacks” are an “indispensable act of reprisal to ward off
aggression” against Muslims. Foreign fighters also justified attacks against Muslim civilians in
this way, because, according to one individual, these citizens “acquiesced to paying taxes to
finance the governments they elected to fight our Muslim brothers.”
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The final piece of evidence that supports the collective identity hypothesis is the way
Tunisian foreign fighters referred to their religious counterparts, those who were members of
local jihadi-Salafist organizations or fellow fighters in Iraq and Syria, as “brothers.” According
to Moez Ghribi, Director of the Department of Geopolitics at ITES, many of the foreign fighters
he interviewed referred to the recruitment process as joining the “brotherhood.” Many recruiters,
both online and in-person, encouraged individuals to engage in the brotherhood to elicit the idea
that these individuals were becoming part of a collective “family.” In an example that came out
in focus group discussions regarding the crackdown of Ansar al-Sharia activity in 2013, fighters
noted that the curtailment by Tunisian security services forced “many of the brothers [members
of Ansar al-Sharia] in that period to resort to traveling abroad to places like Libya and Syria.”
According to Ghribi, Tunisian foreign fighters even had a name for this movement that was
particular to their foreign fighter group. They referred to the exodus of their organization abroad
as al-nafeer, which means “sacred mobilization,” and they saw their mobilization as their
collective duty (fard al-kifayah) to restore true Islam and fight the injustices brought on them by
the Tunisian government.
Moez Ali supports the theory that the lack of a Tunisian national identity made young
people more likely to adopt the identity of radical groups. Ali is a civil society activist and
founder and President of the Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté (Union of
Independent Tunisians for Freedom) (UTIL). He is a strong advocate for educational reform in
Tunisia as a means of “stemming the tide of radicalization” sweeping the country. He told me,
“students are not encouraged to make friends and there is no room in their lives for
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extracurricular opportunities…this leads to a breakdown in social cohesion where values are
spread not from parents or their neighborhood but from social media” (Interview with Moez Ali,
February 6, 2019). He further explained that these are exactly the types of individuals that get
targeted by radical groups. This theoretical supposition is further supported by Scott Atran,
Director of Research in Anthropology at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (French
National Centre for Scientific Research). In a 2015 address to the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) Atran (2015) relayed findings from his own research on ISIS foreign fighters
that mimic that of the experiences expressed by Tunisian foreign fighters; “Violent extremism
represents not the resurgence of traditional cultures, but their collapse, as young people
unmoored from millennial traditions flail about in search of a social identity that gives personal
significance and glory,” he said. “This is the dark side of globalization. They radicalize to find a
firm identity in a flattened world: where vertical lines of communication between the generations
are replaced by horizontal peer-to-peer attachments that can span the globe.” He continued by
way of example, “Young people whose grandparents were Stone Age animists in Sulawesi [in
Indonesia], far removed from the Arab world, told me they dream of fighting in Iraq or Palestine
in defense of Islam.” These were the exact sentiments relayed by Tunisian foreign fighters.
As previously mentioned, I spoke to numerous Tunisian students and I asked them about
their experiences coming up through Tunisia’s education system. At the time of our interviews,
many of the students were getting ready to start their school year pursuing advanced law degrees
at the University of Carthage, Tunis and others had just graduated the year prior. All of them
were in their formative high school years when local recruitment by jihadi-Salafist organization
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was at its peak between 2011 and 2013. They confirmed many of the findings that were present
in the prison study. “We really didn’t [sic] do much other than study and stay home with our
families,” Nour, a Common Law graduate told me (Interview with Nour, August 7, 2019).
Cyrine had a similar experience, “I lived sort of far from my school, so I didn’t [sic] do much
other than go to and from school every day” (Interview with Cyrine, August 6, 2019). Iheb, who
I interviewed at the same time as Cyrine, said he was a typical male youth, “I played [soccer]
with my friends and occasionally watched it on TV, but other than that it was just school, family,
and mosque” (Interview with Iheb, August 6, 2019). As detailed in the previous section, these
students knew young friends at the time who were getting involved with jihadi-Salafist groups
and frequently referred to themselves and other members as “brothers” and adopted the identity
of a Salafist. Iheb said he was actively recruited at his local mosque when he was only thirteen
years old, “They are like gangsters” he told me, “they try to convince you to join ‘the family’
which made it sound like a gangster organization and not a religious group” (Interview with
Iheb, August 6, 2019). Iheb clarified by saying, “I understood that they were referring to Muslim
brothers and the Ummah [greater Muslim community] but how they approached me about it
made it seem like a gangster organization.” Cyrine told me she was also approached, “They try
to sell you the ‘lifestyle’ by telling you that you will have more friends because you get to come
to religious meetings and attend special morning prayers.” Iheb intervened, “It really is a
lifestyle! Children who were part of the group all had the same schedule; Walk to mosque for
morning prayer, break for [soccer], more prayer, meet at mosque, more [soccer], then reunion
[sic] in the evening.” When I asked if these individuals likely formed new identities because of
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being recruited, they confirmed, “adopting this type of identity was better than anything else in
Tunisia,” Iheb told me, “there is no luxury, no life, no culture to be offered; there is no
‘Tunisian’ identity.” It is, therefore, not surprising that even these young university students have
aspirations outside of Tunisia. As previously mentioned, Iheb wants to become an international
lawyer, working for international organizations in Europe and the U.S., Cyrine told me she wants
to one day “earn enough money as a lawyer to own a Maserati and live in Paris,” and Nour told
me she hopes she will soon be able to transfer to a European branch of the legal organization she
currently works for.
Not only do these findings support the theoretical conclusions made by scholars, that
state insecurity can prevent individuals from developing a national identity, but they also support
the hypothesis that individuals will become foreign fighters when they mobilize on behalf of a
collective identity they adhere to. These findings, together with the findings detailed above
regarding the importance of social networks, suggest that there is a strong social logic to the
foreign fighter phenomenon in Tunisia. However, as will be further detailed below, this social
logic is enforced by strong feelings of sacred values and grievances stemming from feelings of
exclusion from legitimate political and economic positions in society.
Sacred Values
One of the most significant factors contributing to Tunisia’s foreign fighter mobilization
was their commitment to sacred values. As detailed in Chapter Two, sacred values are nonnegotiable preferences that seemingly drive behavior independent of any concrete material goals.
In the context of Tunisian foreign fighters, the sacred values cited were parochial religious
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values derived from the Islamic faith. This therefore conforms to the original supposition, made
by Malet (2016) and detailed in Chapter One, that ISIS foreign fighters are best categorized as
“true believers.” But the evidence regarding the role religious sacred values play in motivating
Tunisian foreign fighters is contradictory. On the one hand, all evidence suggests that young ISIS
recruits are not religious, or at least not in the traditional sense, in that they do not possess deep
knowledge of Islamic doctrine, laws, or practices. However, in articulating their rationale for
becoming foreign fighters, these individuals cited threats to their Islamic faith and threats to the
global Muslim community suggesting that while they do not fully understand the tenants of
Islam, they are still perceiving a threat to internalized Islamic values that they hold as sacred.
There is therefore significant evidence to support the hypothesis (Hypothesis #4) that individuals
will become foreign fighters to defend values they hold as sacred.
Recent scholarship has shown that ignorance of established religious doctrines provides a
cognitive opening for individuals to adopt radical, conspiracy-laden values (Trip et al. 2019;
Zmigrod, Rentfrow, and Robbins 2019). Studies have shown that a misplaced commitment to
parochial religious values has led to the rise of conspiracy movements in places like the U.S.,
where the ideological commitment to “Christian nationalism” has led to large portions of the
population believing in conspiracy theories regarding, for example, the vaccination of children
(Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs 2020). A similar process is demonstrated among Tunisian foreign
fighters, who cite a strong commitment to the conspiracy-laden theories and values espoused by
ISIS recruiters.
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As previously mentioned, 76% of the ISIS recruits listed in the ISIS border documents
identified their religious knowledge as “simple” and there are numerous examples from the
Tunisian prison study that support the finding that foreign fighters do not have deep religious
knowledge. For example, in trying to assess the degree of religiosity among the foreign fighters
in the prison study, researchers asked questions regarding an individual’s religious beliefs,
practices, and their conceptions of what they consider an ideal society. The responses confirm
that these were not particularly religious individuals. Only 35% of foreign fighter respondents
said they regularly participated in Salat (prayer) and 32% said they are committed to the five
pillars of Islam, or the five “indispensable observances,” Salat (Prayer), Zakat (Alms), Sawm
(Fasting), Hajj (Pilgrimage), and Shahada (faith). Other statistics similarly suggest that foreign
fighters were not traditionally religious, including the finding that only 50% of respondents
associate the concept of “ideal society” with the concept of Sharia (Islamic law), only 21%
conceive of the “ideal family” as one that adopts the precepts of Islam, 3% conceive of their
ideal neighborhood as one that observes religious rules, and 27% explicitly state that they want
the world to be governed by Sharia. The responses to these questions are remarkable considering
that ISIS’ prescribed goal is to establish a modern Islamic Caliphate, reminiscent of the Rashidun
Caliphates, or Caliphates that are the spiritual and political successors of the Prophet
Muhammad, which were governed by Islamic law and practices. However, this inherent
contradiction is consistent with the previously documented trend in Tunisia that Muslim youth
are increasingly likely to identify as not religious.
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The finding that Tunisian foreign fighters are not religious in the traditional sense is
mitigated by the finding that 100% of the respondents believe that world powers are conspiring
against the nation of Islam and they have a strong commitment to return their civilization to the
legal environment of the time of the Muslim conquests and the Rashidun Caliphates (seventhcentury CE). While experts and commentators I spoke with agreed that ISIS and its fighters were
not traditionally Islamic, the reality is that the Islamic State is very Islamic in that its teachings
and values come from the Prophetic methodology of the Prophet Mohammed, which have been
distilled in a way to make them more palatable to eager, young recruits. As noted by one scholar,
“…pretending that [ISIS] isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be
understood to be combatted, [led] the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes
to counter it” (Wood 2015).
Much of the focus group data from the Tunisian prison study detail the ISIS doctrines
foreign fighters claimed to be fighting for. The two most important aspects of the ISIS ideology
that were discussed by foreign fighters are as follows. First, according to the foreign fighters,
ISIS claims to be awaiting the arrival of “the army of Rome” in Dabiq, Syria, whose defeat will
initiate the countdown to the apocalypse.9 In Islamic eschatology, found in the Hadith, “The Last
Hour would not come until the Romans land at al-A’maq [the Amik Valley in Southern Turkey]
or in Dabiq. An army consisting of the best [soldiers] of the people of the earth at that time will
come from Medina [to counteract them]” (Hadith 6924, 41:9). As a result of this confrontation,
the Mahdi, or “the guided one,” who is believed to be the temporal leader of all Muslims, will

9

Due to the religious significance of the city in Syria, Dabiq became the name of the glossy print magazine that
ISIS distributed throughout its territory beginning in 2014.
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return to earth to lead Muslims as they retake Constantinople and Rome, help Muslims to redeem
Islam, and then ascend with Jesus Christ as he reclaims the true believers in heaven (see also
Wood 2015; Stern and Berger 2016). Second, ISIS has developed a loose form of takfir doctrine.
Takfir roughly translates to “excommunication” and denotes the act of declaring another
individual as a non-believer (of true Islam). Traditionally, a takfiri is a Muslim who accuses
another Muslim of being a non-believer, or an “apostate.” In traditional Islamic scripture, the
accusation of apostasy was reserved for Muslims who outright denied the holiness of the Qur’an
and could result in a sentence of death. As detailed by Tunisian foreign fighters, the ISIS
ideology has expanded the position of apostasy to include any individual who does not conform
to the narrow strictures of the ISIS ideology. As further detailed by other scholars (Wood 2015)
studying the ISIS ideology, those who can be considered an apostate now include those who are
accused of,
…selling alcohol or drugs, wearing Western clothes or shaving one’s beard, voting in an
election—even for a Muslim candidate—and being lax about calling other people
apostates. Being a Shiite, as most Iraqi Arabs are, meets the standard as well, because the
Islamic State regards Shiism as innovation, and to innovate on the [Qur’an] is to deny its
initial perfection.
In other words, ISIS’ takfiri doctrine has provided, according to its leaders and fighters, free
reign to purify the world of what they see as all non-believers. This doctrine not only explains
ISIS’ attacks on the West, but also explains the organization’s systematic genocide against the
Yazidi (Van Schaack 2018), its terrorist attacks throughout the Muslim world (Schumacher and
Schraeder 2020), and public and mass executions that occurred daily in ISIS-held cities
throughout Iraq and Syria (Euben 2017).
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The values and ideas Tunisian foreign fighters claim to be fighting for are emblematic of
the ISIS ideology. During the focus groups, foreign fighters cited numerous examples as
evidence of the conspiracy-laden doctrines of the ISIS ideology including that the problems of
the Islamic world were caused by the “infidel West,” which recruits “traitors and mercenary
agents” throughout the Muslim world to work against their fellow Muslims. The regime of
Bashar al-Assad, for example, was cited as an “infidel Alawi regime” that has been coopted by
Shiite agents and the Russians (which wages war against “brothers is Afghanistan and
Chechnya”) to kill innocent Sunni women and children and oppress the greater Sunni nation. The
U.S. is the “leader” of the conspiratorial plot against the nation of Islam and Israel is the physical
manifestation of U.S. meddling in the region. The foreign fighters believe that they have an
obligation to engage in “sacred jihad” in any Muslim country suffering from oppression and
injustice brought about by these apostate regimes and they will rest for nothing less than their
complete annihilation. Foreign fighters in the Tunisian prison study also noted that they
frequently engaged with ISIS propaganda prior to becoming a foreign fighter, including the
glossy print magazine of ISIS, called Dabiq, where the ideologic basis of the Caliphate is laid out
in the first article, of the first issue, of the magazine;
Shaykh Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi (rahimahullah10) anticipated the expansion of the
blessed jihad from Iraq into Sham [Syria] and linked it to this hadith saying, ‘The spark
has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission –
until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.’ According to the hadith, the area will play a
historical role in the battles leading up the conquests of Constantinople, then Rome.
Presently, Dabiq is under the control of crusader-backed sahwat11, close to the warfront
10

The transliteration of a traditional phrase used after mentioning anyone by name who has passed away. It literally
translates to “God have mercy upon him.”
11

A derogatory term for Sunni Muslims that work with “apostate” governments.
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between them and the Khilafah. May Allah purify Dabiq from the treachery of the sahwat
and raise the flag of the Khilafah over its land. Amin [Amen]. (Dabiq, Issue 1)
During the interviews and focus groups, when researchers pushed back on foreign
fighters about the religious origins of their ideology, they often responded with what Moez
Ghribi, Director of Geopolitics at ITES and principal researcher on the prison study, referred to
as “unverified parables – whose authenticity is difficult to prove” (Interview with Moez Ghribi,
February 13, 2019). These parables usually came in the form of historical examples or religious
“rulings” known as fatwa, whereby a scholarly authority in Islamic jurisprudence declares
something legal or just under Islamic scripture. ISIS has developed a strategy to overcome
religious opposition to their brutality using fatwa to convince young recruits that their actions,
like violent jihad, the execution of apostates, and war, are justified. For example, researchers
cited [then] current events, including the burning of Jordanian-Muslim pilot, Muath alKasasibah, in January 2015 and the terrorist attacks that had occurred in Tunisia, one at the
Bardo Museum in March 2015 and the other on a beach resort in Sousse in June 2015, that killed
several citizens from Western countries as well as Tunisian-Muslims, as examples of ISIS’
brutality against their own people. When respondents were asked to reconcile these actions with
Qur’anic verse, respondents cited parables from the Prophet Mohammed’s biography as
historical precedent for their actions, such as, “Did you know that when the situation required a
certain course of action, the Prophet killed 600 Jews simultaneously…When Islam orders us to
defend Muslims, there is no other choice except using violence…but is it called violence when it
is self-defense?” The execution of Muath al-Kasasibah was self-defense; retribution for his
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“bombardment of Caliphate Soldiers.” The attacks on Tunisia were likewise retribution for the
“state’s ban on public religious action.”
The reality is that real-world events made it possible for ISIS to convince young recruits
of its apocalyptic propaganda. As described by Atran (2015) in his speech to the UNSC, “when
you’ve [sic] already lived through a lot of horrific violence, it’s easier to buy into these
narratives of worldwide persecution,” said Atran, “the idea that there’s a worldwide plot to kill
Muslims, or Muslims like you, starts to seem a bit less crazy.” “This isn’t an outlandish
proposition in their lived circumstances,” Atran continued, Iraqis in Kirkuk told him about
“growing up after the fall of Saddam Hussein in a hellish world of constant guerrilla war, family
deaths, and dislocation, and of not being even able to go out of their homes or temporary shelters
for months on end.” Atran (2015) further explained that years of wars in the Middle East directed
by the West and coupled with “the notorious human-rights abuses of Syrian president Bashar alAssad…help animate the fanaticism of ISIS members.” What Atran described to the UNSC
echoes what was found in the Tunisian prison study. When Atran conducted interviews with ISIS
foreign fighters, he described asking them, “what is Islam?” to which they answered, “my life.”
However, as described by Atran, “they knew nothing of the Qur’an or Hadith, or of the early
Caliphs Omar and Othman, but had learned of Islam from al-Qaeda and ISIS propaganda,
teaching that Muslims like them were targeted for elimination unless they first eliminated the
impure.”
The values inherent in the ISIS ideology and the justifications provided by Tunisian
foreign fighters do not align with previous scholarship that regard “spiritual selective incentives”
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as the motivating factor driving individuals to radical Islamic groups (see Wiktorowicz and
Kaltenthaler 2006). There is no evidence from the interviews and focus groups that Tunisian
foreign fighters were seeking otherworldly rewards such as increasing the prospects of salvation
for becoming a Shahid. Instead, Tunisian foreign fighters were fighting for worldly causes and
values associated with the broader goals of ISIS including establishing a Muslim Caliphate to
protect fellow Muslims from worldly injustices. Therefore, the motivational impetus is not
spiritual payoffs and a path to salvation but a defense of themselves and others who are likeminded and who they believe are being targeted for elimination (Atran 2015).
Tunisians who knew friends or family members that became foreign fighters believe that
those who claim religion, rather than money, inspired their turn to ISIS are probably lying. Many
who saw friends or family make a “radical” turn to religion note that these turns were often
sudden and unexpected. For example, Cyrine and Iheb, who both knew fellow students that had
joined ISIS, said that they were surprised to see their once secular colleagues so fully embrace
Islam after the revolution. “My colleagues were not from particularly religious families,” Iheb
told me, “but when the Islamists took power, people tried to become more Islamic. They grew
out their beards, dressed in Islamic clothing, and started attending the local mosque when they
never did any of these things before” (Interview with Iheb, August 6, 2019). According to the
students, these changes were not due to these individuals becoming more committed to their
faith. As described by Cyrine, “these people were opportunists; they wanted to get in the good
graces of Ennahda so they could get jobs and money” (interview with Cyrine, August 6, 2019).
Ennahda had, in 2011, won the majority of seats in Tunisia’s legislature after the first free
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elections in 2011 and was a part of the three-party Troika government that ruled Tunisia from
2011 to 2014.
According to Cyrine and Iheb, it seemed that everyone they knew was suddenly
becoming more Islamic, and the presumption among many was that it was all a façade. When
those individuals who became seemingly more devout beginning in 2011 found few new job
prospects even after embracing Ennahda, the renewed jihadi-Salafist networks were there to
offer these individuals the opportunities they sought. “It was never the truly devout that joined
Ansar al-Sharia or ISIS,” Cyrine explained. Regardless of whether the radical turn within these
communities was a true spiritual turn or whether new converts wanted to better align with the
Ennahda party in hopes of some new opportunity, the fact is few opportunities eventually arose
for these converts. In the absence of such opportunities, recruits found meaning in new
organizations and values.
Tunisia’s first post-revolution president, Moncef Marzouki, summed up the dilemma
facing Tunisians that partly explains their turn to ISIS. In a 2013 address he said, “We had a
dream—our dream was called the Arab Spring. And our dream is now turning into a nightmare.
But the young people need a dream, and the only dream available to them now is the Caliphate”
(cited in Trofimov 2016). The dream of the Caliphate, one of the sacred values inherent in the
ISIS ideology, proves to be one of the strongest motivators for Tunisian foreign fighters,
supporting the hypothesis that individuals will become foreign fighters to defend values they
hold as sacred. As will be detailed in the next subsection, Tunisian foreign fighters were
disappointed that the Arab Spring did not deliver on its promises. When their dreams of a better
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home evaporated, the sacred values inherent in the ISIS ideology offered a new avenue for
Tunisians looking for answers and hope.
Structural Grievances
According to Sami Kallel, “the lack of economic opportunities, confusion about Tunisia’s
socioeconomic future, and social and economic vulnerability are the most important risk factors
in the life trajectories of the foreign fighters I examined [for the Tunisian prison study]”
(Interview with Sami Kallel, February 6, 2019). Neji Jalloul, who was the President of the
Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies (ITES) when the prison study was sanctioned through the
institute, also put “political, economic, and religious grievances above all else” as the driving
reasons Tunisians became foreign fighters for ISIS (Interview with Neji Jalloul, February 11,
2019). There is ample evidence to support the hypothesis (Hypothesis #3) that structural
grievances motivate individuals to become foreign fighters. References to structural grievances
in the focus group and interview findings were abound. The grievances described were local
political and economic grievances and included unemployment, lack of opportunity, poor
governance and corruption, and the failure of Tunisia’s educational system to provide soft skills
and critical thinking. Even though many of the cited grievances were also partly the cause of the
Arab Spring in Tunisia, the foreign fighters tied these structural grievances to Tunisia’s postrevolutionary environment, linking them to an overall feeling that the revolution failed to
produce desirable outcomes or alleviate these problems.
Tunisians had hope for a better life following the fall of the Ben Ali government in 2011.
Those in the prison study believed the revolution failed to deliver on the promise for a better life.
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The respondents were evenly split in terms of those who participated (50%) and those who did
not participate (50%) in the uprisings. Regardless of whether they participated directly, most
respondents, 69%, said the revolution in Tunisia was not a success. Furthermore, 89% of
respondents said the Arab Spring, encompassing the entire movement that spread throughout the
MENA region, was not a success. Fakhreddine Louati, a junior researcher at ITES who helped
run the focus groups, summarized what he heard during the meetings by stating, “they [the
foreign fighters in the study] thought revolution would be something amazing for them, their
country, and their region, but it never happened,” he continued, “the government failed
them…they were not satisfied” (Interview with Fakhreddine Louati, August 6, 2019).
The evidence suggests that foreign fighters felt a strong sense of aspirational deprivation,
a classic variant of grievance theory (Gurr 1970). As described in Chapter Two, aspirational
deprivation occurs as a combination of rising expectations against stagnating opportunities.
Tunisians believed that their country’s transition to democracy would lead to more political and
economic opportunities. Not only has political and economic development not been realized but
in many areas of Tunisia, especially, as previously mentioned, in the southern parts of the
country, the situation has gotten worse since the revolution. This led many young Tunisians to
seek other avenues for opportunity and fulfillment.
According to the World Bank (2018), despite Tunisia’s recent high scores on various
development indicators, distortions in the country’s economy have manifested in a continued
failure to create jobs and deliver inclusive and sustainable growth. Members of Tunisia’s
government whom I spoke with understand that economic development has so far not followed
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Tunisia’s political development and is creating increasing unrest. Nidaa Tounés parliamentarian
(MP) Fatma Mseddi, who was a member of the parliamentary commission in charge of
investigating the foreign fighters that joined ISIS, said that grievances stemming from a lack of
political and economic progress in Tunisia triggered the movement of young Tunisians to seek
out radical groups and eventually join ISIS.12 She blamed Ennahda for the lack of progress; “in
2011, people demanded liberty, democracy, rights, and transparency and Ennahda did not
prioritize any of those things,” she continued, “Ennahda was only concerned with social issues
and bringing Islam back to Tunisia” (Interview with Fatma Mseddi, February 5, 2019). Even
members of Ennahda agreed that they did not have the experience to run the country. Oussama
Sghaier, an Ennahda MP and spokesperson, as well as member of the party’s 150 member Shura
Council, agreed that the party spent too much time “trying to reconcile Islam with Tunisia’s new
democracy” (Interview with Osama Essghir, February 5, 2019).13
By favoring social issues over economic issues, Ennahda contributed to an environment
that became conducive to religious radicalization. As previously mentioned, with the 2011
general prison amnesty, jihadi-Salafist groups organized without resistance from state security
forces in an environment where religious groups had not been able to practice freely in the
decades under Ben Ali. This gave radical organizations the opportunity to reach tens of
thousands of potential recruits who, without other opportunities or jobs, became interested in

12

Mseddi resigned from this commission in protest, citing the lack of good faith on the part of Ennahda to take
responsibility for the rise in jihadi-Salafist networks across Tunisia.
“Shura” roughly translates to “Consultative.” “Shura Councils” are decision-making bodies primarily associated
with Islamist political parties because the Qur’an says decisions that affect the Muslim community should be made
in consultation with fellow Muslims.
13
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radical ideologies. Understanding how this new religious environment became so engrained in
Tunisia, one only need to look at the redevelopment of Ansar al-Sharia after 2011. As described
by Rosenblatt (2019), the revitalized base of Ansar al-Sharia consisted of three main
components:
1. Ex-prisoners who were either already jihadi-Salafists (e.g., returnees from Afghanistan
and Iraq) or those imprisoned on other charges but were indoctrinated in prison. These
prisoners, numbering roughly 1-2,000, were virtually all granted amnesty in the months
after the 2010-2011 revolution.
2. Exiles (forced or self-imposed) who held jihadi-Salafist beliefs and who were trained
abroad. Many of these exiles were already active in jihadi-Salafist recruitment networks.
3. A small number of intellectually curious young people whose main influences were
hardline preachers from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whose teachings were broadcast on
satellite television.
With the leadership base established, Ansar al-Sharia began a mass recruitment and
proselytization campaign. Estimates suggest that at its peak in early-2013, the organization
counted as many as 100,000 members across all of Tunisia, with membership coming from every
region and every governorate in the country (Rosenblatt 2019; Zelin 2020).
As far as Moez Ali is concerned, the foreign fighter issue in Tunisia begins and ends with
the state; “No opportunities, poor education…these are all things my government has failed to
provide. My goal now, with my organization, is to develop an action plan to make sure we
provide alternatives beyond jihad which the state clearly cannot do” (Interview with Moez Ali,
February 6, 2019). However, according to recent surveys conducted in Tunisia, such sentiments
have been echoed across the entire population. In 2014, when ISIS’ strength was at its peak and
Tunisia was about to host its first presidential election, Tunisia’s confidence in its own
democracy was already waning. According to Pew Research Surveys conducted in 2014, only
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48% of respondents agreed that “democracy is preferable to other kinds of government”
compared to 63% in 2012. Furthermore, the difference between Tunisian preferences for a
“strong economy” and “good democracy” were becoming starker. In 2012, 59% of Tunisians
favored a strong economy over good democracy compared to 2014, when 73% of Tunisians
favored a strong economy. Tunisia’s post-revolutionary environment, one that was defined by a
lack of political and economic opportunities and where Tunisians were still looking for solutions
that the Arab Spring uprisings did not deliver, was clearly an important variable explaining its
foreign fighter mobilization.
While more individuals in the prison study cited social variables (social networks and
collective identity) and sacred values, structural grievances remain a significant factor explaining
why Tunisians became foreign fighters for ISIS. Without widespread structural grievances,
Tunisians never would have sought out alternatives such as those offered by radical jihadiSalafist organizations, and therefore, these individuals would have never been indoctrinated into
the ISIS ideology. This suggests that the existence of structural grievances may propel, or push,
individuals to seek alternative solutions, but it does not suggest what type of alternatives
individuals seek. As detailed in the previous three sections, the choice of solution is based more
what type of social network and identity group that individual connects with, which further
determines what types of values they come to hold as sacred. This relationship, between
grievances, opportunities, and the likelihood of engaging with radical organizations, is
nevertheless a finding the warrants additional research.
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Personal Victimization
Findings from the Tunisian prison study suggest that the remaining two hypotheses
relating to personal victimization and economic incentives are not significant explanations for
Tunisia’s foreign fighter phenomenon. To begin, there is only ancillary evidence to support the
hypothesis (Hypothesis #2) that feelings of personal victimization influence individuals to
become foreign fighters. Several interview questions were asked to probe the backgrounds of
foreign fighters regarding their personal lives and none of the outcomes lend significant support
for the hypothesis that personal victimization fueled a motivation to join ISIS. For example, in
terms of trauma experienced during a foreign fighter’s upbringing, which is a strong predicator
of radicalization identified in the literature (see McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), few of the
foreign fighters experienced such trauma. As previously detailed, about 86% of those who
responded to background questioning described coming from “normal” families, where both
parents were married and lived together. Almost all the respondents, 99%, reported having
mutual respect for their brothers, sisters, and parents and 62% reported having a sufficient family
income to avoid hardship. Furthermore, respondents reported having a generally positive
impression of the neighborhoods they lived in; 70% said they believed relationships in their
neighborhoods were characterized by mutual respect, 85% consider youth in their neighborhoods
to be respectful of women and the elderly, and 67% believe the adults in their neighborhoods, in
general, adhere to morally appropriate behavior.
In addition to reporting coming from healthy social environments, none of the foreign
fighters reported traumatic instances of physical or sexual abuse, either before or after becoming
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foreign fighters. These findings were further supported in the focus groups conducted by
researchers. For example, many foreign fighters talked about the love they felt among their
families and communities. One individual responded, “I have no social problems…Thank God; I
am loved by all those around me.” Another said, “The last time I was released from
imprisonment, neighbors in my place slaughtered sheep to celebrate my release…They do love
me.”
However, one broad sense of victimization that was cited by foreign fighters in the
Tunisian prison study was that Tunisia was a country of “injustice,” with 90% of respondents
associating the image of Tunisia as “the country of injustice.” Respondents categorized injustice
as a belief that the state “violates their rights and treats them unfairly,” suggesting that this is not
just a feeling of structural grievance (discussed above), but a direct feeling of victimization felt
by the individual. However, the lexical evidence from interview and focus group data suggests
that foreign fighters associated these feelings of injustice with religious persecution they faced
after 2013, when the state began cracking down on jihadi-Salafist proselytizing. It is therefore
unclear to what extent each of the individuals citing a feeling of personal victimization was being
personally victimized prior to joining a jihadi-Salafist organization or if they were expressing a
broad sense of victimization associated with the rhetoric of their jihadi-Salafist environment.
This is largely because the crackdown against Ansar al-Sharia did not begin until mid-2013, after
hundreds of foreign fighters had already left to join ISIS (Rosenblatt 2019; Zelin 2018).
As previously discussed, the period between 2011 and 2013 was one of unprecedented
religious freedom. During this time, those individuals who could not find jobs or meaning in
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their own country began to turn to new jihadi-Salafist networks. As one respondent explained, “I
had been marginalized, and I lost hope. I no longer had a goal in life. When I committed myself
and joined the Salafi movement, my life changed.” After 2013, the situation once again
resembled that of pre-2011 Tunisia. In one of the focus groups, a foreign fighter spoke about a
group of his friends who used to gather together at their local mosque as being victims of
Tunisia’s religious persecution, “Tunisia proved to be a country of injustice, a country of
confinement and imprisonment…it tried us for our ideas.” While this individual claimed to have
been tried for their ideas, background data suggests that only three foreign fighters in the sample
had served time in prison prior to becoming a foreign fighter and in one instance, this happened
many years prior to 2013. In that example, the individual spoke about having a long history of
conflict with Tunisian authorities regarding his religious beliefs and membership in a jihadiSalafist organization, stating, “My problems with the state started at the age of 16 when the
external signs of religiosity became apparent on my face and my way of clothing after I joined
the Salafi movement…I did not even find the time to reach the legal age when the regime began
harassing me and sent me to prison at the age of 18 because of my affiliation with the Salafi
movement.” No other individual cited such an experience.
While in power, Ennahda did not want to impose religious sanctions like the ones they
faced under Ben Ali. Members of Ennahda instead hoped that, over time, “democracy would
moderate [Ansar al-Sharia]’s violent, anti-establishment belief” (Rosenblatt 2019, 10). It took
until February 2013, when Chokri Belaid, an opposition leader with the left-secular Democratic
Patriots’ Movement and staunch critic of Ennahda, was assassinated by Ansar al-Sharia
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operatives for Tunisian leadership to even begin to consider the rising threat of jihadi-Salafist
militancy. And it was not until an additional five months later, in July 2013, when a second
opposition leader, Mohamed Brahmi of Tunisia’s People’s Movement, was assassinated in the
same manner and by the same people as Belaid, that the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior began
to consider Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organization. When I spoke to Mohamed Brahmi’s wife,
Mbarka Brahmi, an MP for the Popular Front who is now endearingly known in Tunisia as the
“Wife of the Martyr,” about her husband’s death, she said she was happy that her husband’s
death brought increased attention to the social problems facing Tunisia, but she blamed both
Ennahda and the West for failing to address the issues sooner. According to Brahmi, “America
and the West only help when the situation becomes bad and Ennahda has made the Tunisian
situation a bad one; the terrorists have taken my husband and are taking our young,” she
continued, “How is it possible to be a new democratic regime but still send jihadists to Syria?
We need to focus on jobs and money and not on Islam” (Interview with Mbarka Brahmi,
February 5, 2019). Brahmi was convinced that had Ennahda started its crackdown sooner, her
husband would still be alive.
When the state did begin to crackdown on the organization’s activity and began arresting
key members, Ansar al-Sharia leadership had already decided that the best way to avoid
prosecution was to flee the country. “They would arrest you even on the suspicion that [you]
were involved with Ansar al-Sharia,” explained Wissem, a member of Ansar al-Sharia during the
2013 crackdown (cited in Rosenblatt 2019). New security measures quickly triggered a mass

202
exodus of young jihadi-Salafists out of Tunisia, many fleeing through recruitment hubs in Libya
and Turkey, where they would transit to become foreign fighters for ISIS.
When I probed experts about whether and to what extent personal victimization, or being
a victim of “Tunisian injustice,” factored into an individual’s decision to become a foreign
fighter, they agreed that personal victimization was not a dominant factor. Moez Ali, who, as
previously mentioned, is passionate about reforming Tunisian schools to provide children with
more extracurricular activities, said the only thing young Tunisians are victims of is boredom;
“kids are making these decisions [to join radical groups] at ages twelve and fourteen,” Ali told
me, “kids should be playing! They carry the burden of adults, seeing life as any unemployed
citizen sees it” (Interview with Moez Ali, February 6, 2019). He further described how this
boredom carries on into adulthood and affects their social relationships and identity, further
supporting the social variables described above; “These people are vulnerable, they have no
identity, there is no social cohesion, they just sit at cafés, drink tea, and smoke shisha [molassesbased tobacco heated in a hookah or water pipe]. Sami Kallel agreed; “The individuals I
observed did not link their decisions with their personal backgrounds or with injustices they
faced, their decisions were more political and ideological in nature, and any response otherwise
is symbolic of their ideological convictions” (Interview with Sami Kallel, February 6, 2019).
Mohammad Iqbel, who, as previously mentioned, has worked with several foreign fighters and
their families, also found that the individuals he encountered did not come from traumatic
backgrounds nor did they face injustice. “My own brother [who joined ISIS], who has a physical
handicap, trouble walking, moving, using his muscles, never felt like a victim, but he was
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indoctrinated to believe that joining ISIS could bring him purpose” (Interview conducted with
Mohammad Iqbel, February 13, 2019).
As suggested in Chapter Two, the theoretical literature shows that an individual can feel
personally victimized, and therefore motivated to retaliate violently, as the result of harm to
another person or group even though there was no direct harm against the individual undertaking
the aggression or violence. But the Tunisian foreign fighters interviewed did not express feelings
of victimhood. Instead, these fighters framed their grievances in broad, structural terms
suggesting that structural changes, or lack thereof, promoted group interest in contentious
collective action by way of foreign fighting. This suggests that individuals and groups do not
have to be personally affected by social structures or structural differentiation to be motivated to
act. Therefore, the hypothesis linking personal victimization to foreign fighting is not supported.
Economic Incentives
There is mixed evidence that economic incentives played a role in motivating Tunisian
foreign fighters to join ISIS. In the Tunisian prison study, respondents did not frame their
decisions to join ISIS as one that was based on economic gain, favoring more religious and
identity-based explanations. While there is ancillary evidence that some individuals became
foreign fighters to pursue an opportunity for economic gain, there is not enough evidence from
the interview and focus group data to support this study’s hypothesis (Hypothesis #1) that an
individual will become a foreign fighter when there is an opportunity for economic gain.
Of those individuals who reported traveling, or attempting to travel, abroad to join ISIS,
32% said that their true purpose for travel was to find meaningful work. According to the
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demographic information presented in the Tunisian prison study, 85% of the foreign fighters had
jobs and 5% of them were students; only 10% of the sample was unemployed. However,
consistent with data from the ISIS border documents, roughly half of the prison study sample
belonged to the informal sector and these individuals reported incomes far below the national
average. For example, only 30% of the foreign fighters in the Tunisian prison study earned an
income of greater than 700 TND (approximately $250 in 2020 USD) a month, which is just
barely enough to give them the status of “middle class.” This means 70% of the sample earned
less than 700 TND. Furthermore, only 19.5% of respondents reported receiving benefits from
Tunisia’s social security system, which is well below the national average, which, according to
data from Tunisian Ministry of Social Affairs cited by researchers, was 81% in 2011.
In a question posed to respondents of the Tunisian prison study, approximately 60%
agreed that the “will to earn money” was the main motivator governing human behavior and
most of the respondents in the prison study agreed that Tunisia does not provide individuals with
the opportunity to earn money. One respondent summed up the sentiment well when they said, “I
did not want to live in Tunisia. I wanted to leave this country. I wanted to live somewhere else.
Any other place. What matters most is that I can improve my life conditions. There is neither
money nor opportunities here.”
Many of the specialists I interviewed regarding Tunisian foreign fighter motivations
spoke of economic gain as a potential reason governing these recruit’s decisions to join ISIS.
When asked specifically about how money motivated individuals to join ISIS based on his
observations of prisoners in the prison study, Sami Kallel, who, as previously mentioned, was
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one of the primary authors of the prison study, acknowledged that it was difficult to discern
whether money truly did not matter to these individuals or whether they simply would not admit
that it did. However, Kallel posed the simple, albeit hypothetical, choice he believed most
Tunisian foreign fighters thought they had to make; “you either die in poverty in Tunisia, die at
sea fleeing for Italy [as a refugee], or die at war fighting for Daesh” (interview with Sami Kallel,
February 6, 2019). According to Kallel, the choice for young Tunisians he observed in the prison
study was simple; “only one of those options guaranteed money, joining ISIS.” Moez Ali echoed
Kallel’s message, citing what he had personally heard from many foreign fighters; “young
Tunisians have no vision for a future, they all say to me ‘I am already dying here in Tunisia, but I
would rather die in Syria for money for me and my family!’” (Interview with Moez Ali,
February 6, 2019).
While the evidence in the prison study linking economic gain to the decision to become a
foreign fighter is mixed, other investigators have suggested that ISIS used its vast tax and oil
revenues to target the MENA region’s unemployed with promises of cash and benefits (Luck
2016). However, it is difficult to establish how widespread this strategy was. There are examples
from Tunisia that show that ISIS maintained its promise to pay for service in their military. In an
example given previously in Chapter Two, a young Tunisian named Malik, who had quit school
at age fourteen to help support his working-class family, was promised $1,500 by ISIS in return
for his service. ISIS’ local networks inside of Tunisia delivered the money back to his family via
Western Union when he joined. In another instance, a Tunisian baker (name omitted for privacy)
joined ISIS because, according to his brother (name also omitted) “it was a good chance for him

206
to make a living” (cited from Zelin 2018). According to his brother, “he didn’t [sic] go to
college, and he tried to get a visa to move to Europe, but he didn’t have any luck.” Another
individual, who asked to go by the pseudonym Muhammad, was a foreign fighter who later
defected from ISIS and returned to Syria. He described ISIS’ recruitment strategy as one that
specifically targeted lower-middle-class neighborhoods, promising to wire upwards of $3,000 to
families for three months of military service (Luck 2016).
According to a report published by Taylor Luck (2016) in a special issue of The Christian
Science Monitor, it was often not just the promise of a one-time payment that attracted foreign
fighters. According to Luck (2016), ISIS also promised “high salaries, housing, and additional
benefits of $250 per month for families.” This strategy, of not only promising high salaries for
individuals but offering bonuses for families, is one that ISIS used to attract not just single men,
but married men, who wanted to provide a better standard of living for their families. Keeping in
mind that the $250 bonus is roughly equivalent to 700 TND (in 2020 TND), a sum that most
Tunisian foreign fighters in the prison study did not make, and it is easy to see how this
recruitment incentive may have been effective.
According to Luck (2016), as ISIS targeted individuals who were unemployed and from
lower-middle-class backgrounds, there was a noticeable change to standards of living in parts of
Tunisia’s most economically marginalized neighbors. As described by Luck (2016), “the influx
of cash is noticeable. Several homes of alleged fighters in the working-class Hay Ettadhamen
neighbors…have newly erected second – and third – white concrete stories. Other impoverished
neighborhoods in Tunis are witnessing a minor ‘building boom.’” According to Badra Gaaloul,
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president of the International Centre for Strategic, Security, and Military Studies in Tunis,
“families in impoverished neighborhoods are suddenly living beyond their means, and it is all
because their sons are fighting in Iraq and Syria” (cited from Luck 2016).
While the above findings suggest that some Tunisian foreign fighters, or at least their
families, were paid for their service with ISIS, evidence collected from the Tunisian prison study
does not suggest that this practice was widespread nor was it the predominant factor ultimately
influencing their decision to join a foreign conflict. As detailed in Chapter Two, Olson (1956)
was pointed in his assertion that only a strong economic incentive could motivate individuals to
overcome the free-rider problem and participate in collective action. The expectation, based on
Olson’s (1956) account, is that there would be a clear and consistent payment trend offered to
foreign fighters, but none has ever been uncovered. Foreign fighters are often joining
organizations that are the weaker side in a conflict and cannot make firm offers for payment,
profit, or goods. Foreign fighters are not soldiers of fortune and therefore appeals to something
other than economic incentives must be made to motivate them to participate in a foreign
conflict. Therefore, Hypothesis #1 is not supported; Olsonian rational choice theory is inefficient
as a model for explaining foreign fighting.
Analysis and Conclusion
This chapter examined the motivations behind why Tunisians became foreign fighters for
ISIS in the Syrian Civil War. Six theories from the literatures on collective action, social
movements, and organizational behavior were tested. I find that four factors were significant.
First, the most significant finding from this chapter was that social considerations are
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instrumental in explaining the act of foreign fighting. Evidence presented suggests that close-knit
social networks helped link the local struggles experienced by Tunisian foreign fighters to the
plight of Muslims all over the world. These networks also facilitated travel to transit hubs in
Libya and Turkey that allowed motivated Tunisians to circumvent international travel
restrictions and join ISIS. Becoming a foreign fighter required first becoming an active member
of a local social network and that connection was made by recruiters who were exploiting
preexisting social networks for new recruits. This finding is consistent with the literature on
social networks that engage in political violence that show that many social networks that come
to engage in violence existed long before they engaged in that type of activity (Perliger and
Pedahzur 2011). The findings from the prison study further suggest that without the connections
between local networks and the broader recruitment networks that existed throughout the MENA
region during the rise of ISIS, Tunisians would not have been able to effectively mobilize into
Iraq or Syria. The presence of active social networks, therefore, proves to be a necessary variable
in explaining Tunisia’s foreign fighter mobilization.
Second, the evidence strongly suggests that feelings of collective identity played a
significant role in explaining why Tunisians became foreign fighters for ISIS. Tunisian foreign
fighters adopted a new transnational Islamist collective identity. Their lack of community and
lack of national connections coupled with their involvement with jihadi-Salafist organizations
facilitated this identity formation. As is consistent with theories of collective identity, Tunisian
foreign fighters who adopted a sectarian identity congruent with the ISIS ideology developed
collective beliefs about ISIS’ campaign throughout Iraq and Syria, which helped foreign fighters
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overcome psychological barriers to mobilization. As is further consistent with findings from the
literature, when individuals are unable to develop a strong local identity, such as a strong
national identity, individuals are not motivated to stay home and fight to improve local
conditions. Instead, having developed a collective identity that is more associated with a
transnational group made the progression from participating in local jihadi-Salafist activity to
being part of the global struggle to establish the Islamic Caliphate an easy one.
Third, there is strong evidence that a commitment to and concerted defense of sacred
values played a significant role in explaining why Tunisians became foreign fighters for ISIS.
Individuals that joined jihadi-Salafist organizations adopted new, radical sacred values that
would eventually help foster Tunisian foreign fighters’ “will to fight” for ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Though ISIS recruits were shown to not be very religious in the traditional sense, Tunisian
foreign fighters overwhelmingly adopted the radical values espoused by ISIS and cited these
values as reasons and justifications for their participation in ISIS. Tunisian foreign fighters cited
ISIS’ takfir doctrine, where fighters believe that their goal is to purify the world of what it is sees
as all non-believers, as well as other conspiracy-laden beliefs, including that Muslims are
obligated to participate in the divine confrontation with the West that will result in the
redemption of all true Muslims in heaven, as driving reasons for joining ISIS and supporting its
goals and methods.
Structural grievances then played an intermediate role in motivating Tunisians to become
foreign fighters for ISIS. Tunisians turned to revived jihadi-Salafist organizations that came to
power after the 2011 general prison amnesty in Tunisia as an alternative to a lack of other
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economic or social opportunities in the country. Stemming from the lack of economic
development after the 2011 revolution, Tunisians not only became more susceptible to, but
actively sought out, radical religious alternatives. At the time of the 2011 revolution, Tunisians
hoped that they would have new opportunities for employment and financial gain. When the
state failed to deliver on the promises of the revolution, Tunisians developed broad structural
grievances and became disillusioned with the state. They then sought out radical alternatives,
developed new values, and eventually became foreign fighters.
Personal grievances and economic incentives played a limited role in motivating
Tunisians to become foreign fighters for ISIS. Instead, the confluence of social networks,
collective identity, sacred values, and structural grievances tell the story of Tunisia’s foreign
fighter phenomenon. The evidence suggests that rather than a single variable that explains the
reason one individual is more likely to join a foreign conflict over another, becoming a foreign
fighter should instead be viewed as a process. The process is consistent with scholarship that has
identified what has become known as the “process of radicalization” by which individuals and
groups develop extremist beliefs, emotions, and behaviors (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008;
Bott et al. 2009; Neuman 2010; Klein and Kruglanski 2013; Schmid 2013; Trip et al. 2019).
There are both individual and social aspects to this process. First, individuals seek out
values that are antithetical to the fundamental values of their society. Individuals turn against
society’s values as a result of discrimination, socioeconomic crisis, and political repression,
events that are operationalized in this dissertation as structural grievances. Individuals in this
situation go through dual experiences. First, individuals in this type of situation can experience
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what is known as a “cognitive opening” where they become susceptible to ideologies that try to
provide explanations for the lack of success or meaning (Wiktorowicz 2005). Second,
individuals who face uncertainty about their life and do not have direction from legitimate
institutions, such as the state or local communities, will seek out new identities by seeking other,
like-minded individuals and groups. These groups provide individuals with new forms of
collective identity, which reduce uncertainty regarding who they are and provide new guidelines
as to how they should think and behave (Hogg and Adelman 2013). Tunisians no longer believed
a solution to their lack of opportunities could be found by tapping legitimate avenues for
meaning and advancement, instead finding solace in new, radical solutions such as those offered
by ISIS.
The final chapter, Chapter Six, further clarifies these findings by considering them in
light of the comparative findings from Chapter Four on U.S. foreign fighters for the International
Brigades in the Spanish Civil War. After clarifying the comparative findings and highlighting
their scholarly significance, the chapter suggests several avenues for future research and offers
some initial policy recommendations.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
On September 24, 2014, the UNSC convened a historic meeting of the Heads of State or
Government to address the acute and growing threat posed by foreign fighters. The result of that
meeting was the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 2178. According to the resolution,
foreign fighters are a threat to global security because they increase the intensity and duration of
conflicts. As further documented in the resolution, foreign fighters constitute a serious danger
both to their countries of origin as well as destination countries and have shown to be a danger to
neighboring countries as foreign fighters, prior to returning home at the conclusion of a conflict,
often avoid persecution by fleeing across porous borders. The resolution reaffirms the Security
Council’s commitment to countering terrorism in all forms, including the threat of foreign
fighting, by calling on Member States to adopt operational strategies to counter this emerging
global threat.
As detailed in Chapter Three, according to data available on foreign fighters, nearly
400,000 individuals have participated in ninety-three different conflicts since the Greek War on
Independence (1821 – 1832). With ISIS having emerged as the most prolific recruiter of foreign
fighters in the twenty-first century, the aspirations of the UNSC have never been more prescient.
However, no one has yet found a satisfying answer to the question of why individuals take the
extraordinary risk of becoming a foreign fighter in another country’s conflict. This dissertation
was designed to address this question.
212
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This dissertation compared two of the largest and most significant foreign fighter
mobilizations in history: the foreign fighters who fought in the Spanish Civil War and the foreign
fighters who fought in the Syrian Civil War. The dissertation specifically compared the
motivations of the U.S. citizens who traveled to fight for the International Brigades in the
Spanish Civil War and the Tunisian citizens who traveled to fight for ISIS in the Syrian Civil
War. This concluding chapter discusses the comparative findings of the dissertation and is
divided into three sections. Section one analyzes the significant findings from the comparative
analysis and discusses their scholarly implications. Section two highlights some of the potential
policy implications considering the dissertation’s findings. Section three concludes the
dissertation with a discussion of some suggested areas for future research.
Summary and Implications of the Comparative Findings
This dissertation’s findings suggest that a robust understanding of the foreign fighter
phenomenon must, by necessity, draw on multiple theories and scholarly literatures. Three
factors, social network, collective identity, and sacred values, are significant across both cases,
suggesting that they are necessary factors driving the foreign fighter phenomenon. A fourth
factor, structural grievances, was significant in explaining the case of Tunisian foreign fighters to
ISIS but not U.S. foreign fighters to the International Brigades, suggesting that the finding is not
robust, but is nevertheless one that is ripe for future research. Personal grievances and economic
incentives were not significant factors in either case. These results potentially establish foreign
fighting as an act that is distinct among different types of collective action, with implications for
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both academics and policymakers. This section dissects the findings and places them in
comparative perspective.
First and foremost, there was no evidence to suggest that economic incentives or personal
grievances played a role in influencing foreign fighters in either case. These dominant paradigms
for understanding why contentious collective action, especially violent political action, occurs do
not hold up. This dissertation shows that when the cost of participating in a collective act like
foreign fighting is high and reward or benefit for participating is low, if it is known at all, and
where the political context of where they plan to fight is equally as important as the political
context in which they fled to fight, then theories of economic incentives and personal grievances
are insufficient.
The social aspect of foreign fighting stands out as a key factor driving the foreign fighter
phenomenon. As demonstrated by the personal narratives of U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighters,
the role of social networks was the most significant factor driving their decisions to become
foreign fighters. The comparative findings of this dissertation therefore confirm the hypothesis
(Hypothesis #6) that an individual will join a foreign conflict when they have direct links to other
individuals engaged in the conflict. Social networks were not only influential in recruiting likeminded individuals in both cases, but findings also show that, in both cases, these organizations
were instrumental in helping coordinate every aspect of an individual’s travel to a foreign
conflict zone.
The demographic and archival data on U.S. foreign fighters presented in Chapter Four
illustrate how dense linkages to a social network can influence an individual’s decision to
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become a foreign fighter. The demographic data show that U.S. foreign fighters likely did not
just have one connection to an individual associated with the Spanish Civil War, but likely had
several, overlapping connections because of their membership in other networked organizations
like the CPUSA, a labor union, or other ethnic community group. As was discussed in Chapter
Two, social networks do not exist in a vacuum (Fernandez and McAdam 1988). Social networks
are often connected to other movement organizations in what are known as “multiorganization
fields” (Zurcher and Curtis 1973). Simply stated, when an individual has ties to multiple
organizational fields, they are more likely to become recruited for collective action. In the case
of U.S. foreign fighters, when organizations like the CPUSA and Comintern began a concerted
recruitment campaign to establish the International Brigades, they focused their efforts on
individuals who were already likely to support the war effort by identifying existing networks of
willing participants. Sympathetic individuals, due to their multiorganizational ties, were then
inundated with information about the war in Spain, and as more and more individuals signed up
to become foreign fighters, they recruited friends and colleagues from similar organizations to
join along with them.
While demographic and interview data on Tunisian foreign fighters presented in Chapter
Five further show that social networks were instrumental in explaining the foreign fighter
phenomenon, there is no evidence that individuals had overlapping membership in different,
relevant fields. All the foreign fighters interviewed as part of the prison study described being a
member of a jihadi-Salafist organization prior to joining ISIS. Evidence presented suggests, as
was the case with U.S. foreign fighters, that these close-knit organizations helped link the local

216
struggles experienced by Tunisian foreign fighters to the plight of Muslims all over the world.
These organizations also had network links to foreign terrorist organizations that predated ISIS,
and they therefore already had the organizational capacity to funnel willing individuals to
conflict zones abroad. However, the lack of overlapping membership among Tunisians suggests
that the process by which individuals joined a relevant social network was different than that of
the U.S. foreign fighters. In the case of U.S. foreign fighters, there was a distinct geographic
component to the network mobilization with most of the foreign fighters coming from major
urban areas where the CPUSA, labor organizations, and ethnic groups were most prominent. The
strongest commonality among Tunisian foreign fighters was that their encounters with new
organizations helped them foster a new, sectarian identity as a result of not being able to foster a
feeling of national identity after the perceived failure of the Tunisian revolution. With jihadiSalafist organizations recruiting individuals in the immediate aftermath of the revolution in
Tunisia, individuals that bought into the lifestyle offered by these organizations became more
likely to become foreign fighters for ISIS. The slight differences in network recruitment among
U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighters potentially explains why structural grievances were significant
in the case of Tunisian foreign fighters and not significant in the case of U.S. foreign fighters. I
discuss this potentiality in greater detail below.
One clear commonality between U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighter networks was that,
beyond just bringing like-minded individuals together, these networks were instrumental in
organizing and facilitating the travel of fighters to foreign conflict zones. In both cases, there
existed several barriers to entry enacted by state governments to control the flow of foreign
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fighters. Therefore, the recruitment of foreign fighters to both conflicts required a concerted
strategy and global networks of willing participants to facilitate travel. In the case of U.S. foreign
fighters to the Spanish Civil War, motivated individuals faced numerous barriers including a
commitment of neutrality by the U.S., a legal ban on travel to Spain, and a lack of financing and
organization to make the journey. The same was true in the case of Tunisian foreign fighters to
ISIS. Tunisian foreign fighters faced a limit on international travel for adult men under the age of
thirty-five, and as recruitment to ISIS became an international concern, countries worked to close
transit hubs to prevent foreign fighters from crossing borders into Iraq and Syria. Individuals
alone could not circumvent these restrictions and evidence presented in both cases suggests that
social networks were the physical mechanism allowing individuals to join a foreign conflict.
Social networks stand out as a necessary variable for explaining the foreign fighter
phenomenon for without such networks, it is possible that even the most motivated individual
could not have successfully traveled abroad to fight. Theories that focus on profiles of
individuals more likely to engage in foreign fighting should consider this social dimension by
looking at patterns of social interaction. As will be discussed in greater detail below,
understanding the social component of collective action, especially foreign fighting, has
implications for both theories of social networks and for strategies seeking to counter this type of
behavior. Scholars should consider whether, and to what extent, differences in network structure
can lead to varying outcomes. Furthermore, states seeking to stem the tide of foreign fighters
should start by looking for the prevalence of social networks and then searching for
vulnerabilities to destabilize such networks before a networked mobilization can occur.
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Collective identity is also a crucial variable for explaining the foreign fighter
phenomenon. In the case of U.S. foreign fighters, it was the third most important variable. In the
case of Tunisian foreign fighters, collective identity was the second most important variable.
There is therefore ample evidence to confirm the hypothesis (Hypothesis #5), that an individual
will join a foreign conflict when their self-identity is merged with a collective identity that they
mobilize to defend. A significant, comparative finding is that it is not the type of identity that
matters for the act of foreign fighting. In other words, it is not the case that only a transnational
Islamist collective identity or transnational Communist collective identity is important. Instead, it
is the congruence of an individual’s identity with that of a transnational collective that is the
significant factor. Individuals in both cases joined on behalf of an identity that was compatible
with that of the organization’s values that they joined to defend.
As detailed in Chapter Two, a group’s commitment to transnational identities and their
associated values can deepen trust by both identifying cooperators and galvanizing group
solidarity. As this dissertation hypothesized, when an individual’s personal self-concept is
merged with that of a collective, they will be more willing to engage in extreme, pro-group
behavior like foreign fighting. The U.S. foreign fighters linked their motivations for fighting with
a sense of working-class or proletarian identity. This identity manifested during the Great
Depression, with the rise of trade union organization, and the expansion of local, left-wing
political parties. This was not an economic situation that was isolated to the U.S. The dire
economic situation brought about by the Great Depression was global. When a left-wing, proworker, and democratic government was elected in Spain in 1936 only to be overthrown by
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Spanish fascists in alliance with German and Italy fascists, U.S. workers identified with the
plight of like-minded individuals in Spain. The violent 1936 coup d'état against the
democratically elected Spanish Republic thus became an overt display of threat that many
working-class U.S. citizens associated as a threat to themselves and their identity group.
Tunisian foreign fighters associated their identities with an Islamist collective identity
that they mobilized to defend. Like the U.S. foreign fighters that mobilized on behalf of a
collective identity group under threat, Tunisian foreign fighters cited becoming members of a
collective family or brotherhood that they had a collective duty to defend. The transnational
collective identity that Tunisians cited feeling a part of is one steeped in the ISIS ideology, which
teaches sympathizers that world powers are conspiring against the nation of Islam and they
therefore have a responsibility to defend their ideologically like-minded brothers by returning the
Islamic civilization to its former glory. All the Tunisians analyzed as part of the prison study
associated their personal identities with the Islamic nation first, above family, local community,
and Tunisia. The dissolution of local identities among Tunisian foreign fighters made their
transnational commitment to an Islamist collective identity a strong motivational impetus for
becoming foreign fighters for ISIS.
Scholars (e.g., Whitehouse et al. 2014) provide ample evidence that feelings of
identification with a family-like group of “comrades in arms” can foster an even stronger bond
than genetic family ties. These feelings of collective identification underpin the willingness of
foreign fighters to fight even in the face of death and defeat. In both cases, U.S. foreign fighters
and Tunisian foreign fighters were joining the weaker side of a conflict. Making a costly
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sacrifice in defense of a collective group is an important mechanism that helps individuals
overcome psychological barriers, such as a being a weaker party to a conflict or lacking a clear
incentive to participate, to entry into a foreign conflict.
These findings, together with the findings detailed above regarding the importance of
social networks, suggest that there is a strong social logic to the foreign fighter phenomenon.
Furthermore, what is significant about this finding, from a theoretical perspective, is that it
supports past scholarship that has linked individualism with group norms of glory, self-sacrifice,
and heroism (Lois 1999). Evidence from both U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighters suggests that
individuals joined a foreign conflict not with the goal of harming other people but instead joined
with the goal of helping their ideological comrades from what they perceived as an ideological
threat. Although it was sacred values that operated as the necessary moral imperative to
individual action for both U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighters, values were not alone sufficient for
explaining their choice. Instead, sacred values were shown to be embedded and distributed in
social networks, creating intimate networks of imagined comrades, best associated as collective
identity. Therefore, social dynamics that bound foreign fighters together and initiated group
desires to sacrifice for one another in the name of sacred values defined the process whereby
individuals ultimately decided to join a foreign conflict.
The final variable that was significant across both cases was sacred values. In the case of
U.S. foreign fighters, a commitment to sacred values was the second most significant variable
and for Tunisian foreign fighters it was the third most significant variable. Therefore, there is
enough evidence to confirm this dissertation’s hypothesis (Hypothesis #4) that an individual will

221
become a foreign fighter to defend a value they hold as sacred. Like the findings regarding the
role of collective identity in explaining the foreign fighter phenomenon, the importance of the
comparative findings on sacred values is that it is not the types of values that matter for the act of
foreign fighting, it is the feeling that an individual’s parochial values are under threat and
therefore acting in defense of those values has become a moral imperative.
As detailed in Chapter Two, past scholarship suggests that when people act in defense of
sacred values, they act in ways that cannot be reliably predicted by assessing material risks and
rewards (Atran 2016). Unlike theories that express the importance of instrumental rationality, the
sacred values framework assumes that individuals will act for deontic (i.e., rules and obligations)
reasons. For U.S. foreign fighters, it was the ideological congruence between anti-fascism and
progressive values that motivated them to fight in Spain. The data suggest that regardless of
whether most of the U.S. foreign fighters were ardent communists, or whether they hoped that
socialism would thrive again in Spain, the most prominent ideological value U.S. foreign fighters
cited was anti-fascism. And, as discussed in Chapter Four, while the threat of fascism may have
represented a “marriage of convenience” between radical communists and more moderate
defenders of democratic socialism, the anti-fascist threat nevertheless became the ideological
rallying point of U.S. foreign fighters in Spain.
For Tunisian foreign fighters, the sacred values cited were parochial religious values
derived from the Islamic faith. Evidence from the prison study showed that the young ISIS
recruits that were interviewed were not devout Muslims. The individuals did not partake in the
traditional tenants demanded by the Islamic faith nor did they possess deep knowledge of Islamic
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doctrine, laws, or practices. However, in articulating their rationale for becoming foreign
fighters, these individuals cited threats to their Islamic faith and threats to the global Muslim
community suggesting that while they did not fully understand the principles of Islam, they still
perceived a threat to internalized Islamic values that they held as sacred.
Both U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighters framed their decisions as based on threats to their
values. As previously mentioned, U.S. foreign fighters cited the rising tide of global fascism as a
threat to progressive values. These threats, in many ways, were legitimate concerns shared
amongst democratic countries in the West during the 1930s and became a central pillar on which
World War II would ultimately be fought. The threats perceived by Tunisian foreign fighters are
quite different, and can be categorized as conspiracy theories, or ideas about certain events and
situations that are based on insufficient evidence (Trip el al. 2019). However, the finding is
consistent with recent studies that have shown that a misplaced commitment to parochial
religious values can lead to a rise in conspiracy-minded ideas (Trip et al. 2019). The value-driven
motivation cited by Tunisian foreign fighters was predicated on the belief that world powers are
conspiring against the nation of Islam and Muslims therefore have an obligation to defend their
religious brethren. According to Tunisian foreign fighters, the principle means of defending the
Muslim nation from the encroaching West is to return their civilization to the legal environment
of the time of the Muslim conquests and the Rashidun Caliphates (seventh-century CE). As
discussed in Chapter Five, these values come from what has become known as the ISIS ideology,
which preaches values born from the Prophetic methodology of the Prophet Mohammed and
which have been distilled in a way to make them more palatable to eager, young recruits.

223
Recent research on the ISIS ideology has shown that counter-radicalization campaigns
that work to simply convince foreign fighters that the goals of ISIS are laden in half-truths and
conspiracies constitute a dangerous misconception about how these values pervade parts of the
Muslim world (Atran 2015). The ideal of the Caliphate, and the values and ideology surrounding
it as an ideal, have already emerged as a mobilizing cause in the minds of many Muslims. As one
imam in Barcelona told researchers studying the foreign fighter phenomenon in Spain (Atran
2016): “[T]he Caliphate.... We dream of it like the Jews long dreamed of Zion. Maybe it can be a
federation, like the European Union, of Muslim peoples. The Caliphate is here, in our hearts,
even if we don’t know what real form it will finally take.” Taken together with this dissertation’s
findings regarding the social aspects of foreign fighting and it becomes clear that an individual’s
commitment to sacred values is bolstered by being around other like-minded members of a social
network and identity group, leading to a higher likelihood of extreme behavior. Given this
dissertation’s findings, it is clear that a global network that has adopted the values of the ISIS
ideology exists and is working to spread its message to willing new recruits. Therefore, any
serious counter-radicalization strategy must be attuned to both individual values and to their
social networks.
The findings are further consistent with recent research suggesting that ordinary people
are prone to extreme behavior when dynamic individual and social processes contribute to them
becoming a “devoted actor.” The devoted actor framework defines these individuals as
individuals willing to protect morally important or sacred values through costly sacrifice and
extreme actions, even being willing to kill and die, because their values are embedded in or
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merged with a collective identity, becoming intrinsic to who they are as individuals. This
dissertation shows that becoming a foreign fighter is a dynamic individual and social process, a
process that is not predicated on any one variable or explanation, but instead is based on
individual circumstance and social and cultural contexts.
Unlike with the previous three variables, the role of structural grievances was only a
significant factor in explaining the decision by Tunisian citizens to become foreign fighters.
There was weak evidence that structural grievances played a role in motivating U.S. foreign
fighters to fight in the Spanish Civil War. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to confirm the
hypothesis (Hypothesis #3) that individuals will become foreign fighters when they perceive a
structural grievance that motivates them to action. Nevertheless, the finding warrants discussion
considering the previous findings.
As discussed at length in Chapter Five, the structural grievances described by Tunisian
foreign fighters were local political and economic grievances and included unemployment, lack
of opportunity, poor governance and corruption, and the failure of Tunisia’s educational system
to provide soft skills and critical thinking. Interview and focus group data suggest that without
widespread structural grievances, Tunisians never would have sought out alternatives such as
those offered by radical jihadi-Salafist organizations, and therefore, these individuals would have
never been indoctrinated into the ISIS ideology. At least in the case of Tunisian foreign fighters,
it can be argued that the existence of structural grievances propelled individuals to seek
alternative opportunities that eventually led them to become foreign fighters for ISIS.
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Tunisian foreign fighters perceived of their national government as illegitimate, linking
grievances inherent in the structures of Tunisian society to their decisions to become foreign
fighters for ISIS, where they could fight to establish a new, Islamic state. U.S. citizens that
became foreign fighters did not perceive of the U.S. as an illegitimate government, and therefore
did not link local, structural grievances to their reasons for becoming foreign fighters. While
many U.S. foreign fighters claimed to be fighting on behalf of their working-class identity, U.S.
foreign fighters developed that identity even prior to their experiences with the Great Depression.
These individuals therefore did not associate economic struggles, such as those cited by
Tunisians, with their decisions to fight in Spain. Instead, U.S. foreign fighters saw their fight in
Spain as a continuation of their ideological fight for worker’s rights, an ideal that is best
explained by theories of collective identity and sacred values. U.S. foreign fighters also did not
link structural grievances brought about by a foreign adversary to their decision to become
foreign fighters. As was discussed in Chapter Four, there were a few U.S. foreign fighters who
wrote of the potential structural problems that could arise should fascism to take hold throughout
the globe. But in 1936-37, the U.S. and many other European countries were still on friendly
terms with countries like Italy, which had become fascist in 1923. Furthermore, while Hitler had
come to power in Germany in 1933, the belligerence of the Nazi regime would not be on full
display until 1939 when Hitler invaded both Czechoslovakia and Poland. It is for this reason that
U.S. foreign fighters to the Spanish Civil War have been colloquially referred to as the “premature anti-fascists,” a label that, as previously mentioned, was one they accepted with both
pride and confusion.
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According to theories that link structural grievances to collective action, the conditions
conducive to collective action, especially extreme forms of collective action like foreign fighting,
require certain push factors, or structural factors from which collective action directly emerges
(Nanes and Lau 2018). Push factors include lack of socio-economic opportunities;
marginalization and discrimination; poor governance, and the violations of human rights and the
rule of law. These factors were rampant in the case of the Tunisian foreign fighter mobilization,
but in the social context of the U.S. foreign fighter mobilization to Spain, fighters did not need
the same push. As previously mentioned, U.S. foreign fighters were already inundated with
information about the war because of their involvement in multiple, overlapping networks of
like-minded supporters. These individuals were already involved in the local labor disputes that
were prevalent in the U.S. during the Great Depression and their working-class identities had
been fostered over years of new and diverse forms of progressive politics in the U.S.
In the case of Tunisian foreign fighters, however, their break with the nation-state and
development of a new sectarian collective identity was more sudden and traumatic. On the heels
of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, when Tunisians had expected a better life following the fall of the
Ben Ali government in 2011, those who became foreign fighters did not believe that the new
regime did enough to improve their life-situation. In other words, the combination of years of
political and economic oppression under Ben Ali, rising expectations after the Arab Spring, and a
further stagnation of opportunities even after the revolution led many young Tunisians to seek
other avenues for opportunity and fulfillment outside of the state. This included opportunities
with new, radical organizations that had gained new freedoms after 2011.
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These inconsistent findings suggest that structural grievances can act as an important first
step in pushing individuals to seek out alternative opportunities when none are provided by the
state, pushing individuals to networks that promote radical values and ideologies. But, as
illustrated by the case of U.S. foreign fighters, the presence of structural grievances is not a
necessary condition for explaining foreign fighting. This dissertation’s findings instead illustrate
the importance of social processes and individual values in driving the foreign fighter
phenomenon.
In sum, this dissertation’s findings have theoretical implications for understanding the
transnational dimensions of collective action, for understanding the processes by which
individuals turn to radical ideologies, and for understanding the individual and social processes
of foreign fighting. The comparative findings demonstrate that becoming a foreign fighter is a
dynamic process that to understand requires considering how collective action is justified by
individuals within a certain social context. This dissertation argued that U.S. and Tunisian
foreign fighters both conformed to a similar process. These are individuals whose self-identities
have been linked with a collective identity that was steeped in shared sacred values that thus
provided all group members with a similar desire to become foreign fighters when those values
were under threat. Social network organizations were not only influential in recruiting likeminded individuals to such groups in both cases, but findings also show that these organizations
were instrumental in helping coordinate every aspect of a fighter’s travel to a foreign conflict
zone. The next section discusses some of the policy implications of these findings before
concluding, in the final section, with some suggested avenues for future research.
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Policy Implications
The dissertation has numerous policy implications. First, this dissertation offers the first
in-depth, individual-level analysis of the foreign fighter phenomenon, which the U.S. continues
to confront in a variety of conflicts throughout the globe, including three conflicts that are critical
for U.S. national security: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Second, this dissertation explores the
competing factors that motivate foreign fighters, which, if past is prologue, will help scholars
and policymakers confront the foreign fighter challenges of tomorrow including developing
methods for preventing radicalization and foreign travel. Finally, the dissertation is timely in that
the dilemma posed by the thousands of foreign fighter returnees from Iraq and Syria are invoking
a global policy debate regarding how to treat these individuals who potentially threaten the peace
and security of disparate countries across the globe. Understanding their motivations for leaving
can help inform policies for confronting their inevitable return and can provide avenues for
future reintegration policies.
An important assumption of the foreign fighter literature is that effectively (i.e.,
peacefully) reintegrating foreign fighter returnees as productive members of society requires
understanding the reasons why they left in the first place. But practically confronting the foreign
fighter phenomenon and the returnee challenge requires coordination and cooperation between
not just experts (policymakers and academics) but with other members of civil society,
governments, and organizations that exist across different countries all over the world. For
example, when looking at the case of Tunisia, it is estimated that at least 600 of Tunisia’s foreign
fighters, or approximately 20% of the total 3,000 who have fought for ISIS, have returned home
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to Tunisia (Zelin 2018). While the returnee challenge has global ramifications, members of
Tunisia’s security establishment told me they have been particularly concerned with those who
may attempt to return to Tunisia clandestinely with the intent of undertaking terrorist attacks.
Indeed, Tunisian and U.S. policymakers have argued that Tunisian foreign fighters, whether
those who have left to fight abroad, or those who have returned, constitute the heart of a growing
Tunisian national security challenge, with important implications for the Tunisian economy (i.e.,
terrorist attacks have gravely affected the tourism industry), regional security along Tunisia’s
western and southeastern borders, and the country’s still-fragile transition to democracy.
There are lessons for Tunisia that can be learned from the U.S. foreign fighters who
fought for the International Brigades and later returned home. Veteran U.S. foreign fighters were
treated by the FBI as a security risk and the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
organization was put on the General’s List of Subversive Organizations (Hochschild 2016).
Veteran U.S. foreign fighters were also denied military promotions while serving in WWII and
were barred from government jobs out of fear that communists could rise to prominent ranks in
the U.S. government (Carroll 1994). Many veterans were denied housing, refused passports, and
as mentioned in Chapter Four, were forced to change their names to avoid further persecution.
Regarding the returnee challenge posed by the dissolution of ISIS, international stakeholders are
calling for a commitment to peaceful reintegration strategies, so as not to further fuel violent
extremism (UNSC 2015). Many Tunisian state (e.g., Tunisian politicians) and non-state (e.g.,
Tunisian human rights groups) actors that I interviewed for this dissertation are already working
to establish programs to help convicted foreign fighter returnees navigate the process of
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becoming active and engaged citizens of the country. These actors need to consider counterradicalization strategies that focus on the ideological aspect of their original motivation, as well
as the social aspect that helped influence their decision to fight abroad.
The contemporary case of Tunisia analyzed for this dissertation does not represent the
most extreme example of the security challenge posed by the foreign fighter phenomenon. In
September 2014, three months after ISIS declared its Caliphate, U.S. Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper admitted that the U.S. had radically underestimated ISIS’ “will to
fight” while drastically overestimating that of the Iraqi army (Payne 2014). Then House speaker,
John Boehner called ISIS fighters “barbarians,” and said “They intend to kill us. And if we don’t
[sic] destroy them first, we’re going to pay the price.” But the ISIS “army” was outnumbered
forty to one and the Iraqi army had training and military equipment from U.S. special forces.
ISIS was fighting wars on two fronts, in Iraq and Syria, and most of its new recruits had never
held a gun. ISIS and its large army of foreign fighters seemingly defied strategic calculations that
assumed that the better equipped, better trained, and better staffed armies would easily quell the
spread of ISIS. The problem was that traditional military calculation does not factor in an
enemy’s willingness to die for values that they hold as sacred and for their ideological comrades
especially when those individuals feel those values and groups are threatened by a recognized
enemy.
Even as the power of ISIS dwindles in Iraq and Syria and the organization poses less of a
traditional military threat, the world has seen the security dilemma posed by foreign fighters
fleeing the conflict zones of Iraq and Syria to countries across the globe, most notably to the
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MENA region but also to Europe (Syrian-trained fighters were responsible for a series of attacks
in Europe in 2015, notably the attacks in Paris and Brussels), Asia, and even North America.
Thus, developing a collaborative strategy to confront the foreign fighter phenomenon requires
working with strategic partners across the globe at different levels of society, including with
governments, civil society organizations, and individuals, to stop foreign fighting. An underlying
assumption of this dissertation is that any attempt at stemming the flow of foreign fighters to any
conflict must start with exploring the competing factors that motivate foreign fighters in the first
place. The findings from this dissertation provide a framework for understanding the disparate
motivations of foreign fighters that can therefore help inform broad, international policy
initiatives.
Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research
The methodology adopted for this dissertation can be utilized to expand the scope of
analysis to other cases of foreign fighting. It also provided new comparative data from one
historic and one contemporary case of foreign fighting and proposed a new theoretical
framework for understanding the process by which individuals take the extraordinary risk of
traveling abroad to take part, and potentially die, in another country’s conflict. The dissertation
therefore makes a significant contribution to the literature in that it provides a new and highly
original theoretical and methodological benchmark for exploring the foreign fighter phenomenon
in more than 90 conflicts during the last two centuries, including numerous contemporary
conflicts with a foreign fighter dimension. By analyzing the competing motivations of foreign
fighters from the two most significant foreign fighter mobilizations in history, U.S. foreign
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fighters in the Spanish Civil War and Tunisian foreign fighters in the Syrian Civil War, the
dissertation further provided the first individual-level analysis of the foreign fighter phenomenon
and thus has implications for academics who study collective action and violent conflict.
The dissertation has numerous scholarly implications and has the potential to foster peernetworks of experts, practitioners, and scholars from different countries and backgrounds who
could all be working, in their respective conflict contexts, to understand and confront the issue of
foreign fighting. But data, theories, and methods to study foreign fighting must constantly
improve, and there are numerous areas where researchers from different backgrounds can
contribute to the cumulative knowledge of the foreign fighter phenomenon. By way of
concluding this dissertation, I provide two areas that I believe are ripest for future research.
The most significant findings from this dissertation involve the social processes of the
foreign fighter phenomenon. One variable in particular, social networks, acted as a necessary
factor driving both the U.S. and Tunisian foreign fighters. This is an area that is ripe for future
research. In both cases, it was networks that predated the foreign conflict that were important. Is
it possible to predict what type of social network is most susceptible to this type of contentious
collective action? One way to further investigate the role of social networks is to code historical
social network data from disparate civil conflicts that also contained a foreign fighter dimension.
Historical cases can be fruitful in this regard, as the archival data available on U.S. foreign
fighters provided an opportunity for more in-depth, genealogical research that helped identify
several organizational connections among foreign fighters.
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One obvious question to consider is whether social networks played a significant role in
other foreign fighter contexts? For example, do social networks remain significant when looking
at conflicts that are not categorized in the typology detailed in Chapter One as conflicts
associated with true believers? Again, historical case studies with ample historical and archival
data can help answer these questions. Chapter One highlighted several historical civil conflicts
that had a foreign fighter dimension. Collecting and analyzing social network data on such cases
will allow for additional comparative studies and even the potential for large-N, statistical
analysis if enough cases can be coded.
One of the primary obstacles to future research on foreign fighters is the availability of
contemporary, individual-level data. Therefore, the second area that is ripe for future research is
for scholars to locate and code individual-level data for other cases of foreign fighting to see if
the hypotheses tested for this dissertation hold up. One finding that warrants future research in
this regard is the finding related to religious sacred values in the case of Tunisian foreign
fighters. As was previously discussed, individuals with seemingly low levels of religious
knowledge were susceptible to the ISIS ideology. Is this finding applicable to other conflicts and
foreign fighter cohorts with an Islamic dimension? What about foreign conflicts with a definitive
Christian or Jewish dimension, such as the Israeli War of Independence (1948 – 1949)? Do we
need to reconceptualize religion as ideology, or do we only need to reconsider the religious
dimensions of ISIS’ Prophetic methodology? An excellent comparative case study would be to
compare similar individual-level data from the Iraq War (2003 – 2011), where foreign fighter
veterans are still potentially available to interview. Though it is estimated that only 6,000 foreign
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fighters participated in the Iraq War on the side of Islamists, it would be valuable to investigate
whether, and to what extent, religion played a motivating role, considering that Islamist foreign
fighters in that conflict were fighting U.S. coalition forces in Iraq.

APPENDIX A.
ARCHIVAL RESEARCH CHECKLIST
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Individual’s Name: _______________________ Source Type: ______________________
SOURCE LEGEND
D = Diary
L = Letter
A = Autobiography

I = Interview
P = Speech of Public Statement
B = Biography or Secondary Source

FACTORS THAT MOTIVATED WHY THE PERSON
DECIDED TO BECOME A FOREIGN FIGHTER
ECONOMIC INCENTIVE REFERENCED? (when a foreign fighter is motivated by
personal economic gain such as a direct payment or job)
 The foreign fighter referenced an economic reason for joining
Types of economic incentives (check all that apply):
o Direct monetary payment
o Promise of future monetary rewards
o Potential to loot goods/resources (for example: gold, diamonds, antiquities)
o Employment
o Promise of future employment
o Additional economic incentive (write in): _______________________________
 Other details:
________________________________________________________________________
SACRED VALUE REFERENCED? (when a foreign fighter is motivated by a higher moral
or ideological value that they consider to be of great importance)
 The foreign fighter referenced a sacred value
Types of sacred value (check all that apply):
o Political, economic, or social equality
o Democratic socialism
o Democracy
o Secularism
o Communism
o Global communist revolution
o Anarchism
o Feminism
o Worker’s rights
o Anti-fascism
o Anti-capitalism
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o Civil rights
o Establish Communist state
o Establish socialist/left laws
o Additional sacred value (write in): _____________________________________
 The foreign fighter expressed willingness to die for the value
 Other details:
________________________________________________________________________
PERSONAL VICTIMIZATION REFERENCED? (when a foreign fighter is motivated by
perceived mistreatment of self)
 The foreign fighter referenced a personal victimization (a perceived mistreatment of self)
Types of personal victimization (check all that apply):
o Humiliation
o Loss of a friend or loved one
o Victim of injustice
o Victim of violence
o Feeling of alienation
o Additional personal victimization (write in): ______________________________
 Other details:
________________________________________________________________________
STRUCTURAL GRIEVANCE REFERENCED (when a foreign fighter is motivated by
perceived injustices at the country-level)
 The foreign fighter referenced a structural grievance
Types of structural grievance (check all that apply):
o Economic inequality
o Political inequality
o Religious inequality
o Ethnic inequality
o Racial inequality
o Gender inequality
o Mass unemployment
o Lack of meaningful opportunities
o Mass poverty
o Authoritarianism
o Political repression
o Religious repression
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o Legal repression
o Lack of access to education
o Foreign interference in my country
o Additional structural grievance (write in): _______________________________
 Other details:
________________________________________________________________________
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY GROUP REFERENCED? (when a foreign fighter is motivated
by an expressed shared orientation with others and acts on that basis)
Type of collective identity (check all that apply)
 The foreign fighter expressed a sense of connection to fellow Communists and the global
Communist community
 The foreign fighter expressed a sense of collective duty
 The foreign fighter expressed a sense of connection to fellow foreign fighters in Spain
 The foreign fighter expressed a sense of connection to another group (write in):
________________________________________________________________________
 Other details:
________________________________________________________________________
SOCIAL NETWORK REFERENCED? (when a foreign fighter is motivated by a concrete
relationship with another foreign fighter, recruiter, or member)
Types of social network (check all that apply)
 The foreign fighter joined alone
 The foreign fighter was abducted
 The foreign fighter knew someone else that had joined the war effort
 The foreign fighter referenced a friend or family member that were already in the war or
that they joined the war effort with
 The foreign fighter referenced political group or meeting as a primary location where
planning, recruitment, or travel to Spain was discussed or organized
 The foreign fighter referenced an additional concrete relationship or multiple other
relationships
 What other relationships were referenced? Describe the relationship(s):
________________________________________________________________________
 Other details:
________________________________________________________________________
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GLORY OR HEROISM REFERENCED? (when a foreign fighter is motivated by the
desire to bolster their status and be seen as a hero)
 The foreign fighter referenced glory or heroism as a reason for joining
 Other details:
_____________________________________________________________________
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